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ABSTRACT
EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
February, 1978
Stewart Philip Shapiro, B.A., S.U.N.Y. at Binghamton
M.A., S.U.N.Y. at Binghamton
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Jerome King
This study seeks to examine the likelihood of full
equality of opportunity ever being attained within the
United States and the role that the image of equality of
opportunity plays in contemporary American society.
Most examinations of equality of opportunity in America
begin with two fundamental assumptions. First, it is taken
for granted that existing social, political and economic ar-
rangements are as close to an ideal arrangement as one is
likely to find in the world today. While some reforms may
be desirable for various specific aspects of the system, on
the whole the system is regarded as sound. Second, it is
assumed that equality of opportunity is, in itself, a highly
desirable goal. The purpose of this study is to explore more
fully these assumptions with the object of discovering
whether such a goal can and/or should be attained within
the contemporary American context.
Through an investigation of the concept of equality
and the various social barriers to equality of opportunity,
v
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the study finds that full equality of opportunity is im-
possible in any context. However, it is possible to more
closely approximate this goal in a less stratified setting
than currently exists in the United States. Factors such
as the family, the hierarchical division of labor, and
large differentials in wealth are all found to have signif-
icant negative effects upon equality of opportunity, while
genetic elements are found to be of little importance.
The desirability of pushing for equality of opportun-
ity while accepting existing social, political and economic
arrangements is discussed in a case study of American educa-
tion policy. The study contends that the image of equality
of opportunity, particularly in education, best serves the
interests of those deriving the most benefits from the
status quo by providing a rationale both for their own
position and for the positions of those below them in the
class hierarchy.
The study concludes that equality of opportunity is
impossible even to approximate in a stratified society. The
myth that it has or can be realized within that context
serves important stabilizing purposes. Therefore, a closer
approximation to equality of opportunity requires not dif-
ferent and more "fair" processes, but rather, alternative
contexts. In this regard, the notions of moral incentives
and limits to growth are discussed—the former as a potential
alternative to and the latter as a potential check on the
prevailing notions of equality of opportunity.
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INTRODUCTION
Equality of opportunity has long been an underlying
principle of the American political, social and economic
systems. Throughout American history, and, to a large
extent, throughout much of modern European history, the
concept of equality of opportunity has enjoyed a highly
privileged status. We rarely find a Western government
that does not make claim to being well on its way to
achieving equality of opportunity for its citizens; nor an
opposition party that does not promise a more effective
means for achieving that goal; nor an individual who will
openly disclaim any desire for the achievement of equality
of opportunity. Those conflicts that do emerge regarding
equality of opportunity generally involve the related issues
of whether it does exist in a particular society and, if
not, how it may most effectively be attained. Therefore,
as we view modern Western history, particularly since the
advent of the modern industrialized capitalist state, we
repeatedly see, especially in various reformist and revolu-
tionary groups, support for the proposition that equality
of opportunity is the sine qua non of the "good society."
The virtually sacrosant status that equality of op-
portunity has retained has led to an unquestioning accept-
ance of both its desirability and its attainability with
little, if any, regard for some of its real or potential
Xnegative effects. One of the purposes of this dissertation
will be the exploration of such effects which have, parti-
cularly in the United States, largely been ignored. An
attempt will be made to explore in some depth what is in-
volved in eguality of opportunity, what are the implications
inherent in the concept as a goal, whether its full develop-
ment is a conceivable possibility, and how the inevitable
societal costs and benefits would likely be distributed if
it were fully attained. In addition, the issue of a viable
alternative to current notions of eguality of opportunity
will also be discussed.
The privileged status of eguality of opportunity in
contemporary democratic political thinking can be traced to
two specific factors. On the one hand, there is its literal
connection with the concept of eguality. For centuries, the
term "eguality" has had a generally favorable connotation in
Western political thought. The notion that all persons
possess egual rights and duties, and deserve a relatively
egual share in the benefits and burdens of society has,
particularly among democratic theorists, long been a cherish-
ed belief. Even among those who strongly oppose an emphasis
on eguality as a major societal goal, or who believe that
such a goal is impossible to achieve, there is a felt neces-
sity to give some justification for a negative stance,
rather than mere rejection out of hand. Reasons are general-
ly reguired of, and offered by, those who oppose any degree
of egalitarianism in their societal prescriptions. Thus, we
xi
find few modern political philosophers who would position
themselves against all notions of equality - be it of
rights, opportunity, or results. Given the positive status
of the concept of equality, it is not surprising that the
concept of equality of opportunity should share some of
this positive status, although the connection between
equality as it relates to egalitarianism and equality as
it relates to the contemporary version of equality of
opportunity is antithetical.
The second factor which has had a strong influence in
producing the generally positive position of equality of
opportunity has been the ease with which the concept has
fit the prevailing capitalist economic systems of Western
Europe and the United States. If, as Marx maintains, the
prevailing ideology of a particular epoch is part of a
superstructure erected upon an economic base, then it would
be virtually impossible for a political concept like equality
of opportunity to gain such acceptance, at least verbally,
if it did not fit the prevailing system of production. In
fact, equality of opportunity serves as an ideological
underpinning for the economic structure, an underpinning
which is functional both by enabling those "best equipped"
to manage the system in terms of preserving its highly
individualistic nature to do so, and by presenting to the
society as a whole an image which combines two of its more
cherished notions—equality and merit.
Given these bases for the prevailing system's
xii
acceptance of equality of opportunity as a worthwhile goal,
it would seem that a detailed exploration of the concept
might serve the purpose of redirecting the main thrust of
various groups and individuals seeking to alter existing
social structures. If, as I will argue, equality of oppor-
tunity, as it currently exists, serves to strengthen the
existing order, then those groups whose overall goal is a
restructuring of society in a more egalitarian direction
by gaining "more" of such equality of opportunity, have
erred in their strategy. As already suggested, most such
programs tend to make more viable and stable the existing
structures of society. Such strategies do not serve as
effective radical challenges, except in relation to those
elements of society which are, in a sense, out of place and
time in a modern capitalist state.
The connection between the image of equality of oppor-
tunity and social stability is a fundamental theme in this
dissertation. The competition, need, and desire for in-
creased material acquisitions, and the strongly individual-
istic nature which this image produces and reproduces are
essential ingredients in systemic stability. The notion of
a free market and individual rights which is so much a part
of liberal capitalism obviously cannot be accommodated in a
formally ascriptive society. A system which prides itself
on persons "making it," based upon their own individual merit,
must take care to ensure that at least the image, if not the
reality, of equality of opportunity exists in the society in
xiii
the political, social and economic spheres.
What is generally meant by the concept of equality
of opportunity is, in part, the image of life as a race.
The idea that each person is allowed to start from the same
point and can be assured that the other contestants will be
bound by the same rules describes in somewhat simplified
terms a basic conception of equality of opportunity. How-
ever, to adequately probe the concept it is necessary to
view it in more detail. A more adequate approach would be
to say that a society has equality of opportunity if
Each individual has equal access to a range
of specified resources which will enable him
to pursue certain goals.
1
In viewing equality of opportunity in this manner, we
must attempt to specify the relevant resources, the relevant
goals, and the rewards which are, or should be, attached to
the achievement of such goals. To rephrase, if equality of
opportunity involves all starting at approximately the same
point, with some eventually "winning" and other eventually
"losing," it must first be explained just what resources have
been, or are to be, equitably distributed so as to allow all
to start at the same point. It is obviously an impossibility
to expect that all resources will be distributed equitably
prior to the commencement of the race. Some resources are
impossible to distribute equally, such as various physical
characteristics including height, sex, etc.; while others
1 For this definition I am grateful to Professor William
E. Connolly of the University of Massachusetts.
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might be deemed irrelevant for a particular race and there-
fore would not need to be distributed on an equal basis.
Having specified what resources are to be distributed,
we must next deal with the goals involved in the race.
While it is clear that the goal of most contestants in a
race is to win, the question of what in particular they are
endeavoring to gain from such a victory requires some clari-
fication. Prestige, power, wealth and personal self-esteem
are some of the more obvious general goals derived from the
winning of various races. In the contemporary American con-
text of equality of opportunity, the case has been made that
all of the above are involved in the goal of upward social
and occupational mobility. Another view holds that American
society, being a system which does not have cumulative in-
equalities, has varied goals with different races being won
by different contestants. As is the case with resources, a
number of questions arise regarding goals. For example, how
are goals determined, what constitutes a proper reward, and
how does one deal with the problem of "right" and "wrong"
goals? The point here is that the goals and subsequent re-
wards involved in the various races must be clearly specified
Once a society has been established, or appears to have
been established, on the principle of equality of opportunity
a pervasive view develops that those who come out on "top" in
society have done so by virtue of their own worth and effort.
Similarly, those who do not win the races have only them-
selves to blame. Society, and particularly the societal
XV
class structure, are absolved of any responsibility. Society
thus becomes, in a sense, "classless," although such a view
involves a fairly narrow definition of what is meant by a
class structure.
Essential to a meaningful exploration of the concept
of equality of opportunity is a prior analysis of the con-
cept of equality. Such a conceptual analysis is undertaken
in Chapter I. The relevance of a discussion of equality in
relation to equality of opportunity is that implicit in the
American notion of equality of opportunity is the belief
that, in one or more highly significant and socially relevant
attributes, all men are not equal; and that, in addition, an
egalitarian society, in either its purest form or in its
modified Marxist form, is neither desirable nor possible.
Therefore, it is likely that the adherent to the goal of
equality of opportunity within a capitalist context has pre-
cluded both the possibility of men already being equal and
of their ever becoming equal.
Following this chapter, I discuss the guestion of the
desirability of equality of opportunity, particularly in the
context of the American economic and political system. There
have been a number of criticisms leveled against setting up
equality of opportunity as a goal. Some critics have focused
on the inherently inegalitarian results of equality of oppor-
tunity, while others have emphasized the need for certain
social and economic preconditions being met prior to the
achievement of equality of opportunity. Most critics
argue
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against meritocracy advocates like Daniel Bell by citing the
potential costs of equality of opportunity. Such costs in-
clude damage to a sense of community, an overly competitive
atmosphere, frustration and a lack of self-respect on the
part of the "losers," and, in a sense, the eventual and in-
evitable loss of real equality of opportunity - either by
creating a sort of genetic "caste" system, or by the in-
equality of results which, in turn, inevitably lead to in-
equality of opportunity.
In Chapter III, I explore the possibility of attaining
equality of opportunity. Such a possibility must be regard-
ed as, at best, highly unlikely. The problem of providing
equal access to the various resources required to win a
particular race runs into a number of seemingly insoluble
difficulties. For example, to use the race analogy, we
might be able to get a certain degree of equity in terms of
some material conditions of the race, such as each lane of
the track being equally level and with the same degree of
hardness. However, this does not bring about equality of
opportunity if some of the contestants have had more experi-
ence in the use of such a track. To this problem we might
respond by calling for a training program for those who have
not had adequate racing experience so that they too can pick
up an appreciation of the rules and techniques, and thus
help to further equalize their opportunity to win the race.
The critic might go a step further and point to the con-
testants themselves. We might find, indeed we would
XVI
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inevitably find, that some are more physically fit than
others. Even with training in the rules and techniques of
racing, an overweight contestant who chain smokes is un-
likely to run much of a race against the more fit. Perhaps
we could argue that equality of opportunity involves equal
access to resources, not necessarily an equality in terms
of ownership or distribution of resources. Thus, there is
no responsibility by those conducting the race to interfere
in the lives of others to see to it that they are physically
able to compete properly. Their only responsibility is to
ensure that the contestants have equal access to the re-
sources and not to enter into the contestants' private lives
outside of the race.
The problem with this latter argument is the highly
individualistic assumption implicit within it. The pre-
sumption of a sharp dividing line between internal and
external spheres of activity is very debatable. If, for
example, it is not the responsibility of the conductors of
the race to see to it that all contestants are equally pre-
pared for the race, the question remains as to who, if any-
one, is responsible. For example, if the unfit contestant
was raised by a family lacking either the knowledge or the
income to give him a healthy diet, we might blame the parents
or perhaps the societal structure, but we can hardly affix
responsibility to the child for his environment and resulting
lack of access to various crucial resources. Therefore,
equality of opportunity does not exist under such circum-
stances .
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This argument can be drawn a step further. Not only
might it be impossible for total equality of opportunity to
exist with regard to the ability to run the race, but also
the question of willingness to run the race must be taken
into account. it is illogical to expect that all contest-
ants will have the same desire to win such a race, or even
to compete in it. If such is the case, then this inequality
of desire would certainly entail a lessened probability of
their winning the race. if such a desire is part of the
resources involved in a race, then the problem of how to
induce a relatively equal desire to achieve various goals
is an integral part of creating equality of opportunity.
While it may be argued that the willingness or desire to
enter the competition is not a part of the resources to be
made equally accessible to all, but instead is part of the
individual's "will," this still leaves open the question as
to how such a will is formed and what responsibility society
has in its formation. If this aspect is to be categorized
as an element of the resources involved, then to arrive at
true equality of opportunity would, of necessity, involve
the virtually impossible task of seeing to it that the moti-
vation and determination of all potential contestants was
equal
.
The problem of genetic factors and their relationship
to the possibility of attaining full equality of opportunity
will be explored in Chapter IV, with particular reference to
the positions of Arthur Jensen and Richard Herrnstein. They
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arrive at highly critical conclusions regarding the possi-
bility of setting up full equality of opportunity and
further claim that attempts to gain "more" equality of
opportunity will be harmful to the status and self-esteem
of those with the least genetic potential.
As an illustration of the uses to which the image of
equality of opportunity has been put in the United States,
I present, in Chapter V, a case study of American education-
al policy. In this chapter I analyze the "success" of
equality of opportunity in American education policy with
particular reference to those who have been the strongest
proponents of equality of educational opportunity; what
benefits, if any, have accrued to the various groups in-
volved; and what problems have emerged from such programs.
The basic theme of this dissertation as a whole, that
equality of opportunity has primarily been used as an
ideological cover for an inegalitarian system, will be
analyzed in this specific context of education policy.
Furthermore, I will argue that attempts to attain equality
of opportunity within such an inegalitarian context are
based upon a fraudulent notion of what equality of oppor-
tunity requires in the way of social and economic precondi-
tions .
In the final chapter I deal with alternatives to the
contemporary notion of equality of opportunity as well as
some of the criticisms directed against these alternatives.
Problems such as reconciling the goal of a free and efficient
XX
society in which the most qualified persons fin the most
crucial positions with the goal of what Bernard Williams
refers to as "equality of respect"2 will be discussed. By
equality of respect I mean the ideal of treating others as
ends in themselves rather than as means to an end. It may
well be that there is an insuperable contradiction between
the goal of equality of opportunity and the goal of equality
of respect. Or, it may be that given a different social and
economic context, the costs of equality of opportunity could
be substantially reduced while equality of opportunity it-
self could be more closely approximated. Finally I discuss
some of the more viable alternatives to the contemporary
American notion of equality of opportunity, such as a system
of moral incentives and a generally more egalitarian context.
The latter is crucial for, as I will show, equality of
opportunity without an egalitarian society is impossible.
2Bernard Williams, "The Idea of Equality," in Philosophy,
Politics and Society , Second Series (Oxford: Basil Black-
well, Inc., 1969), pp. 118-119.
CHAPTER I
THE CONCEPT OF EQUALITY
Traditionally, Americans have tended to view equality
of opportunity as one of the foundations of a just and demo-
cratic society. While a great deal of lip service has been
paid to the essential equality of man and the value of
equality in various contexts, Americans have tended to
place most emphasis upon equality of opportunity. Nor is
this tendency prevalent only in the United States. The
modern capitalist states of Western Europe have also
adopted the ethic of equality of opportunity, though be-
cause of a less pervasive and consistent bourgeoise tradi-
tion, the European attachment to equality of opportunity is
neither as emotional nor as comprehensive as that of the
United States.
Because of the strength of support for the goal of
equality of opportunity in the United States, there has
been substantially less attention paid to other forms of
equality and particularly to egalitarianism. What attention
is paid to such concepts is generally of a negative
nature.
Visions of enforced conformity, drab and gray societies,
an end to individual initiative and incentive,
the death
of the arts, and subsequent stagnation and
dictatorship are
generally seen as the hallmarks of societies
having equality
2of treatment and equality of result at their ideological
foundation. Equality of opportunity, on the other hand,
is viewed as leading to the vibrant, dynamic, and diversi-
fied society of the free individual who, thanks to his own
ability and ambition, can realistically aspire to almost
anything. Given these dichotomous visions it is of little
wonder that the latter tends to be chosen over the former.
It is assumed that equality of wealth, respect, and/or
power is impossible and the attempt to make such goals
realizable can bring about only inefficiency, chaos, and
eventual collapse of the established political, economic
and social order.
Thus, equality of opportunity is seen as not only the
ideal form of equality, but also the only possible form of
equality consistent with the American liberal - capitalist
framework's view of human nature. Prior to examining why
this belief is so strongly held, it is necessary to deal
with two fundamental questions which logically precede it;
that is what is meant by the concept of equality, and what
is its relationship to equality of opportunity.
"Equality" and "Sameness"
When we state that two or more individuals or things
are "equal," the first and most obvious point to be clari-
fied concerns the context. That is, equal with respect to
what? For the present, the following schema will be used
to describe a relation of equality:
X is equal to Y with respect to Z.
Note, for the moment, that nothing in this schema specif-
ically deals with the issue of treatment of X and Y. The
crucial point of the schema is the "with respect to Z"
aspect. To leave this phrase out leads to a highly
ambiguous and perhaps even meaningless description. For
example, the Declaration of Independence states that "all
men are created equal . " If we are not aware of the con-
text implicit in that particular phrase, we are left with
little in the way of a useful or coherent statement.
Therefore, we must fill in the X, Y and Z. If we are
concerned with physical attributes, then this is a relative-
ly minor task. We may simply turn to the various reliable
measuring devices which accurately measure such charac-
teristics, and then determine whether X and Y are in fact
equal with respect to height, weight or whatever. In such
a comparison, "equal to" is used like the concept "same as."
Further, such measuring devices are not often subject to
attack on the grounds that they are biased in one way or
another
.
However, discussions of equality generally go beyond
such easily measurable attributes as height and weight.
Most usage of the concept "equality" centers around issues
of a more social nature. Even on questions relating to
athletic ability, physical attributes are combined with less
measurable factors such as desire, competiveness and intel-
ligence. Therefore, the need for establishing criteria for
"equal" inevitably arises.
We might claim that the criterion for equal is
"sameness" in the absolute sense of X being completely
identical to Y. The problem here is that since no two
persons are completely identical, this criterion effective-
ly eliminates virtually any accurate usage of the concept
of equality with respect to persons. 1 Neither "complete-
ly identical" nor "completely opposite" has any practical
meaning. Hence, it is very difficult to set up clear-cut
reference points for both equality and inequality. One
possible way to lessen this dilemma is to make equality a
comparative concept. The equality relationship now becomes
something like:
X is more similar to Y with respect to
Z than is A, B or C.
Again, however, the criterion problem arises over the
issue of those who are also similar to Y, but not as similar
as X. Apparently X would then be "more equal" to Y than A
is, while perhaps A is more similar than B and so on. There-
fore, depending upon context, A is both not equal to Y and
equal to Y. This kind of problem attains more importance if
a question of treatment or rights is being discussed. In
fact, when these types of problems are confronted by persons,
Isee, for example, Hugo Adam Bedau, "Egalitarianism and
the Idea of Equality," in Equality , ed. by Roland Pennock and
John W. Chapman (New York: Atherton Press, Inc., 1967), pp.
7-8. Bedau maintains that equality, particularly in terms of
treatment, distribution and rights, does imply the "same
treatment. He does not, however, regard "same" to mean
"identical .
"
5it is usually over some underlying question of treatment.
Questions relating to equality and who is equal to whom
are almost invariably connected to the issue of treatment.
This is why the establishment of criteria is such a crucial
issue and, as will be demonstrated, why the concept of equal-
ity cannot adequately be treated in isolation from the issue
of treatment.
Before dealing with the task of establishing a speci-
fic criterion, it is helpful to elaborate on the important
distinction between "same" and "equal" alluded to earlier.
If we take "same" to mean a relationship of identity, then
perhaps to differentiate "equal" from "same" we miqht
describe the former as a relationship in which there is
sufficient similarity so as to make it unnecessary to dis-
tinguish between them in a particular respect. While this
is a somewhat awkward sounding definition, it does serve two
important purposes. It makes a clear distinction between
"equal" and "identical," and perhaps more importantly, it
reveals the inseparable connection between "equals" and the
treatment accorded them. We can claim that X and Y are
similar with respect to Z, but that tells us little about
their subsequent treatment. We might also claim that X and
Y are the "same," but this runs into the various logical
problems described earlier. However, to describe X and Y
as "sufficiently" similar with respect to Z avoids both of
these problems. If they are sufficiently similar, there is
a definite implication that they should be treated similarly.
6The word "sufficiently" conveys this point.
The important distinction between "same" and "equal"
can perhaps be better understood by dealing with the analo-
gous concepts of "different" and "unequal." There is a sub-
stantial difference between, on the one hand, describing
apples as being different from oranges, or person X as
being different from person Y; and on the other hand,
describing apples and person X as respectively unequal to
oranges and person Y. The latter carries with it the clear
implication that in each of the contrasts, one is "better"
than the other in some respect. For example, we could say
that apples and oranges are different in sweetness. This,
by itself, carries with it neither implications of better
or worse, nor any prescriptions as to behavior. However,
if we rephrase the statement so that it reads,
The sweetness of the orange is un-
equal to the sweetness of the apple,
we then have, not merely a different arrangement of words,
but also a different meaning. There is the clear connota-
tion that the apple is superior to the orange insofar as
sweetness is concerned. Further implicit in the sentence
is the idea that if we are searching for sweetness, we
"should" select the apple instead of the orange. Thus,
unlike sentences utilizing the word "different," the con-
cept of "unequal" carries with it a clear behavioral impli-
cation.
Moving from objects to people, we can see a similar
situation. It is clear that all persons are in some ways
different from one another, just as they are somewhat
similar in other ways. To say that persons X and Y are
different from one another does not tell us anything in
terms of whether and how their treatment should differ.
But, to say that persons X and Y are "unequal" to each
other regarding some specific attributes does open up two
critical and related questions. First, what does this
inequality imply as relates to the relative superiority
and inferiority of X and Y? Second, what is the relation-
ship between the inequality of X to Y to the treatment which
should be accorded them?
As has been observed, to call X "unequal" to Y carries
with it the connotation that X is in some way inferior to Y,
a connotation which is not implicit in the notion of being
"different from." If this is the case, then it would appear
logical to say that if X and Y are unequal in intelligence,
then one of the two must be more intelligent; likewise if
X and Y are unequal in artistic ability, one of the two must
have more artistic ability; and if X and Y are unequal in
their ability to participate wisely in the governing of
society, then either X or Y must have more such ability.
In each of these cases, unegual has carried with it the im-
plication that one of the two subjects has "more" of a given
quality and is therefore "superior" as regards that specific
quality.
However, this kind of inference is not always correct.
8For example, we could be dealing with a person's height.
Suppose that X is seven feet tall and Y is five feet tall.
Under these circumstances it would appear to make sense to
say that X and Y are not egual in height. We could assert
that X has more height than Y, and go on to say that X is of
a superior height to Y. Yet, when we reflect upon the con-
notations implied in the concept of "superior," this does
not seem as valid a statement as the earlier examples. In
areas like intelligence, artistic ability and political
acumen, it is obvious that, under most circumstances, it is
better to have more of such qualities than less of them.
However, this is not so obvious with an attribute like
height. While most would probably agree that they would
not like to be extremely short, it is also unlikely that
very many persons could be found who would like to be ex-
tremely tall. Because of various aesthetic and social
standards, such preferences would be further influenced by
the sex of the respondent. In matters of height, "superior"
could refer to two very different standards of measurement.
On the one hand, to use an extreme example, if X is six
feet tall and Y is eight feet tall, then Y is superior by
virtue of having "more" height. On the other hand, if we
are measuring superiority in terms of which is more likely
to lead to a less difficult life in terms of financial and
social pressures, then perhaps X's height should be seen as
superior
.
The question thus arises as to whether it makes sense
9to speak of height comparisons in terms of unequal, since
there is this superiority - inferiority connotation implicit
in the use of the term. It might make far more sense to use
"different from" under such circumstances and avoid the
superiority - inferiority relationship altogether. Keeping
in mind that the concept of unequal did seem to fit with
attributes such as intelligence and artistic ability, we
might argue that "equal to" and "unequal to" should be used
only in comparing those attributes which are valued by
society. However, referring back to the example of height,
it is not that height is not valued so much as it is that
there is a parameter within which more height is valued and
beyond which more height is not valued.
We could also argue that what this discussion has dis-
proven is the assumption that "unequal to" has implicit with
in it a superiority - inferiority connotation. No such con-
notation exist and equal and unequal are "neutral" concepts.
If this argument is correct, then there is no distinction
that can be made between the concepts "unequal to" and
"different from." Yet such a distinction surely does exist
in our language. For example, to say that
I am unequal to this task,
carries with it a very different meaning than to say that
I am different from this task.
The latter makes little sense, while the former is easily
understood to mean that the task is beyond the ability of
the subject. In a sense, it is "superior" to him. We
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cannot simply eliminate this distinction and deny the various
implications which are such an integral part of the concepts
of "equal" and "unequal."
It might be that, in attempting to posit a rule govern-
ing the use of the concept unequal, we should simply make its
use contingent upon dealing with those attributes with which
one is attempting to make a superior - inferior comparison.
That is, in determining how we use the concept of unequal,
we should make reference to the purpose which such a con-
cept serves. The argument then is that the purpose served
by the concept "unequal to" is precisely to show that one
person, object or attribute is superior or inferior to an-
other. Use of the concept for any other purpose violates
the rules governing the use of the concept.
The concept of "equal" bears an analogous usage.
Making reference to the purpose which the concept serves in
ordinary discourse, to claim that X and Y are "equal with
respect to Z" is to say that they are sufficiently similar
to each other with respect to Z so that neither can be judged
superior or inferior to the other. They are not the "same"
but they also are not sufficiently different so as to be
judged unequal to one another. Given this usage, it becomes
clear that, depending upon the criteria, it is possible for
two individuals to be both different and equal with respect
to a specific attribute.
11
Equality of Treatment
If X is unequal (and therefore inferior) to Y with re-
qard to Z, what, if anything, does this imply for the re-
spective treatment of X and Y? Perhaps a better way to
examine this issue would be by first dealing with the issue
of what is implied regarding treatment if X is equal to Y
with regard to Z. A number of theorists have accepted the
idea that to claim that X and Y are equal sets up a prima
facie case for the equal treatment of X and Y. 2 Logic
would seem to dictate that if two individuals are seen as
equal, neither one inferior to the other, then in the ab-
sence of countervailing considerations, their treatment
should also be equal. This involves not only their being
treated equally by third parties, but also that they should
treat each other as equals.
3
A problem which immediately arises is the question of
unequal treatment. In a phrase like "all men are created
equal," it is important to clarify what is meant by such a
claim. Primarily it would seem to imply that all men, by
virtue of their being human beings, are equal to each other.
2 See Stanley I. Benn, "Egalitarianism and the Equal
Consideration of Interests," in Eguality , ed. by Pennock and
Chapman; Bernard Williams, "The Idea of Equality," and
Charles Frankel, "Equality of Opportunity," Ethics , LXXXI
(April, 1971).
3see the distinction made by John Wilson, Equality
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1966), pp.
27-29, between equality of treatment and equality of scope.
Further, that not only are they all human beings, but also
that they are all equally human beings. As a result, none
are superior or inferior and therefore all are entitled to
receive equal treatment. While this presents a concise
picture of the situation, it does leave a number of key
questions unanswered. For example, what is it that consti-
tutes a human being? This question brings to bear a number
of philosophical and biological considerations. Assuming
that such a question can be answered to the satisfaction of
all, there remains the problem of why, once such a criterion
for being a person has been established, this should entail
that all who fit into this category are entitled, prima
facie, to equality of treatment. Looking back to the crite-
rion established for equality, "sufficiently similar so as
to not be judged inferior or superior," it would seem al-
most illogical to treat any two humans unequally, since such
treatment does imply an inferiority - superiority relation-
ship. It is crucial to keep in mind the important distinct-
ion between equal - unequal and same - different. Given
this distinction, it becomes clear that by definition two
persons deemed equal in terms of certain characteristics
should also be treated equally in terms of those characteris-
tics. To do otherwise, without "good reasons," forces us
into an admission of arbitrary behavior which follows no
understandable rule and is therefore irrational. Unless we
want to posit irrationality as an acceptable mode of be-
havior, we are forced into a position of accepting the prima
13
facie case for equality of treatment of all human beings if
we accept the view that all persons are equally human.
Two exceptions might be made regarding such treat-
ment, m the first case, we might maintain that while all
are human beings, all are not equally human beings. Some
are perhaps "more" human than others, and therefore are
worthy of more favorable treatment. This kind of justifi-
cation for unequal treatment rests upon a substantial loosen-
ing of the criterion for humanness. It can be seen, for ex-
ample, in the categories of human types which classical
philosophers like Plato and Aristotle envisioned. The "born
slave," while still a human, neither is nor can be as much
or as developed a human as is the "born ruler." We could
also posit the idea that the "born slave" is actually more
of a human being while the "born ruler" is so designated be-
cause he is less prey to ordinary human weaknesses. In
neither case, however, are we maintaining that either category
of individual is completely outside of the human realm.
The issue regarding equality of treatment stems from
the proposition that all human beings are equal, or at least
born equal, in their humanness. This supposition is what has
created the prima facie case for equality of treatment. The
denial of the original supposition has an effect upon the
prima facie case. For example, if there is a large class
of beings called humans who share a number of characteristics,
though not in the same amount or proportion, and we claim
that they are more different than alike, it is not as easy
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to make the claim that all humans are equal and therefore
deserving of equal treatment. First it is necessary to
determine in what specific characteristics they are equal,
though perhaps also different, and then to determine if such
equalities are sufficient to justify equality of treatment.
The burden of proof now appears to be upon those calling
for equality of treatment. The prima facie case is against
such treatment. Yet, if we examine the argument more close-
ly, it appears that in fact, what is being offered here is a
countervailing consideration to offset the initial case for
equality of treatment. We are being forced to justify, via
reasons, a departure from equality of treatment. By virtue
of the fact that all are given the same classification,
"human,
"
we have already accepted a substantial degree of
equality among all fitting within that category.
In comparing this latter position with the position
preceeding it, we can view it as a question of whether it
is possible to distinguish between the following two claims:
a) All humans are not equal.
b) All humans are not equally human.
The first exception dealt with centers around state-
ment (b). From this we can derive a case denying that all
humans should be treated equally. In effect, it sets up
the case that in those attributes which distinguish the
species "human" from other species, it is possible to ob-
serve significant inequalities, not only between humans and
other species, but also among humans themselves. Further-
more, because such inequalities are regarded as significant
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in terms of superiority and inferiority within the species,
it makes sense neither to speak of all human beings as
equals nor to assert that they should all be treated equal-
ly. What does make sense, given this type of argument, is
to maintain that those groups of humans who are equally
human, be they at the top, middle or bottom of the scale,
should be treated equally as a class.
Statement (a), on the other hand, appears to be a more
direct and conclusive assertion. The problem with such an
assertion is that it is incomplete in the same way that
statements claiming that all human beings are equal is in-
complete. To refer back to the schema for equality advanced
earlier, statement (a) does not specify in what respect all
humans are not equal. Statement (b) does, though somewhat
vaguely, by asserting that all humans are not equal with
respect to those attributes comprising "humanness." If the
assertion that all humans are not equal is to make sense it
must be completed. To leave it as it is makes it impossible
to argue either for or against it. Given the infinite number
of characteristics which different human beings possess, we
can always point to an example of equality or inequality
among men depending upon our preference.
Suppose that we do complete the statement in such a way
that it reads:
All humans are not equal in those
characteristics which are import-
ant for determining treatment.
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Clumsiness of the statement aside, and ignoring, for now, the
question of treatment with regard to what, this is, what is
implicit in statement (a).
Assuming that this is the case, the distinction be-
tween statements (a) and (b) is that the criterion for being
considered a human being is more crucial in statement (b).
Statement (a) can admit that all humans are equally human.
It bases its case for unequal treatment on criteria which
rest outside of the standards that constitute humanness
.
The idea of a prima facie case for eguality of treatment
may still be present, but now we have attached a counter-
vailing reason for overcoming it. if,
a) All men are human, but
b) All men are not equally human,
then it is clear that the second statement cuts away at the
basis for equality of treatment and in fact more logically
leads to a prima facie case against such equality of treat-
ment .
On the other hand, we can claim that:
c) All men are human.
d) All men are egually human.
e) All humans are not equal in those
characteristics which are import-
ant for determining treatment.
The latter statement has presented a case against equality
of treatment. In other words, the prima facie case that is
set up by statements (c) and (d) is overriden by statement
(e).
The logic of this prima facie case has been criticized
by various writers. J. R. Lucas, for example, makes the
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point that some egalitarians (though he implies that it's
inherent in egalitarianism itself) set up a false schema to
justify equality of treatment. According to Lucas, the
egalitarian position can be viewed as follows:
a) All men are men
b) All men are equally men
c) Therefore all men are equal.
Against this position Lucas draws the following analogy.
a' ) All numbers are numbers
b' ) All numbers are equally numbers
c' ) Therefore, all numbers are equal.
Because, according to Lucas, (c' ) is so demonstrably false,
Lucas's conclusion is that the fact that men are equal in
some respects does not necessarily imply that they are equal
in all respects.
4
However, few egalitarians maintain that people are to
be considered equal in all respects. In the first place, the
claim that is derived from the schema is that a prima facie
case has been made in favor of equality of treatment, not
that such treatment is always required. Second, there are
some problems with the analogy that Lucas uses to make his
point. Since statement (c) is an incomplete version of an
egalitarian position insofar as it does not indicate with
respect to what all men are equal, Lucas has set up a highly
vulnerable straw man to attack. If Lucas had completed
statement (c) so that it read, "Therefore a prima facie
case exists for treating all men as equals," which is closer
4j. R. Lucas, "Against Equality," Philosophy , XL
(October, 1965), 297-298.
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to an egalitarian position, though still somewhat over-
generalized, then the weakness of the analogy becomes ap-
parent. Statement (c«), to remain parallel with (c) would
then have to read, "Therefore a prima facie case exists for
treating all numbers as eguals." This latter statement con-
ceivably could be regarded as correct in the sense that
classifying X as a number brings in considerations of
treatment relevant to all numbers and therefore a prima
facie case for treating all numbers as eguals does exist.
However, this is not the critical objection to be made to
the Lucas analogy.
The crux of the matter is that it is not consistent
with the conventions of our language to speak of "treatment"
of numbers in the same sense that we speak of treatment of
human beings. Numbers are abstractions and their treatment
has little in the way of conseguences for the number itself.
We could never argue that a person treated a number in an
"unjust" manner, nor would we ever bother to argue for or
against treating all numbers with the same degree of "re-
spect." "Correctly" and "incorrectly" are the sorts of terms
ordinarily used to evaluate the use of numbers. Numbers can
only represent other things and as such the treatment of the
numbers themselves is of little import. Thus, the step from
(a 1 ) and (b' ) to (c') is not a legitimate step, but this has
more to do with the weakness of the analogy that Lucas draws
rather than with any specific logical inconsistency inherent
in such a move. Finally, Lucas has also failed to make any
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distinction between "equal" and "same." Two persons can be
equals without at the same time beinq the same. For numbers
such a distinction does not exist.
Assuminq that we do accept the notion of a prima facie
case for equality of treatment, this by itself does little
to quarantee such treatment. Like any other prima facie
case, it can act only as a startinq point. We may qet around
it if we are willinq and able to qive reasons for doinq so.
It is over the issue of what constitutes a sufficient reason
or reasons for overridinq the prima facie case that much of
the controversy over equality of treatment arises. We can
accept the idea that:
X and Y are human
X and Y are equally human
and still assert that X and Y are not equal with respect to
some other attribute and therefore should not be treated as
equals. The "humanness" of X and Y is not a quantifiable
attribute. They are both human to the same extent, as are,
we miqht arque, all persons. But, treatment for X and Y
miqht be determined accordinq to some other criteria by
which X and Y are not equal. The fact that they are both
human says nothinq about how they should be treated. Or,
we could maintain that their common humanity entitles X
and Y only to a minimal amount of consideration, but that
much of the rest of their treatment involves very different
criteria. This appears to constitute the basis for the
proponent of meritocracy. The position is:
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a) X and Y are equal with respect to.Z
( being human)
.
b) X and Y are not equal with respect
to Z' (eg. physical strength).
c) Z' is more important in terms of
certain kinds of treatment than is
Z.
d) X and Y should not be treated equally
in those areas relevant to Z' .
It is important to note that in making such an argument,
it is not necessary to maintain that X and Y are not equal in
terms of their being human. Such an assertion would under-
mine the prima facie case argument. 5 Rather, we can argue
that some other attribute or attributes is more relevant in
terms of treatment than is their common humanity. In a sense,
all people make this distinction when they select their
friends. We do not need to deny the humanity of those with
whom we are not friendly. Instead, we select some other set
of characteristics as being more important in terms of friend-
ship. In this connection, it is more important to determine
not only what reasons we are willing to substitute for the
prima facie case for equality of treatment, but it is also
crucial that we establish just what is meant by "equality of
treatment." How far does it go and what does it entail?
Sufficient and Insufficient Reasons
What sort of reasons can be regarded as sufficient to
override the prima facie case for equality of treatment? As
5a detailed treatment of this distinction between under-
mining and overriding may be found in Charles Taylor, "Neu-
trality and Political Science," in Social Structure and
Political Theory , ed. by William E. Connolly and Glen Gordon
(Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company, 1974), pp. 28-29.
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Charles Taylor points out in his essay, "Neutrality in
Political Science," reasons must fulfill certain require-
ments for them to count in such matters and not appear to
be arbitrary whims. 6 it is not enough for us to acknowledge
on the one hand, that X and Y are equally human, and on the
other hand to assert that they should not be treated as
equals. John Rees takes this position, claiming that to
discriminate against an individual or group requires
reasons, the reasons should be given and intellectually
defended, they must be justifiable reasons as opposed to
just explanatory reasons, and they must be "relevant and
sufficient . "
'
However, we might claim that we will not treat X and
Y as equals because we like Y better than we like X. If
pressed, we could probably give a reason as to why we like
Y better and such a reason would necessarily make reference
to some characteristic which X and Y do not possess or ex-
hibit in equal amounts. This characteristic, in turn, would
then be a primary criterion for our determination of what
does or does not constitute a likeable person. The question
then arises as to whether some such reasons are more accept-
able than are others, and/or if some reasons are simply un-
acceptable. For example, suppose we state that we like X
better because X will physically injure us if we do not.
Bibid . Note particularly the difference between
claiming that "X is good," and "I like X."
7john Rees, Equality (London: Pall Mall, Inc., 1971),
p. 133.
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Such a reason would make little sense because the rules for
the use of the concept "like" are not consistent with such
a usage. We would, in effect, be breaking a "linguistic
convention. "8 It might make sense for us to say that we
"treat" X better than Y for this kind of reason, but not
"like." Thus, we could be claiming that X is more powerful
than Y, therefore they are not equals in this respect; that
power is a significant variable in determining how people
are treated; and therefore, X should be treated in a more
favorable manner than Y. It is a situation in which:
a) X and Y are unequal with respect
to Z.
b) X and Y are to be treated unegually
with respect to Z.
What is justified in the way of treatment depends upon
where the argument is focused. If we focus primarily upon
the above schema, then (a) appears to have set up the basis
for an argument against equal treatment. However, we might
instead prefer to keep the focus wholly on the earlier schema
a ) X and Y are humans
.
b) X and Y are equally human.
We might thereby claim that the inequality of X and Y with
regard to various other Z's is not sufficient to overcome
their equality as humans, and thus all humans should be
treated equally with respect to everything.
It is obvious that neither of the two schemas can ex-
clusively be relied upon. We cannot claim that every
8william E. Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse
(Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company, 1974), p. 33.
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inequality is sufficient to merit unequal treatment without
puttinq ourselves in the position of trying to determine and
measure every conceivable inequality, and parcel out treat-
ment accordinqly. Given the infinite number of types and
gradations of possible inequalities between people, this
presents an impossible task. On the other hand, to take the
position that because all men are equally human they should
be treated equally in all respects also makes little practi-
cal sense. Nor does it stand up alonqside notions of in-
dividual responsibility and morality.
This point does not undermine the basic case for equal-
ity of treatment restinq upon equality of humanness. Ac-
ceptance of this point still appears to posit a prima facie
case for equality of treatment to a qreater extent than in-
equality of some other characteristic posits inequality of
treatment. To illustrate this point, a somewhat altered
version of the earlier schema shall be utilized.
X and Y are equally human; therefore,
in the absence of countervailing rea-
sons, the needs (or wants) of X and Y
shall be treated equally.
As opposed to, for example,
X and Y are unequal in intelliqence
;
therefore, in the absence of counter-
vailing reasons, the needs (or wants)
of X and Y shall not be treated equally.
The reason that the former presents a stronqer case is
that those conclusions which follow from beinq human are more
open-ended than those which follow from deqree of intelli-
gence. The fact that X and Y are unequal in intelligence may
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conceivably present a case for their receiving unequal
treatment only in those areas deemed relevant to intelli-
gence. However, the argument can be made that the relev-
ance of intelligence to basic human needs is very tenuous.
The fact that X and Y are egually human serves as a sort of
starting point for any future comparison. The assertion of
their common humanity presents the most basic of classifi-
cations once we have gone beyond the idea that they ,ire both
living creatures. To begin with a comparison like intelli-
gence is to bypass a critical step in distinguishing people
from other living things. It may be more reasonable to let
criteria like intelligence be added onto the initial case
for equality of treatment.
Such an issue can perhaps best be resolved by using
the criterion of relevance. To return to the example of
inequalities in intelligence, 9 subsequent inequality in
terms of treatment would need to involve matters such as
education which are, in theory, closely related to intelli-
gence. Such inequality of treatment would also have to con-
front the issue of whether the more intelligent should get
superior treatment or whether the less intelligent should
receive the greater attention so as to compensate for their
lower intelligence. A case for some ineguality of treatment
could be made on this basis.
Against this position we could argue that what is
9l shall return to the issue of what is meant by in-
telligence and how, if at all, it can be measured.
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really required is different treatment, rather than un-
equal treatment. Referring back to the superiority -
inferiority connotation of unequal, we might claim that
when dealing with inequalities in areas such as intelligence
and physical strength, it is unfair for anyone to get supe-
rior or inferior treatment. Instead, they should be given
"different" treatment relating to their particular wants,
needs and capacities. 10 We might pursue this further and
assert that the very use of the term "unequal" in describing
the attributes themselves, let alone the people's treat-
ment, is itself a faulty use of the concept. People are
only different in intelligence, creativity, etc., and any
attempt to label them as "unequal" in such attributes is
to impose the observer's and/or society's value system upon
them. In simplified form, the implication is that:
All men are equally human and be-
yond that all is differences, ra-
ther than inequalities.
The crux of the matter is what is required to offset
the prima facie case for equality of treatment in a parti-
cular context. What characteristic or attribute in which
men are significantly unequal can, in turn, act as a justi-
fication for unequal treatment in matters specifically re-
lating to that characteristic or attribute? The context
aspect here is crucial for if the prima facie case does
nothing else, it at least sets up a situation in which not
10of course such a position can run into the "separate
but equal" rationale so often used to preserve inequalities.
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only must subsequent inequalities of treatment be justified,
but also that they can be justified only within a specific
context deemed relevant to the particular inequality. This
point is emphasized by Charles Frankel, who states that in-
equalities of treatment are:
justified only when they serve a specific pur-
pose, and they are warranted only when they
are restricted to the area in which they serve
that purpose. 11
Thus, when dealing with inequality of treatment, there
are four questions which must be answered.
1) In what respects are the subjects
unequal?
2) Is such an inequality sufficient
to justify inequality of treatment?
3) What kind of treatment is relevant
to the inequality?
4) How unequal need such treatment be?
In this connection, the question regarding a definition
of equality of treatment must also be posed. Is it enough to
say "Treat all humans equally," or "Treat all equals equal-
ly?" While such statements are meaningful, they cannot be
left as they are. Such rules as these can have various im-
plications. We can say that such prescriptions only imply
that, once we have made a particular rule, (for example, of
distribution of material goods) that rule must be applied
with impartiality, that the rule prevents arbitrary behavior,
and that arbitrary treatment is the true opposite of equality
of treatment. 12 It is not inequality of treatment per se
11 Frankel, "Equality of Opportunity," 201.
12w. von Leyden, "On Justifying Inequality," Political
Studies , XI (February, 1963), 62.
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that is open to criticism, but unjustified inequality of
treatment. We can refer to this as a "process-oriented"
notion of equality of treatment.
Equality of treatment can also have a more "result-
oriented" emphasis. That is, designating equality of treat-
ment to mean a result which occurs when something is dis-
tributed equally among a group. Departures from this kind
of distribution may at times be justified, but such depar-
tures also mean that equality of treatment is not present
at such times. in terms of whether equality of treatment
exists or not, the reasons offered for exceptions are ir-
relevant. It is either there or it is not, and the test is
to observe whether some have more than others after a given
distribution is made. This is the type of equality which
defenders of the meritocratic position often equate with
the socialist alternative to capitalist - style equality of
opportunity. It is, however, only a caricature of the
socialist position.
From the above two examples it is obvious why the prima
facie case for equality of treatment does not give very much
in the way of specific prescriptions for institutional be-
havior. Not only is clarification necessary to determine
what is meant by such treatment in terms of process versus
result, but also it is necessary to clarify just what it is
that is to be equally distributed. If, for example, we are
speaking of income, then the problem is to see to it that all
receive the same income. However, problems can emerge over
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who comprises the "all." Families, individuals and adults
are but a few of the possible alternatives. in each case
the actual amount distributed to each individual would vary.
A more important issue arises if we carry equality of
treatment beyond anything as readily quantifiable as income.
A number of philosophers have argued the case for "equality
of respect. "13 such respect is not something which can be
withdrawn for countervailing reasons. This type of equality
of treatment is not necessarily committed to equality of in-
come. Like any other equality of treatment, it is committed
to the following of a rule and to the avoidance of arbitrary
treatment of others. Nor does equality of respect commit us
to equality of praise. This too is a distinction which many
contemporary advocates of meritocracy and equality of oppor-
tunity have failed to perceive. The rules for the distribu-
tion of respect and praise are not the same. Respect is to
be offered to all equally on the grounds that they are all
human beings, none superior and none inferior in this regard
It does not have to be "earned." Praise, on the other hand,
is to be given only to those who have achieved and there-
fore "earned" it.
Thus equality of treatment must be detailed in such a
way so as to specify in what realm people are to be treated
as equals. W. von Leyden makes the point that equality of
treatment and inequality of treatment are, in practice,
13see Williams, "The Idea of Equality," and Steven
Lukes, individualism (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1973).
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inextricably bound together. it is impossible to treat
people equally in all respects and, in fact, equality of
treatment in some respects requires inequality of treatment
in other respects.
In some way or other, directly or indirectly,the claim to equal and/or equitable treatmentlies at the root of most, if not all our
natural justifications of unequal treatment. 14
To use an obvious example, if each individual is given
equal treatment in terms of the opportunity to gain wealth,
it is highly unlikely that the society can also give each
individual equal treatment in terms of how much actual
wealth is to be gained. The two would most likely conflict
with each other unless we are positing a society in which
people are totally equal in capacity and ambition. Another
example can be seen if we accept the prima facie case of
equality of treatment and try to apply it to the political
sphere. It might initially be claimed that a pluralist
democracy with a one-man, one-vote arrangement and an em-
phasis on equality of rights would fulfill the requirements
of political equality. On the other hand, it could be
asserted that such an arrangement is but an illusion of
political equality if it reflects a structure in which some,
because of their wealth, have far more political power and
influence than do others. 15 if this is so, then more than
14von Leyden, "On Justifying Inequality," 67.
l^This position has been presented by a number of
authors. See, for example, Jean Bethke Elshtain, "The
Feminist Movement and the Question of Equality," Polity ,
VIII (Summer, 1975); R. H. Tawney, Equality (London: George
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a formalized procedural set up is required for political
equality to exist. There must be at least some degree of
equality of result in terms of wealth, not just in the op-
portunity to gain wealth, as a precondition for real poli-
tical equality; or it would somehow have to be guaranteed
that the influence of private wealth not be felt in the
political process. A third possibility is to accept the
notion that political equality is, at best, severely and
necessarily limited in most modern states generally classi-
fied as democratic.
A related point to be considered involves the very
rule governing such treatment - "treat equals equally."
For example, one of the important aspects regarding the
relationship of equality of treatment to equality of results
is that if the latter is to exist in even an approximate
form, one of two things must occur. Either equality of
treatment must be defined in such a way so as to ensure
equal results among people of unequal capacities wants, and
needs, or an effort first must be made to attain relatively
equal results. 16 The latter is one of the major problems
involved in equality of opportunity. For equality of
Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1964); and Richard Lichtman, "The
Facade of Equality in Liberal Democratic Theory," Inquiry
,
XII (Summer, 1969) .
l^Flathman discusses this issue and claims that we
should treat people according to the same rule. The criti-
cal question is which rules we choose, for rarely can we
treat persons equally in one respect without treating them
unequally in other respects. Richard E. Flathman, "Equality
and Generalization: A Formal Analysis," in Equality , ed. by
Pennock and Chapman, 49-51.
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opportunity, with its emphasis on a competitive race en-
vironment, accepts equality of treatment only up to the
formal beginning and actual running of the race. There
does not need to be equality of treatment prior to the
formal beginning of the race because it is too great a task
to go back that far. Equality of treatment after the race
is even less desirable from this perspective because it
would undercut the individual's incentive for ever entering
the race in the first place. Naturally this implies a very
functionalist perspective on human nature in terms of what
people's capacities and incentives are and can be. It may
also be the only position which an advocate of equality of
opportunity in a stratified society can take with any con-
sistency
.
Thus the notion of equality of treatment cannot ade-
quately be explored in isolation from such related concepts
as equality of condition and equality of results. If we
elect to deal only with equality of treatment, that is,
treating all via the same rules, and concern ourselves
neither with prior conditions nor subsequent results, then
we are treating people equally only in one very particular
respect at one particular time. For example, if we state
that all shall be given the same amount of food, then all
are being treated equally in the sense that each is getting
the same quantifiable amount. However, if we adopt a rule
for treatment which states that all are to be given an
adequate diet, then we have introduced a need criterion
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which will entail a substantially different distribution
than does the former rule of distribution. Likewise, if
we were to posit the amount of food that people want or
deserve as the distribution criterion. In each of these
four cases, an argument can be made that equality of treat-
ment is present, yet each distribution is significantly
different from the others. Each criterion will benefit
some to the detriment of others. None are neutral.
"Natural" and "Artificial" Equality
The prima facie case for equality of treatment as a
general rule in any context cannot be based on any "self-
evident" truths regarding the equality of men. There is
no way to deny that some men and their actions are not just
different from others, but preferable. Some would argue
that, if intended as a description of what people actually
are, the eguality of all persons is a fiction. Unless we
are dealing with a Hobbesian state of nature, some persons
are going to be regarded as more moral and therefore more
"good" in their thoughts and actions than are others. How
then can we call for giving the same treatment to the good
as to the bad and still be properly using the concepts, par-
ticularly the moral concepts, that people utilize in their
daily lives. In such a case there is little question but
that some are regarded as superior to others - whether in-
nately or by upbringing or whatever. Therefore, to attempt
to rest the case for equality of treatment on any behavioral
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model places it upon a shaky foundation.
The case has been made that equality of treatment rests
upon a specific human treatment which all have regardless of
their behavior
- a "natural" equality. This brings in two
related problems - the relationship between natural and
artificial equality, and that between equality as a fact and
equality as an ideal. There have been a number of defini-
tions of what constitutes a natural inequality. Height, as
was discussed earlier, might be regarded as such an in-
equality. That is, a difference between men in which some
are regarded as superior in that particular aspect (hence
unequal) and in which the possessor of the superior attri-
bute has had little, if anything, to do with its development.
We do not choose or work to be tall. For the most part it
is a result of genetic makeup and thus far removed from a
person's individual choices and actions. Hence, those in-
equalities and equalities are labeled as natural which the
individual has not chosen and cannot personally affect. It
is not a man-made inequality, but rather, something which is
just "there" or just "happens."
In dealing with the notion of an artificial inequality
as opposed to a natural inequality, it is important to real-
ize that it is not merely two differences between acquired
and innate traits and abilities that are being explored.
There is a close relationship between such characteristics
that cannot easily be separated. In our language, however,
we do, in fact, make such distinctions, as in concepts such
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as "merit" and "deserve." Concepts of this sort seem to
emphasize that we are dealing with actions in which a per-
son has had some choice and which involve personal respon-
sibility on the part of the actor. They are not viewed as
merely the outgrowth of what he "is." To "deserve" some-
thing implies that we have made choices and behaved in such
a way that we can be praised or blamed, rewarded or punish-
ed, for the results of our behavior. The question is whether
this kind of distinction is in fact a distinction between
natural and artificial inequality. It may be that it is
precisely in the potential to make choices that all humans
are "naturally" equal. Furthermore, concepts such as merit
and deserve often involve a kind of interaction between
choices and background (physical, mental and emotional),
which helps to shape such choices. It is not that a person
does what he does because of either innate or acquired
characteristics, but rather because of a particular inter-
action between them.
To illustrate the manner in which the distinction be-
tween natural and artificial inequality has been expressed,
it is helpful to discuss how three theorists view the ques-
tion. Rousseau bases the distinction on those inequalities
which are a part of nature, for example, age, sex, and
strength, as opposed to those which are rooted in convention
and are therefore "artificial." Thus, status, power, wealth
and prestige are all artificial in the sense that they are
35
based on social convention - the consent of' men. 17 such
consent is not required, according to Rousseau, to see the
obvious and natural inequalities between people in terms
of age, sex and strength.
John Rees claims that Rousseau's criterion hints at,
but does not sufficiently take into account, the more
crucial distinction between natural and artificial equali-
ties and inequalities. To Rees, what is most important is
the element of human choice. While Rousseau does make re-
ference to the importance of human consent in determining
what kinds of inequalities are artificial, Rees implies
that Rousseau does not give this particular point sufficient
emphasis. Rees sees the basic distinction to lie in the
fact that the natural inequalities do not depend upon human
choice while the unnatural inequalities do. He is careful
to point out that this does not necessarily imply that
natural inequalities are unalterable. Eyeglasses and hear-
ing aids can help people who have natural inequalities be-
come, in a sense, "equal" over time. 18 Developments in
science and technology can make people more equal, or less
equal at the same time that these developments narrow the
natural and expand the artificial spheres. The criterion of
choice, therefore, is not a particularly satisfying means of
17jean Jacques Rousseau, A Discourse on the Origin of
Inequality , in The Social Contract and Discourses , translated
by G. D. H. Cole (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc.),
196 .
l 8Rees, Equality , p. 22.
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keeping the two types of inequality or equality distinct.
Not only does the sphere of characteristics which are un-
alterable by human intervention continually narrow, and
thus blur the distinction, but also the very concept of
"choice" is itself subject to dispute. Our choices may be
severely limited by the biological and psychological en-
vironment within which we have been raised. Thus the
criterion of choice requires that a number of related
issues be resolved. For example:
1 ) Does "choice" mean within the parameters
which we can logically be expected to be able
to choose? That is, must we be fully aware of
the alternatives prior to being able to have a
choice?
2 ) Can we ever be expected to make a choice
in the sense of a "freely made" decision,
without a great deal of influence from
sources over which we have had no control?! 9
Perhaps these kinds of issues are resolvable, but they are
of a sufficient complexity so as to make the choice criterion
a somewhat unsatisfactory method of distinguishing between
natural and artificial equalities.
A more satisfactory means of distinguishing between
natural and artificial inequalities is discussed by John
Wilson. Those inequalities and equalities which are artifi-
cial are, according to Wilson, those which require of a per-
son that he learn a set of rules, while those which are
natural are those which are found in nature. 20 Natural
l^See Herbert Spiegelberg, "Equality in Existentialism,
in Equality , ed . by Pennock and Chapman, for a presentation
of various existentialist positions on equality.
20wilson, Equality , p. 41.
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inequalities can be detected via sensory equipment. Thus,
we can "see" who is more physically attractive and "hear"
who has the better voice. However, these two examples in-
troduce another difficulty because we may ask whether attri-
butes such as physical beauty or a pleasant voice can ever
be regarded as "natural." A voice or appearance may be a
result of nature, but the criterion for labeling someone or
something as beautiful or ugly does not lie "out there" in
the natural world but instead is a social product whose
criterion involves learning a set of man-made rules. it
is these rules that determine what is regarded as beautiful
or ugly. And, just as Rees's notion of what is alterable
by human choice can vary by time and place, so too the sets
of rules determining such attributes as beauty and ugliness
may also vary. Hence, the latter examples seem to involve
what Wilson's distinction would call artificial inegualities
.
We might argue that a characteristic such as "tallness" fits
very well into the "natural" category. We need not adopt a
particular social value system to see that one person is
taller than another. However, this perception, by itself,
leads us to conclude that there are natural "differences"
between persons and not that such differences necessarily
entail natural inequalities. The latter term, because of
its intimation of a superior - inferior relationship, can
make sense only in the context of man-made rules. As al-
ready mentioned, to state that two persons are of unequal
height requires that we learn a set of rules for judging
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which heights are "best" and which are the "worst." Wilson
appears to be aware of this kind of problem. He points out
that the criterion of similarity and difference is itself a
man-made product requiring a public language, so as to be
able to correct mistakes in usage, and a set of rules. 21
Therefore, our perception of one man being taller than an-
other requires that we adopt a set of rules to determine
what is meant by "taller." Thus, we might conclude that
there are no "pure" natural inequalities or equalities, and
that Rousseau and others are wrong in labeling differences
such as age, sex and strength as natural inequalities.
However, it is difficult to dispense with the notion
of natural equalities and inequalities altogether. A case
can be made that in some characteristics, such as physical
strength, all men are not born the same, and further, that
such differences do in fact constitute inequalities. It may
be that an attribute such as physical strength is deemed
valuable solely by social and not natural standards. Ob-
viously to term anything "valuable" requires learning some
set of rules. However, even if such an inequality is in
this sense "artificial," it also at least appears natural
in the sense that we would be hard-pressed to find any
society, past or present, in which physical strength was
not valued in some way. Whether this universality is, by
itself, sufficient to affix the term "natural" to such in-
equalities is a difficult question to answer, particularly
21 ibid . , p. 42.
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since the need for physical strength seems to diminish as
technology increases. Wilson's own criterion would lead
him to deny that physical strength, solely because of its
universal status, constitutes a natural ineguality. For
Rees, the guestion of physical strength also poses a dilemma
since strength is a product of a number of factors, some re-
lated to choice (for example, a weight lifting program) and
some totally removed from choice (for example, the genes of
the parent and the environment in which the child is raised).
Likewise for Rousseau, the issue of physical strength cannot
consistently be placed in either category.
The point here is that despite the universal respect
for physical strength, it does not really "belong" solely to
either the natural or artificial spheres. If we look closely
at most other attributes we discover that they too do not fit
in any consistent manner. Most, if not all, characteristics
which are generally labeled as either natural or artificial
kinds of ineguality can, in truth, rest in either category.
Wilson, however, is not willing to collapse the dis-
tinction altogether. He points out that human sensory equip-
ment and human interests "force" certain criteria upon us
such that we do say that some similarities and differences
are "found" in nature. Wilson uses the example of color
categories as a case in which normal human sensory equipment
tends to impose a set of distinctions upon us. Likewise
Wilson's example of the fact that people distinguish between
ant-eaters and lions is a distinction which is very much in
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our interest as humans to make, even while it might be pos-
sible to construct a language which did not make such a
distinction. Thus, certain criteria of similarity and dif-
ference are, in this sense, imposed upon us by nature. They
are learned, but it is not a matter of choice because no
viable alternatives, logically or physically, exist. 22 How-
ever, Wilson is speaking of natural differences, not in-
equalities. Distinguishing between colors is some distance
removed from claiming that they are unequal to one another.
Wilson expands upon this distinction by reference to
how one verifies natural and artificial similarities and
differences. (Note again that he is not speaking of equal-
ities and inequalities here). Common language and standards
are necessary for making any judgments, but judgments re-
garding artificial similarities and differences require that
one learn the rules of a particular "game." They are not
found in nature. 23 This now brings Wilson to artificial
and natural equalities. Natural equality may be verified
by observation while artificial equality presupposes the
learning of a further set of rules. in terms of activity,
the capacity or potential to perform artificial activities
constitutes an important distinction between man and other
creatures. Nevertheless, the difficulty mentioned earlier
still remains. Wilson may have produced an adequate criter-
ion for distinguishing between natural and artificial
22ibid
. , p. 44.
23Ibid
. , pp. 44-45.
differences, but the question of whether it makes sense to
speak of a natural or artificial equality has not been
answered
.
An analogous problem arises with the related issue of
whether people are "naturally equal," particularly as re-
lates to the question of whether all "are equal" or are
"born equal" or both. To say that persons are born equal
does not necessarily imply that they will remain equal as
adults. However, if people are born equal with respect to
a certain degree of humanness, then by definition, they are
by nature equal. Any subsequent inequalities which may
emerge are likely to be man-made and therefore artificial.
This can be a difficult distinction to maintain for, in
Wilson's words, "it is plain that notions of natural and
artificial equality, though logically distinguishable, bear
a very close relationship in practice. "24 on the other hand,
in speaking of a highly artificial inequality like "privi-
lege," Wilson makes the point that
It is appropriate to speak of privilege. .
.
when the artificially granted status or power
is not connected to or justified by any
natural characteristics. 25
Hence, some inequalities like privilege, are artificial by
definition.
This is further complicated by the issue relating to
how the pre-natal environment affects personality and
24ibid., p. 48.
25ibid . , p. 37.
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capacities. Here, the line between artificial and natural
becomes even more ambiguous, particularly as human control
over previously "natural" factors increases. in confronting
this dilemma, Wilson opts for a solution which retains a
distinction between the natural and the artificial. He de-
fines natural capacities as being "what a thing can in
practice do, be, or become, whilst remaining itself. "26 This
kind of move requires that we have a conception of what a man
is so that we become concerned only with capacities which can
be described as "human."
Here, as with so many other related issues, our view of
human nature becomes crucial to the way in which we under-
stand not only what man is, but also what he is and is not
capable of doing. This applies both to actions and to states
of mind. Societies tend to generate an image of human nature
which is conducive to existing social and economic arrange-
ments. The accepted view of man's capacities does not come
to be acceptable by chance. If man is competitive in order
to attain certain kinds of goals, and if within the category
of human beings, there are numerous relevant inequalities,
then the stratified society which emerges appears to be in-
herent in the human condition. It is not subject to rational
criticism because it is not subject to a more rational form.
On the other hand, the egalitarian vision of society is based,
in large part, upon a very different view of human nature and
capacities.
26Ibid. , p. 51.
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The problem that emerges is that once we have de-
scribed a given hierarchical order as "natural," we have
implicitly legitimized that order. This vision of each
individual, or class, seeking and finding (or being placed
in) its predestined position and role is an essential aspect
of the functionalist position. By portraying society as
comprised of individuals having, not merely different, but
unequal capacities and abilities, we have established a case
for a stratified society. The case is strengthened if we
make the further claim that with all individuals properly
"placed" into their roles, both the individual and the
society as a whole will benefit. 27 Thus the functionalist's
explanatory theory, having been premised on the idea of
natural inequality, leads in turn to an almost inevitable
rejection of egalitarian programs as being a Utopian and/or
needless and potentially harmful tampering with nature.
If instead, we wish to maintain that all inequalities
are man-made and artificial, then a different situation
emerges. If all inequalities are artificial, then none are
inevitable or intrinsic to the human condition, though this
does not imply the same for human differences. Therefore,
we are left with the position that all are by nature equal. 2
27see Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore, "Some
Principles of Stratification," American Sociological Re-
view, X (April, 1945).
28Regarding the issue of "equal with respect to what?"
since I am speaking here at a fairly high level of general-
ity, I can say equal with respect to "being human;" or
"developing into fully human beings;" or, borrowing from
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This inevitably must lead us to an exploration of those in-
equalities which do exist between persons in society. dust
as by calling humans naturally unequal leads to the need to
explain those equalities which do exist, so too by viewing
all inequalities as artificial, we are presented with the
need to justify such inequalities as may be present in
society. If all or most inequalities are artificial, then
they are all subject to change and all conceivably could be
abolished. Society, therefore, no longer reflects nature,
but instead has imposed artificial inequalities upon persons
naturally equal. Under these circumstances, we would be
more likely to view the stratification somewhat critically
and to require some justification, if not a restructuring.
We might argue that stratification is necessary or function-
al because, despite the basic eguality of people, some degree
of hierarchy is required to keep the whole system running and
to prevent chaos or, in a more extreme form, a "war of all
against all." Furthermore, to provide sufficient incentives
for those on top to do their best, it is crucial to provide
a system of unegual rewards leading, in turn, to subsequent
inequalities in terms of position, material goods and re-
spect. However, by accepting the premise that all are nat-
urally egual, we have already undermined this position. For
now we have little to offer as a justification as to why one
individual or group is placed in a position higher than
Steven Lukes, persons actual or potential autonomy, need for
privacy and capacity for self-development . Lukes, Individual
ism
, p. 133.
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another. Neither ability nor ambition is adequate to ex-
plain this. if an are naturally equal> then ambitiQn and
ability are qualities of which all should have an equal
amount, or they are artificial criteria superimposed over
the basic equality of persons. if the former, then nothing
has been explained regarding why some have better positions
than others unless we wish to rely upon "luck" as an ex-
planation, or we take the position that different artificial
environments lead to different levels of ambition and abil-
ity, if ambition and ability are artificial criteria and
this is used as a justification for a society's unequal
arrangements, then we can argue that such a society is using
an artificial construct to explain artificial inequalities
and therefore is not adequately confronting the issue in
terms of the "fairness" of such an arrangement. Fairness
aside, defenders of this position generally make the claim
that it is the most efficient means of running a society.
Even accepting the very questionable basis for this claim,
such a defense entails viewing persons as means to an end
rather than as ends in themselves, and thus conflicts with
the idea of equality of respect. Premised on the view that
this arrangement involves the construction of artificial in-
equalities, once we have accepted the view that persons can
and should be treated as means to an end, it makes relatively
little difference whether the results involve artificial or
natural inequalities.
If we assert that all, or almost all, inequalities
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between people are artificial, then we have set up a prima
facie case for an egalitarian society, but it is not an
indestructable case. While the original assertion regard-
ing whether or not men are naturally equal is of some signi-
ficance, the results which follow from such an assertion may
vary. Similarly, we may deny that "natural" has any real
meaning with reference to equality or inequality. Every-
thing that people are able to observe about themselves and
others is to a large extent, artificial. Owing to the
socially imposed criteria for equal and unequal as well as
the encompassing factor of upbringing, the word "natural"
is not a meaningful concept in this context. For these rea-
sons it may be more fruitful to bypass the issue of natural
versus artificial equalities as being irresolvable and per-
haps irrelevant.
Equality and Equality of Opportunity
In dealing with the concept of eguality we must make
continued reference to the function which the concept serves
in our language. We have already asserted that the function
of the concept is to portray a relationship in which neither
party is superior or inferior in a particular respect. We
have also brought out that such a relationship logically con-
veys the idea that equal parties should be treated equally
unless overriding reasons for not doing so can be brought to
bear, and that such reasons must be judged relevant and suf-
ficient before they can be accepted. Given the fact that
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equality of treatment in one respect requires inequality of
treatment in another, how then are we to choose amonq the
various kinds of equality of treatment? One of the most
popular choices in capitalist society is equality of oppor-
tunity, in such a situation, the opportunity for advance-
ment is the treatment which is equalized while the results,
in terms of respect, wealth, power and prestiqe are very
unequal
.
Hence, equality is still connected with treatment.
The advocate of equality of opportunity need not deny this
relationship. However, in the United States such treatment
includes the opportunity to become unequal, that is, to
surpass our fellows. If we are qiven the opportunity and
are unwillinq or unable to succeed, the problem is not with
the subsequent inequality of results that occur, but with
ourselves. Thus, if we do not "push" ourselves sufficiently
in school, we have no one to blame but ourselves and society
need not feel any responsibility for our plight. The pro-
cess of natural selection will ensure that artificial and/or
natural inequalities will be made manifest and be treated
accordingly. Clearly a choice has been made here in favor
of a stratified society which allegedly reflects the in-
equalities among persons in that society. Yet, within the
context of such a society, equality of opportunity itself
cannot be realized.
The question of why this particular kind of equality
has been so popular in the United States involves considera-
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tions of the general political and economic system. For it
is clear that praise for this ideal is by no means univer-
sal, particularly in terms of how equality of opportunity
allegedly is manifested in the United States. in Chapter II
the question of whether the popularity of equality of oppor-
tunity is warranted will be examined.
CHAPTER II
THE DESIRABILITY OF EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY
In this chapter the issue being dealt with is not
whether a society can attain complete, or near-complete
equality of opportunity, but rather with whether it should
even try to do so. The advocates and critics of the de-
sirability of this goal can be classified according to
three major schools of political philosophy: the liberal
perspective, typified by such figures as John Stuart Mill
and Daniel Bell; the conservative perspective, reflected in
the works of Edmund Burke, Emile Durkheim and Alexis De
Tocqueville; and the radical perspective presented in the
works of Karl Marx and a number of contemporary thinkers.
The Liberal Perspective
The liberal perspective provides the strongest defense
for equality of opportunity. There are several reasons for
this, but primary among them is the close connection both
liberalism and equality of opportunity have with laissez
faire capitalism. Though the significance of laissez faire
in modern capitalism has decreased substantially, the identi-
fication of equality of opportunity with capitalism and
liberalism has remained strong. Therefore, it is to the
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classical, as well as contemporary, liberal thinkers that we
must look for an advocacy of equality of opportunity. John
Stuart Mill's essay, "On the Subjection of Women,"! is a
good example of the liberal approach to the subject.
In this essay Mill specifically deals with the rights
of women, but the principle involved is that all adults
have, or should have, an equal right to develop themselves
to the best of their abilities. The "legal subordination"
of one sex to another renders this impossible. 2 There are
two points we should note here. One is that Mill is imply-
ing that all discriminatory laws ought to be abolished so
as to render more complete the equality of opportunity be-
tween the sexes. The second point is that, in line with
free market principles, the only kind of subordination that
Mill is speaking of is legal subordination. It is certain
laws that are interfering with equality of opportunity and
these should therefore be repealed, just as laissez faire
capitalism calls for the abolition of laws which attempt to
restrict or regulate trade and other commercial activities.
Mill does not go beyond calling for an end to such laws to
more positive action to bring about equality of opportunity.
It is a negative form of freedom and opportunity that Mill
is advocating--a position that later liberals would find
themselves heatedly debating with regard to issues like
Ijohn Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women , ed. by
Stanton Coit (London: Longman's, Green and Company, 1924).
2ibid., p. 29.
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affirmative action and quotas. For Mill, removal of such
laws would tend to bring about significant "human improve-
ment" due to their being "replaced by a principle of perfect
equality admitting no power or privilege on the one side,
nor disability on the other. "3 In the first paragraph of
his essay, Mill presents a general picture of the liberal
interpretation of equality of opportunity - no legal obsta-
cles or privileges should be granted to one group which
harm another.
This latter point is reemphasized later in the essay
when Mill, in language echoed by modern advocates of merit-
ocracy, calls for as much as possible being left to the
choices of those directly involved.
It is not that all processes are supposed to
be equally good, or all persons to be egual-
ly qualified for every thing; but that free-
dom of individual choice is now known to be
the only thing which procures the adoption
of the best processes and throws each opera-
tion into the hands of those best qualified
for it.
4
The idea here is that equality of opportunity can act as a
natural and accurate means of ensuring that the most quali-
fied get into the most important positions while weeding
out, in a non-arbitrary manner, the less qualified. Women
should not be excluded from entering the competition. If
indeed they are "inferior," this will be made apparent by
the results of the competition itself. Likewise, it will
3lbid.
4lbid .
, p. 45.
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also become evident just what it is that they are most fitted
to do.
What women by nature cannot do, it is quite
superfluous to forbid them from doing. Whatthey can do, but not so well as the men who
are their competitors, competition suffices
to exclude them from ...it is only asked that
the present bounties and protective duties infavour of men should be removed .. .Whatever
women's services are most wanted for, the freeplay of competition will hold out the strong-
est inducement for them to undertake.
5
Thus Mill is saying that if the competitive market is open-
ed up to women as well as men via equality of opportunity,
both women and society as a whole will be better off.
The key element here, as in equality of opportunity in
general, is the idea that any individual ought to have the
right to compete if he or she so desires. It is not a matter
of having to compete so much as being allowed the option to
choose if, where, and when one does compete. The assumption
in the liberal framework is that individuals are autonomous
beings who, if given the opportunity, either can choose what
is in their best interests or should be allowed to make
choices in order to discover what their best interests are.
This is an argument upon which Mill later elaborates in a
different context in On Liberty . 6 To be able to make
choices is consistent with the free market capitalism with
which liberalism is so intimately associated. In each case,
5lbid . , p. 54.
6john Stuart Mill, On Liberty , ed. by Currin V.
Shields (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.,
1956).
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the emphasis is on the autonomy of individuals coming to be
expressed once legal obstacles are removed, without any
formal dictation of what they may choose to do. Further,
since the chooser is free to make the choices, so too is
he or she responsible for these choices. This point is
significant, for it implies almost an existential finality
regarding the choices that one does make, once formal legal
obstacles have been eliminated.
Hence for Mill, and for liberalism in general, there
are several advantages to be gained from the principle of
equality of opportunity. As already mentioned, the most
fundamental factor is that if performance in open competi-
tion dictates position, then surely society has little to
lose and much to gain by seeing to it that those who per-
form the best reach the highest positions. The inferior
will be unable to compete well with the better qualified,
so there is little danger that incompetent individuals or
groups will rise to the top. This is an argument that Mill
repeatedly uses against those who claim that women are in-
ferior and demand that they be kept out of the competition
altogether. If they are inferior, their subservient status
will be given an empirical basis; if they are not inferior,
then society stands to gain by allowing a whole new group
of citizens to contribute their talents to the social system.
That this desire for the good of the social system is often
contradictory to the self-interest of those who do not want
additional competitors is not viewed by Mill as being signi-
ficant .
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Mill adds to this argument the claim that justice can
be served only be allowing all into the competition.
...would it be consistent with justice to re-fuse to them their fair share of honour anddistinction, or to deny to them the egual
moral right of all human beings to choose their
occupations (short of injury to others) accord-
ing to their own preferences, at their own
risk?7
On an individual level, Mill cites the happiness that
comes with the attainment of freedom which is "the first and
strongest want of human nature," after food and shelter. 8
Whether subseguent liberal philosophers, including contem-
porary liberals, would place freedom either so high among
human desires or even designate it as an inherent part of
human nature is not as important as the fact that the
philosophy of liberalism, the economic system of capitalism,
and the concept and policy of eguality of opportunity all
place a great deal of emphasis upon the value of freedom.
In comparison to other political ideals, and particularly
in comparison to the ideal of eguality, freedom is given the
greatest priority in the liberal framework and its relation-
ship to other cherished liberal ideals such as individualism
and tolerance is both clear and close.
A further argument for eguality of opportunity which
liberals like Mill touch upon is that, once all are allowed
into the competition to gain the greatest rewards and/or
7Mill, The Subjection of Women , p. 79.
8lbid . , p. 123.
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make the greatest contribution to the social good, there is
less likely to be the kind of frustration and feeling of
uselessness which can come to those who "want of a worthy
outlet for the active facilities. «9 m the case of women,
this will especially be a problem for those who either have
no children or whose children have grown up and left home,
leaving their mothers little that they are either allowed
to do or are capable of doing with the rest of their lives. 10
Mill condemns the manner in which society has forced women
into a "dull and hopeless" existence by not allowing them to
fulfill, or even discover, their potential. 11
Another advantage of equality of opportunity, implicit
in all of the other positive features, is that it clearly
affixes personal responsibility. Once eguality of opportun-
ity has been established, and all formal barriers to open
competition eliminated, each individual within society must
bear full responsibility both for the choices made and for
the consequences of the choices, particularly in terms of
eventual position within the various hierarchies. The former
involves the decision as to what one wants to do; the latter
involves whether and how well one is able to do what one de-
sires in competition with others. On this latter point, Mill
is quite willing to let the chips fall where they may as long
as equal opportunity exists. There will always be winners
9lbid .
10Ibid
. , p. 126.
11 Ibid . , p. 127.
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and losers. Equality of opportunity makes the game fair.
This gives both winners and losers no one but themselves
upon whom they may place responsibility for the outcome.
Hence, another positive feature of equality of opportunity
is that it absolves other individuals and society itself of
responsibility for the results of the various contests go-
ing on within its boundaries. This is as it should be in
a liberal individualistic, laissez faire capitalist system.
Even with the advent of the welfare state in the twentieth
century, all that has changed is the amount and scope of
activity that the government is allowed to undertake in
order to bring about equality of opportunity and a merit-
ocracy.
Much of Mill's position is echoed in the works of
modern advocates of equality of opportunity like Daniel
Bell and Irving Kristol. The label of "neo-conservatives"
which has been attached to them serves to illustrate the
fact that today, particularly in the United States, there
are few who can accurately be described as conservative un-
less conservatism is equated only with the desire to con-
serve that which already exists. The irony is apparent when
we consider that what is here being conserved is, in reality,
a form of liberalism. The chief focus of debate is over how
this "traditional" liberalism is to be conserved. Can
liberalism best be preserved by welfare state economic
policies along with programs such as affirmative action and
quotas; or is it best preserved by a return to its nineteenth
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or even eighteenth century principles? m both cases the
goal of equality of opportunity retains a high priority.
What is at issue are the questions of how best to define
it and how best to attain it.
Daniel Bell in particular, gives evidence of the
modern American liberal's attachment to equality of oppor-
tunity. This is demonstrated by the way he defines the
goal
:
The principle of equality of opportunity de-
rives from a fundamental tenet of classical
liberalism: that the individual - and not
the family, the community, or the state - is
the basic unit of society, and that the pur-
pose of societal arrangements is to allow
the individual the freedom to fulfill his
own purposes - by his labor to create pro-
perty, by exchange to satisfy his wants, by
upward mobility to achieve a place commen-
surate with his talents. 12
As with Mill, what Bell is portraying here is a situation
where the individual
, unencumbered by any but the most neces-
sary of checks, is given free rein to develop, to create, to
profit, and especially to choose. Freedom is still the key
element and the role of society, particularly government, is
to be minimized.
In his discussion, Bell specifically praises the coming
"meritocracy" more than equality of opportunity. However, it
is clear that the meritocracy cannot exist without equality
of opportunity. What Bell does is to separate such oppor-
tunity from the idea of equality of results, which he regards
12Daniel Bell, "On Meritocracy and Equality," The
Public Interest , XXIX (Fall, 1972), 40.
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as a "socialist ideal." The assumption is that some are
more talented, ambitious, intelligent and therefore more
deserving than are others. We discover who they are via
eguality of opportunity, not by "populist" programs such
as open admissions, quotas, and other "ascriptive" criteria
which Bell sees as endangering the process of discovering
the talented as well as lowering standards. 13 once the
process of discovering the most competent has been com-
pleted, such persons are then placed in the most important
positions in society and a just meritocracy is created.
While Bell also advocates "the priority of the disadvan-
taged... as an axiom of social policy," 1- 4 how this is to be
accomplished in a manner consistent with his perspective on
equality of opportunity is not explained. The obvious
priority here, as with Mill, is with those who can rise to
the top within the equality of opportunity framework.
The Conservative Critique
Because the philosophy of classical conservatism is
not, and perhaps never really was, a major perspective in
American political thought, to analyze the conservative
critique of equality of opportunity it is necessary to
examine various European theorists. As has already been
alluded to, what passes for conservatism in the United
1 3ibid . , p. 37.
14ibid., p. 67.
Im
59
States is little more than a style of laissez faire liberal
capitalism, which not only does not present any of the basic
conservative critiques of equality of opportunity, but also
is one of the strongest defenders of this very unconserva-
tive principle. Therefore, it is European conservative
like Edmund Burke, Alexis De Tocqueville and Emile Durkhei
who will be dealt with in this section.
One of the major criticisms conservatives make is that
as the passion for liberty and equality increases among men,
and as equality of opportunity becomes more and more a guid-
ing principle in politics, economics and the area of social
status, there will be a steadily declining concern for the
public good. Liberal advocates of equality of opportunity
freely admit that one of its essential ingredients is its
individualistic nature. Their assumption is that this in-
dividualism will work to the benefit of society as a whole.
With equality of opportunity, each person is competing
against others to gain certain goods or to "win the race."
The result, according to liberals, is greater efficiency
which works to the benefit of the individual and the society
Conservatives are highly critical of this view. Their
stress is upon the dissolution of social ties that equality
of opportunity engenders, and the societal and personal
costs of such a dissolution. From this perspective, liberal
ism and its attendant equality of opportunity are contrasted
with an idealized version of an earlier time. Conservatism
holds that in feudal times, there were stronqly felt mutual
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obligations, rights and duties which all classes in society
possessed. Obviously some were far better off than others,
but such a situation was rendered less objectionable by
these strong ties and the mutual respect that conservatives
claim to have existed. Under such circumstances, equality
of opportunity was out of the question since people born
into a particular class stayed within that class as did
their descendents. Hierarchies existed, but they were seen
as both natural and legitimate by all concerned. Thus, the
ties between persons were strong, and when such ties exist,
there also is a strong concern for the public good, since
people are concerned with more than just themselves and
their immediate families. A sense of community is thereby
encouraged . 1
5
De Tocqueville is greatly disturbed by what he regards
as the tendency for concern about the community to decrease
as the dissolution of ties between persons increases. At
one point he describes man in modern society as being too
concerned with his self interest, narrowly individualistic,
lacking in care about the public good and exhibiting a
general lack of feeling for his fellow man.!6 Tocqueville
does not share the liberal's praise of equality of oppor-
tunity, particularly as the doctrine relates to each being
on his own. Referring to the French peasantry, he claims
15It should be re-emphasized that we are speaking of an
"ideal type" kind of a feudal situation.
16Alexis De Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French
Revolution
, translated by Stuart Gilbert (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955), p. xiii.
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that,
Tocqueviiie perceives serious problems arising from
the erosion of the hereditary ties of status between per-
sons that existed in the feudal era. with equality of
opportunity and the rise of capitalism, wealth, instead of
birth becomes the criterion for status and power. To the
liberal, this permits a livelier, freer, and more efficient
mode of social existence. To a conservative, however, while
some of these features may be beneficial, they have to be
weighed against the costs in terms of a society where people
no longer care about one another. The major result that
Tocqueville sees as deriving from such principles is a re-
turn to a Hobbesian state of nature with "unspoken warfare
between all citizens "18 o-;^-^
" Since all are starting off from
the same point, not only do individuals no longer "owe" any-
thing in the way of rights and obligations to their fellow
citizens, but also each of these fellow citizens is, in
fact, a competitor and a real or potential "enemy." Under
such circumstances, it clearly is not going to be easy to
instill any feeling for the common good. Modern liberals
17Ibid
. , p. 557.
ISAlexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America
, trans-lated and edited by J
.
P. Mayer (Garden City, NY: Doubleday
and Company, Inc., 1969), p. 566.
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tend to denigrate any such concern wifv,th common good on the
grounds that it is too varmo
° gue and ambiguous a concept un-
less measured strictly in terms of material productivity.
This is an easily measurable quantity which bears little
resemblance to the classical conservative view that con-
tains a strong moral element and is far more concerned with
ties between people than with commodities produced.
Looking at modern society, Tocgueville sees the ad-
vent of a growing industrial aristocracy. Further, it is
an aristocracy which, unlike its counterpart in feudal
times, bears no permanent or supportive relationship to
those below it.
3^vindUrfiali3t °nly asks the workman for hiswork, and the latter only asks him for his pay.The one contracts no obligation to protect, northe other to defend, and they are not linked inany permanent fashion either by custom or duty. 19
Contrasting the industrialist with the feudal landed aristo-
cracy, he states:
The territorial aristocracy of past ages was
obliged by law, or thought itself obligated by
custom, to come to the help of its servants and
relieve their distress. But the industrial
aristocracy of our day, when it has impoverished
and brutalized the men it uses, abandons them in
times of crisis to public charity to feed them.
.
.
Between workman and master there are frequent
relations but no true associations . 20
While this kind of criticism may relate more specifi-
cally to capitalism and/or individualism, its interrelatedness
19Ibid . , p. 557.
2QIbid
. , pp. 557-558.
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with equality o, opportunity is clear. „ all have been
granted an equal chance to get into the aristocracy of
wealth, and if there is an ongoing and constant struggle
to get into, and stay within, the aristocracy, then few
close ties or feelings of mutual obligation can be main-
tained over time.
Among democratic peoples new families con-
^kL^ 86 fr?m . not--hing while others falland nobody's position is quite stable.. Allof a man's interests are limited to thosenear himself
... Aristocracy links everybody,from peasant to king in one long chain. Demo-cracy breaks the chain and frees each link?2?
Thus the conditions of life in a society with equality
of opportunity encourage self reliance. But such self reli-
ance tends to isolate persons from each other as they con-
stantly compete, and provides a kind of moral justification
for not being concerned about the problems of others.
The conservative critique of equality of opportunity
also makes reference to the effect that such a doctrine has
upon established standards, taste and the ideal of the con-
templative life. To understand this position it is neces-
sary to understand the conservative perspective on hier-
archies. Hierarchies are both natural and inevitable. How-
ever
,
this idea is unlike the capitalist notion in which
hierarchies and values are determined by the market place,
preferably in a setting of equality of opportunity, and our
value is determined by how much we can sell ourselves for on
21 ibid., pp. 507-508.
the open market. To the conservative fchere
_
natural hierarchies involving various spheres Qf^ ^
the "market value" of what we contr . bute , s . rreievant
Even Mil! comes close to thi. position in his denigration
Of popular taste and opinion in On Liberty. For the CQn_
servative, areas such as the arts and sciences should not
be subject to market forces, but instead should be the
result of men living guiet contemplative lives, guided by
the wisdom of tradition and free from the hustling so typi-
cal of equality of opportunity. In a society where prQs _
perity, if not survival, is dependent upon responding to
the market and where equality of opportunity ensures a
competitive framework in which much of our time and energy
must be devoted to fighting off fellow citizens in the race
for scarce rewards, it is not surprising that conservatives
look with some trepidation upon the conseguences of all
this for contemplation, intellectual advancement, taste and
tradition.
Tocgueville gives some attention to the downplaying of
contemplation in modern society. A society based on equal-
ity of opportunity is unlikely to have a leisure class. Such
a society may have wealthy citizens, but their wealth is not
as it was in feudal times. With equality of opportunity,
wealth is less hereditary and therefore requires constant
effort to attain and retain it. This opens up the possibil-
ity that we could lose wealth in a perfectly legal manner.
In feudal times, the members of the nobility were more secure
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in their positions and therefore, if they so desired> cqu1
devote their time to art, science, or philosophical specu-
lation without worry that someone was going to overtake
them or that their work would not "sell" on the market.
Tocgueville describes the distinction between the feudal
contemplative life and the modern active lif e:
Men living in times of equality have muchcuriosity and little leisure. Life is so
P
£
actical complicated, agitated and activethat they have little time for thinking. 22
The result of this lifestyle is that, as life moves so
quickly, the
-quick, superficial mind"23 becomes a valuable
commodity. The traditional ideal of the contemplative
thinker, carefully and slowly working out problems, becomes
less desirable. Further, the kinds of problems and thoughts
with which men become concerned also undergo a shift. The
emphasis is no longer on the so-called "higher" principles
and pleasures. Instead, great attention is paid to those
practical applications of thinking which will either save
or make money via saving time, increasing production and
accumulating more material goods.
Conservatives are also disturbed with regard to how
the elimination of a permanent leisure class and the in-
crease in the role of the market influences standards of
taste. Edmund Burke warns that the democratizing aspects of
the French Revolution in particular, and the kind of free
22 ibid
. , p. 540.
23Ibid
. , p. 461.
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market, egalitarian leaning equality of opportunity) doc-
trines which were then spreading would serve to destroy or
seriously impair the two principles upon which civilization,
taste, and manners had been built: the spirit of religion
and the spirit of the gentleman. 24 what Burke means by the
"spirit of the gentleman" is the values and lifestyle of
the landed nobility. They, and not the market or the masses,
should be the source for standards of taste and for the
maintenance of what is regarded as civilization. Equality
of opportunity presents a danger here just as it presents a
danger to the very existence of a leisure class. it leads
to mass taste replacing the taste of the nobility. From the
conservative viewpoint, with its vision of natural hier-
archies, nothing could be more damaging to the maintenance
of high standards in manners, art and civilization. Burke
thus describes revolutionary France's future:
Along with its natural protectors and guardians,learning will be cast into mire and trodden down
under the hoofs of a swinish multitude. 25
Perhaps the most fundamental of conservative criticisms
of equality of opportunity has to do with the "excess" of
freedom which it is said to engender. Allegedly, it en-
courages a lack of proper restraints and limitations on the
actions and aspirations of persons, thereby leaving them un-
prepared for the disappointments that inevitably follow.
24Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1961), p. 92.
25Ibid.
Bur*e attacks the liberal idea thafc ^
^free to do as he pleases provided ^ ^^ ^ ^ ^
BurKe, coming from a perspective more conducive to a sense
of community and sharpH nK! -;ed obligations, questions the results
of such freedom:
riIque
ha
congr:iuia^Ss
e
26
them t0 d
° bef°~ «
Later, he questions the individualistic pre,ise behind such
freedom and rights.
Men have no right to what is not reasonableand to what is not for their benef?**§?
'
The feeling behind these anti-liberal sentiments is
that people should be concerned about their fellow men and
their society. More importantly, all are not equally aware
of, or the best judge of, their own best interests. conse-
quently, we must "interfere" with the liberty of those who
are unable to handle liberty properly. m terms of equal-
ity of opportunity, such interference poses serious problems
for it involves restrictions placed upon what races are run
and who competes in each contest.
However, it is with regard to the question of setting
limits to expectations and aspirations that the conservative
critique is most telling. Burke refers to equality of oppor-
tunity (though he does not use the term) as,
26Ibid
. , p. 20.
27Ibid . , p. 75.
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instead, there is a constant striving for more and „e
,
which is encouraged by the notion that all have a ch.,nce
to gain great wealth and that horizons should be unlisted.
The result of this is what DurKheim refers to as a state of
"rulelessness," in which the interrelated processes Qf
having infinite wants and being unable to satisfy such
wants because of their infinite nature result in feelings
of despair and disappointment. The hopes that one has can
only last so long and the inevitable result is a sense of
disillusionment . 29
This problem of rulelessness specifically relates to
the liberal ideal of laissez faire and unrestrained compe-
tition. The liberal ideal of an absolute minimum of checks
upon an individual's activities is, for Durkheim, undesir-
able. Instead, it is crucial that society set up moral
limitations to mobility and therefore to people's aspira-
tions for upward mobility. Without this restraint, indivi-
duals lose their stability, become less content, and often
turn to suicide. Durkheim cites as evidence of this the
fact that much suicide, particularly what Durkheim refers to
as "anomic suicide," occurs among wealthy individuals in the
areas of commerce and industry. It is among these groups
that external limits are most weak, as are the individual's
own internal restraints. The attainment of wealth, parti-
cularly in the highly mobile world of commerce and industry,
29Emile Durkheim, "On Anomie," in Images of Man , ed.
by C. Wright Mills (San Diego, NY: George Braziller, Inc.,
1960), p. 450.
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often leads to the id<=a t->^+- u • ^. .3 that
'
hy ^dividual efforts, we can
continue to move up indefinitely. 30 However, when infinite
aspirations are eventually confronted by the finite capac-
ities of self and market, and either setbacks or a lack of
further upward mobility occurs, then the individual is ill-
prepared to handle the frustration. Modern society induces
a very strong future orientation. Activity is geared
primarily to gaining more wealth as opposed to enjoying
what we have. When the future suddenly appears less bright
because our progress has either ceased or slowed, disillu-
sionment and a potentially suicidal reaction are quite
possible. 31 This is a danger w . th wh . ch ^ ^ ^
likely to be faced. The poor are unlikely to have infinite
desires and expectations since the reality of their lives
illustrates to them the limited nature of their future.
Checks on their aspirations are presented to them in the
form of numerous other persons standing between them and
the top. 32 consequently, they are likely to avoid the sort
of "passion for the infinite" that Durkheim sees as so typi-
cal of the modern industrial classes.
Thus equality of opportunity, as Durkheim sees it,
particularly in the economic sphere, can be viewed as a
source of some of the socially and psychologically destab-
ilizing tendencies in modern society. To counter such
3°Ibid.
, p. 456.
31 lbid
.
. p. 459.
32ibid . , p. 460.
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o an
tendencies, Durkheim does M ^
^
ascriptive society in which hereditary r^vl ank is passed along
xnterge„,ratio„ally
. Instead
, he calls for retaining
ity of opportunity, but within specific ^.^ ^^
tion invokes a division of labor^ ^ ^
a restrained degree of social mobiUty> almost^ ^ g
parallel to an idealized feudal system of mutual obligations
and rights. it is an attempt to reconcile the modern in-
dustrial age with some of the virtues that existed in the
pre-industrial age but which have since teen downplayed or
subverted.
Durkheim refers to a division of labor in which the
individual is alienated neither from the work process nor
from his fellow workers. m such a setting, each knows his
Place and role in the overall productive process, and he
knows that some degree of advancement is open to him. The
individualistic view that he is isolated from his fellows,
owes them nothing, and is a self-sufficient entity is re-
placed by a more feudal type vision where he views himself
as a part of an integrated process whose end "he conceives
more or less distinctly
.
"33 Thus a source of social solid-
arity and a kind of limitation upon the unbridled egoism
and rulelessness which equality of opportunity in the liberal
sense so often encourages is provided.
Equality of opportunity fits into this setting by
virtue of its being the major means by which positions in
33ibid
. , p. 475.
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the division of labor are to be apportioned. However
against the traditional liberal view of equality of oppor-
tunity, Durkheim's conception has two distinct advantages
for the conservative. First, it is not a wholly unre-
strained opportunity. Durkheim seems to be speaking of
an opportunity to go higher or lower within a specific
functional level. This avoids the sudden surges in mobil-
ity, upward or downward, which are so damaging to the
stability of both society and the individual. There is
room for mobility, but it is a restrained form of mobility.
The second advantage of this Kind of equality of opportunity
is that the stakes are not so high as they are in the liberal
version. if each individual has a function, and each func-
tion serves a useful societal purpose, and functions are
drawn together in a web of mutual rights and obligations,
then there is far less damage to a person's self-esteem if
he is at one of the lower levels in the division of labor.
It may be that under such circumstances, classifying posi-
tions as "higher" or "lower," at least in terms of their
usefulness to society, is itself a faulty means of distin-
guishing between functions. Thus, not as much is riding
upon the equality of opportunity race. Even the "losers"
do not feel useless, since their function, though not as
highly rewarded as that of the "winners," is nevertheless a
function which must be fulfilled.
Within this solution lies the conservative critique
of equality of opportunity. It is impossible to return the
consciousness of men to a point when they
_ ^
-1th eMity of opportunity, just as ifc ig impossiWe ^ ^bacK to the feudal era
. However, it U possible to confrQnt
equality of opportunity i„ such a way as fcQ ^ ^ a^
tive force both for the community and the individual
. The
way to accomplish this is to nlarpp ce limits upon it within the
frameworK of a society with a functional division of labor
.
By so doing, many of the conservative objections and criti-
cisms can be dealt with, without risKing the Kinds of prob-
lems that would emerge from more reactionary solutions.
The Radical Critique
The radical critique of the desirability of equality
of opportunity bears many similarities to that of the con-
servatives. The primary difference between the two is in
the question of solutions and alternatives to equality of
opportunity. Otherwise the critical themes-particularly
with regard to areas such as community, competition, and
the contemplative life, and the deficiencies of explaining
all human relationships and values on a market basis— are
given great attention in both perspectives.
In discussing the radical perspective examples will
be drawn primarily from contemporary thinkers. While
philosophers like Marx and Rousseau were both aware and
critical of the implications of equality of opportunity,
their criticisms were directed more generally against the
individualistic capitalist system as a whole, rather than
at equauty of opportunity per se . The latter ^ ^
a twentieth century issue
, requiring a mQre
capitalist context than existed in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries.
Thus, while Marx's views on equality of opportunity
can be surmised from many of his writings, specific refer-
ence to the concept is rarely made by him . instead, he
criticizes the ki nd of liberal capitalism, which would have
probably included eguality of opportunity in On the Jewish
these works criticism is made of the sorts of issues with
which liberal reformers, both then and now, were striving
to deal, particularly with regard to people's "rights."
For example, speaking of the desire for such rights under
capitalism, Marx claims that they are rights fit only for
egoistic man living under a competitive, individualistic
system.
None of the supposed rights of man, there-fore, go beyond egoistic man... an individual
separated from his community, withdrawn intohimself, wholly preoccupied with his privateinterests in accordance with his private ca-price. 35
Marx is criticizing a vision of man which ignores all
aspects of his being other than the capitalist conception of
34Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question
, in The Marx - En-gels Reader, ed. by Robert C. Tucker (New York: w. W. Norton
and Company, Inc., 1972); and Karl Marx, The Critique of theGotha Programme (New York: International Publishers, 197377
35Marx, On the Jewish Question
, p. 41.
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man as competitive, profit-motivated, egoistic individual.
However, with a conception of man which sees him as po-
tentially less materialistic and more cooperative, the Kinds
of rights which Marx labels as bourgeois can be transcended.
Another radical perspective is presented in an essay
by John Schaar, "Equality of Opportunity and Beyond," and
in Richard Sennett's and Jonathon Cobb's The Hidden In-
juries of Class. 36 Schaar speaks Qf inherently cQnser_
vative nature of the idea of equality of opportunity. it
primarily involves each person being given the chance to
develop his abilities along those lines which society is
most likely to reward. 37 since societies reward best those
abilities which are of greatest benefit to the preservation
of the existing order, it follows that equality of opportun-
ity will tend to induce "support for the established pattern
of values. "38 For one desiring substantial change in a more
egalitarian direction, equality of opportunity intensifies
problems, since in a liberal capitalist system, such a pat-
tern of values is highly inegalitarian in its consequences.
The conservative and inegalitarian implications of
such an allegedly "progressive" doctrine can be seen in a
36john H. Schaar, "Equality of Opportunity and Beyond,"
in Contemporary Political Theory
, ed. by Anthony De Crespigny
and Alan Wertheimer (New York: Atherton Press, Inc., 1970);
and Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb, The Hidden Injuries
of Class (New York: Vintage Books, Inc., 1972).
37Schaar, "Equality of Opportunity," p. 137.
38ibid.
number of other aspects of equality of opportunity> both
terms of the process involved a„d the results which^
Schaar
, in seeming tQ accept fche conservative uberai
assumpti o„ that ..natural ., hierarcMes dQ exiat> maintains
that equaiity of opportunity, by its abiUty tQ discover
and place in positions of authority such natura! elites
111 in fact increase and stabilize the inegualities in
society. NoW the
..truly superior win te placed in posi .
tions etching their ability, while the less talented^
be placed accordingly
.
39 Essentially „hat Schaar ^
-
to accept the meritocratic arguments about human abili-
ties, and then claim that their conclusions, while logical
are not desirable. While this position is not especially
strong regarding the ability to discover the talented and
the notion of "talent" itself, nevertheless it does illus-
trate a potential problem for the advocate of a more egal-
itarian society.
An area in which radicals find themselves strongly in
agreement with conservatives is over the issue of the exces-
sive competition engendered by eguality of opportunity.
Such a competitiveness cannot help but destroy most chances
for fraternal ties among persons. For example, Sennett and
Cobb discuss how difficult it is for persons to relate well
to one another because so many aspects of their lives are
tied up in an attempt to assert their own personal worth and
dignity. The asserting of worth and dignity is accomplished
39Ibid
. , pp. 138-139.
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primarily at the expense Qf others> whne> ^ ^ ^
dividua,, a person u alSQ Qf ^^^^
ties with others
. sennett ^ cobb quQte a ^
who wants to be liked and have close friends ^^ ^
"ho is al so caught up in the eompetitive race to outdo his
fellow workers.
It would be messy to apt- t-o k« * •
guys you
-re supposed to te vou"rf
ndS
"ith
to perform against. 40
' ,yOU e suPP°sed
This is similar to Schaar . s portrayal Qf equaUty Qf
opportunity as a doctrine whose vision of success involves
doing better than others, and not merely as wel l as one
can.41 The point is that equality of opportunity, at least
in the American context, sets up an arrangement which, be-
cause of its highly competitive nature, greatly limits, if
not eliminates, the chances and indeed the rationality of
maintaining close personal contacts with other persons,
particularly at the workplace. Furthermore, because the
desire for these ties still is strong, it lends itself to
contradictions within the individual. The conflict between
humane values and the desire to achieve, causes what Sennett
and Cobb refer to as "divides in self. "42 Such divides are
generally ignored or downplayed by contemporary advocates
of a liberal meritocracy, who prefer to see individuals as
40Sennett and Cobb, Hidden Injuries , p. 104.
41 Schaar, "Equality of Opportunity," p. 141.
42sennett and Cobb, Hidden In juries
, p. 210.
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esi re
being motivated primarily, if not exclusively, by the d
for rewards of wealth, power and prestige.
Closely related to the overly competitive atmosphere
which is so much a part of eguality of opportunity is the
very individualistic perspective which it encourages. it
is not exactly that eguality of opportunity causes a highly
individualistic outlook, as it is that the two feed into
each other in the context of liberal capitalism and the
class structure that it engenders. What this individualism
involves is a feeling, both by self and by others, that each
person is responsible for his ultimate position. The less
dependent on others that we become, the more admired and
respected we are. Those who are not independent are guilty
of "perhaps the ultimate weakness in American terms. "43 The
American hero as often portrayed in American literature, film
and television is the wholly self reliant individual with
few, if any, ties which could render him less independent.
This hero is embodied in such forms as the solitary Clint
Eastwood or John Wayne-type cowboy or detective, the Ayn
Rand "superman," the James Bond and other such independent
types whose ties are few precisely because they stand out
from and above the masses.
Such an ideal image, particularly when connected to an
image of equality of opportunity, creates or intensifies a
number of problems for those adhering to these images. As
conservatives point out, it makes the creation and retention
43lbid
. > P- 109.
-
-ose relationships very difficult
. ^^ ^
public interests wholly lr«n„ ,i irrational. Spending any time on
such matters diminishes one, self interests dug ^
constant competition from other individual aspiring fcQ"her
°" ^ * " leaves open the gues-
tron of what to do about the numerous non.heroes ^
society. Tnis situatiQn is exaccerbated by ^
today, in modern technological society, it has^ ex.
tremely difficult to he an "independent" individual. For
-ny Africans, the reality of their day to day lives in
which, particularly on the job, they are confronted with a
relatively faceless and powerless existence, in contrast to
the African, ideal of self
-rel iance and independence, creates
a series of problems and defenses which Sennett and Cobb
explore. For example, the willingness and desire to
"sacrifice" for one's children as a means of affirming '
one's dignity and freedom is closely examined in terms of
why such sacrifices are made and why they so often fail to
provide much satisfaction for any of those involved.
A major problem is that those who are viewed by others
or, more importantly, who view themselves as having "failed"
in the race are in a very precarious position both material-
ly and psychologically. Because each individual is regarded
as being responsible for his position, and because failure
is measured in terms of a lack of self-reliance and freedom,
and since such a lack is the common predicament for most
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nd
Americans, the problem is substantial both in Weuu n intensity a*,
in scope. Success or failure ^ ^is seen as purely a personal
problem. Because it is so personal, in terms of respon-
sibility, fai iure also leads to a lack of self-respect.
The "loser- merely becomes a part of the m„dli: r fi asses, with
neater self doubt and lover self-respect . 44 A mr sur_
veyed by Sennett and Cobb places responsibility for his
lack of success on himself by saying:
got
e
to
P
r:Kc
e
it
Ca
^°rder y°u around
'
You
RiiJ ?4..
CaUSe you need job.But it's more too, like they got a certainright to tell you what to do.4?
^
There is resentment here, but a good deal of such re-
sentment is channelled back at ourselves for not having
"made it" when the opportunity was there; even if we are
also aware that the opportunity was not egual to that of
others in the first place. The lower in terms of independ-
ence we define ourselves, a definition which is orimarily
based upon how much we must follow orders, the greater the
tendency to blame ourselves for our position in society. 46
This is a situation of which the egalitarian must be criti-
cal, whether eguality does or does not exist in society, so
as to avoid the dilemma of people feeling that they lack
dignity or are "superfluous" to their society. 47
44 Ibid . , pp. 182-183.
4
5
Ibid.
, p. 97.
46lbid
. , p. 96.
47Ibid
. , p. 266.
The politico consequences of equalitv -
a„ alm . . au y of opportunityre lso undesirable. Essentially these non n consequences areseen as both conservative and undemocratic. In ^ 1{iddentt™ « am. for example, the authors speaK of^
e image of equality of opportunity serves to » legitinize ..the authority of those on too Th=P- e vefy fa^ that they have
achieved hiqher positions indicates that they probably
reserve., to he there, and therefore that they also have
fight bacfc...48 The polifcical impUcat . ons Qf fch . s ^
clear. if those in power can be sure of the acqiiescence
or apathy of persons who are so filled with self
-doubts and
so wrapped up in their own personal struggles and contests
for dignity that they rarely have any inclination to parti-
cipate actively in the political process, then such a power
structure need concern itself only with responding to the
needs and desires of the upper levels of society. The lat-
ter group will include those relatively few indi.iduais who
are not filled with doubts about their ability or right to
become angry and/or activated on political issues.
Schaar touches upon a related issue when he says that
the inevitable result of eguality of opportunity is the
creation of an oligarchy. The meritocracy that supposedly
48 Ibid . p. 159.
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win derive from such equality of opportunity iK inherently
~"tiC
-
SCha" is * ^ro„g advocate of political
participation as an essenH=i _ntial part of human development
Equality of opportunity, tflth lts eraphasis Qn f ^
"best" individuals, encourages participation only by this
superior group. The rest of society come to be viewed, and
to view themselves, as less qualified to participate and
thereby absolve themselves of their political responsibil-
ities^ Thus
, equa] . ty Qf opportun . ty> wh . ch . s often
viewed as perhaps "the" democratic principle turns out on
examination to possess the potential of becoming an ex-
tremely anti-democratic principle. Perhaps more dangerous-
ly, it is an anti-democratic principle requiring no physical
coercion. Instead, all that is required is that persons
believe it does exist in their society; that it applies to
the political sphere in that the best should rule; and that
their own political participation is not all that valuable
to society or to themselves.
A further radical critique of equality of opportunity,
which clearly relates to its competitive aspect, concerns
its tendency to discourage emotional involvement both with
other persons and in our own activities. Sennett and Cobb
cite a number of situations in which persons come to see
such involvement as either a sign of weakness or a dangerous
risk.
49Schaar, "Equality of Opportunity," p. 151.
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if I care too much 50
not
--- 1 9et scared
Sennett ana Cobb see the class system as
for this sort of situation, hut it is interrelated with the
notions of eguality of opportunity and persona! responsi-
bxlity as wen. „ a person tecomes strongiy ^
another person or activity, and then fails in that involve-
ment, he is ieft in a very painful situation. Many students,
at an levels of education, from elementary school through
hrgh school, college and graduate school, probably adopt a
similar strategy to that used by worker cited above. That
is, a student either does not study or, if he does, , ries
to give the impression to his fellow students that he has
not studied. in each case the goal is to create an impres-
sion, either to himself or to others, that he has not made
the complete commitment to the activity - the activity in
this case involving the passing of an exam or course, if
the student does not pass the exam or course, he has not
"lost" very much. A ready made excuse, "I didn't study,"
is available to the student. This allows the student to
preserve a great deal more self-esteem and/or esteem from
others than if he did study, try his best, but still either
failed or passed at a mediocre level. Even failing an exam
can sometimes be seen as preferable to taking the risk of
looking inadequate to self and/or to others. With a failure
50Sennett and Cobb, Hidden Injuries , p. 217.
due to a lack of studying, the student can claim that, in
a sense, he has ^eely chosen" to fail the exam by virtue
of has decision not to study. Under these circumstances,
while others may guestion his judgment, they cannot gues-
tion his ability. since so much of a persons self-esteem
and esteem from others is tied in with his abilities, he
has not lost as much in the failure.
Further, there is always the possibility that the
student may do quite well despite not studying. if this
occurs, then the student is in the enviable position of
being viewed as "naturally, bright and able. Self-esteem
may also be increased as he looks at fellow students who
had to study to pass or who perhaps studied and still fail-
ed. He has, as it were, "beat the system" by doing well
without the commitment and subseguent effort and risk in-
volved in such a commitment. Equality of opportunity en-
courages this kind of behavior by affixing responsibility
for a person's behavior and position solely upon himself.
If such a person is the only one responsible for how well
he does in the various contests that he enters, and if the
individual is relatively unsure of himself in the first
place, it is much safer either to avoid entering such con-
tests or, to give less than a total effort when he does
enter. If he gives a total commitment and fails, he has
nothing left.
In such a way does eguality of opportunity serve to
militate against strong commitments. Hence, it adversely
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affects not only personal rel ationships, ^ ^ ^ ^
velopment of human potential in purely productive terms
Therefore, it is not even a particularly efficient or
meritocratic tool. It is possible ^ ^ g ^^
divided society, where the contests are more diverse, the
stakes not quite so high and the importance of surpassing
one's fellows not so crucial, eguality of opportunity could
be a very good policy.
„hat does see, clear, however, is
that the liberal version of equality of opportunity cannot
adequately deal with most of the critiques which radicals
and classical conservatives alike have made.
The liberal conception of equality of opportunity then,
is fraught with problems in terms of its desirability. How-
ever, judging equality of opportunity solely in terms of its
desirability is an inadequate approach, because the main
models for equality of opportunity are those which exist
in capitalist inegalitarian societies. If it can be shown
that even a close approximation to eguality of opportunity
is impossible in such a context, and that many of the prob-
lems discussed are not endemic to equality of opportunity
per se, then the question of its desirability may be posed
more favorably. For this reason, an exPloration of whether
equality of opportunity is attainable at all or, if not,
whether it can be more closely aPProximated in a non-
capitalist environment, will be undertaken in Chapters III
and IV.
CHAPTER III
THE SOCIAL LIMITATIONS OF EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY
If we accept the idea that eMty Qf £>
a highly desirable goal, then we have gone some distance in
establishing certain palters regarding how far and in
what general direction we wish society to go in its rela-
tionship with the individual citizen. m this and tie next
chapter the question of whether eguality of opportunity is
possible will be examined. if it does not make lQg . cai
sense to speax of such a concept in general or, if it does
not within the context of a stratified society in palt icular
then other issues must be confronted.
Discussions relating to the conceivability and feas-
ability of equality of opportunity in the United States can
be divided into two types. One type stresses the social
factors which seem to militate against equality of opportun-
ity, such as family structure, necessity and degree of
governmental intervention, economic costs, and the overall
class structure existing today in America. These factors
may, in a sense, be "curable," though whether such a cure is
likely, or even feasible, is a guestion which is very much
at issue.
The second type of criticism which has been leveled
against the conceivability of equality of opportunity rests
upon bioloqical factors, namely the alleged heritability of
certain Key traits
, particularly
^ ^^that a belief i„ the heritability^ ^^.^
possibility of equali ty of opportunity ever being reaazed
_UnUKe the soci ai factors weighing against ^
opportunity, the hiol ogical factors
, according fco thQse ^
9 ive then, most credence, Know of no
..cure." They are im_
*utable. This separatio„ between soci al and bi ologicaX
factors is l argely artificial. However, for the purpose of
dxstinguishing between the different Kinds of arguments
raised aga inst the conceivability and feasibility of equal-
ity of opportunity, the separation win temporarily be re-
tained
.
At the root of many of the arguments regarding the
feasability of equality of opportunity is the question of
just what factor or factors may be most responsible for
some winning and others losing the various struggles and
races that they enter. To clarify this somewhat, it is use-
ful to repeat the criterion for the concept of equality of
opportunity which was established in the Introduction:
Each individual has equal access to a
range of specified resources which
will enable that person to pursue
certain goals.
Given this criterion, how then can we both explain and
justify the fact that some do win while others do lose? if
all persons have "equal access," does it not seem likely that
they will all finish in approximately the same position? At
this point a counter-argument is often made to the effect
that equal access only applies at the beginning of the race
thSreafter
«—ially on their own
C°nteStantS
™' ^
-en an equal opportunUy
connection between this kind of docfcrine ^
laissez faire capitalism, with the race^^ ^ ^
-rt of "hidden hand .. mechanism to sort out the wheat from
the chaff. Theoretiraiiv 4- v.-c lly. this operates for the betterment
of society and the particular individuals
However, suppose that we wish to carry the phrase
"equal access" to its logicai conclusion, ^ that equal
access involves ajl those facto, which tend to make a dif-
ference in the results of a given race. it is no longer
sufficient to limit such access to the various training and
educational programs, and "fair tests open to all.- Now we
must also deal with the problems of equal access to an en-
vironment which will instill an equivalent amount of ability
and motivation and to which all other competitors had equal
access. Further, it may also become necessary to make cer-
tain that all such contestants have equal access to the
proper pre- and post-natal environments. But now the en-
vironment would be such that there really could be no sub-
stantial differences in aptitudes or motivations. It may be
that this position assumes that all persons are inherently
equal, particularly in the various cognitive abilities, and
that such an assumption is groundless. However, this, in
effect, is to opt for one of two possibilities. Either dif-
ferences in inherent (innate) traits are immutable and
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theref0rS ttere
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" — * of opportuni
,y _
eept within certain specific and somewhat^
or equality of opportunity can fully be attained if
inherent traits can somehow be equalized. Por what „re the
traits if not a resource to which all must have equai ^
if equality of opportunity is to be realized? Thus, if
winners are determined by their „hv,: ra , = •i un pnysic l environment, there
is not equality of opportunity; if they are determinpd by
parental class and status, there is not equality of opportun-
ity; and if they are determined by hereditary parental in-
telligence, there is not equality of opportunity.
Hence, we might argue that the presence of winners and
losers is itself an indicator that equality of opportunity
has not been attained. This is the basic problem regarding
the feasability of equality of opportunity. An analysis of
what the obstacles are and why it would be so difficult to
overcome them win constitute the remainder of this chapter.
Autonomy
The essence of the case for equality of opportunity is
that it can be utilized to find the best individuals via the
mechanism of fair competition for specific and scarce re-
wards. The emphasis is upon the responsibility of the in-
dividual to find and establish his or her own place in
society. Failure or success in such an endeavor, as well
as in achieving a person's overall goals in a society which
has equality of opportunity, is the responsibility of the
90
individual. We owe neither gratitude nor^ fcQ^
else for our position, except perhaps insofar as we are
fateful or ungrateful for having been given ^
bxlity in the first place. within this framework is the
implicit premise that individuals are autonomous bei„gs who,
regardless of the world which they Know and have come into
contact with, can and do make their own choices. It would
not be wholly consistent to speak of complete individual
responsibility if we are coerced, manipulated or socially
into making or not making certain decisions. Nor can auton-
omy easily he reconciled with the idea that people
-s wants,
to a significant degree, are themselves a result of external
forces acting upon the individual. Hence, the first question
to be raised regarding the possibility of equality of oppor-
tunity centers on this issue of individual autonomy and what
is involved in the makinq of a choice.
Suppose, for example, that we accept the existentialist
theory regarding the pervasiveness and necessity of human
choice. If each of us is, in fact, fully responsible for
our choices and actions, then eguality of opportunity would
seem to be a viable goal. A case could be made that little,
if anything, need be done in the way of external measures to
help facilitate eguality of opportunity. Perhaps, if society
erects specific legal barriers to our aspirations, then that
would be an infringement upon freedom. But, if such barriers
were removed, then the responsibility would fall upon the
individual. However, the assumption that once specific legal
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barriers are removed we are ] ^Ft- ^ uleft to choose freely among
alternative means and ends ic * v,-! u-,a S a highly questionable sup-
position.
It is true that prominent existentialist theorists
Particularly ,ean Paul Sartre, rarely deal with issues liKe
equality of opportunity in any specific way. Sartre's con-
cern is more with the human condition itself. Hence his
notion of existence preceding essence is basically an at-
tempt to expend upon a certain Kind of freedom inherent in
each individual's existence. That is, people exist first;
what they do and become within that existence is a matter
of their own actions based upon their own choices. They
are not
-born- to do any one specific thing or to fl3 1 any
particular role, rather, they can and do make of themselves
what they choose. Persons who deny responsibility for
their choices are accused by Sartre of acts of "bad faith."
They are attempting to evade the necessity for choices and
hence to evade their freedom and responsibility.
Bad faith is an attempt to lie to oneself. For ex-
ample, the Freudian analysis, to which Sartre makes numerous
allusions, is, in existentialist terms, premised on such an
attempt at bad faith. Placing responsibility upon uncon-
scious and repressed drives, which the individual cannot
grasp and/or deal with is, to Sartre, merely a means of
evading one's freedom. Sartre denies that one might be un-
conscious of certain drives and therefore be unable both to
control them and to be held responsible for them. "Drives"
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are themselves the product of the ^.^ ^
as such, are conscious acts. Por example, the individual
who miqht be classified as "suffering from an inferiority
complex" is, in Sartre's estimation, acting (which itself
implies a conscious decision) upon his own choice to pre-
sent such an image, both to himself and to the world, m
so doing, he hopes to evade some of the responsibility for
his actions, m Sartre- s terminology, his "essence" is to
see himself as inferior. Such an individual is, from his
own perspective therefore, neither free nor responsible to
the extent that his various activities performed are done be-
cause he has an inferiority complex. He no longer acts as
a free individual
- he acts in a certain manner because he
is an individual afflicted with an inferiority complex and
therefore not an autonomous being. Sartre regards such an
individual as afflicted only with bad faith. He is still a
free and responsible person who has chosen inferiority as
the way that he wants to be for others. 1 It is an attempt
at escape, but an attempt which not only exhibits bad faith,
but which also is destined to fail. The act of bad faith is
itself an act of freedom; that is, a choosing not to be free.
For Sartre, one is free in all respects except to not be
free
.
This position is weak if Sartre is maintaining that all
persons are equally free to choose from the same number and
Ijean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (New York:
Washington Square Press, 1966), pp. 591-592.
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sh
e are
s
kinds of alternatives Qarfro v,S t e
'
ho^ver, does distingui
between the different- »cH *. •erent situations" with which peopl,
faced. For example, home and educationstional environment i„
a situation which obviouslv rHy differs among various indivi-
duals and classes. Nevertheless Sari-ron i , t e asserts that each
individual, regardless of situa^™-uation, is egually free to
decide upon the meaning of his situation and hence, the
Particular action or inaction which is appropriate for him
to undertake in response to his situation.
Thus, we are not responsible for our situation in
terms of its objective existence, but we are very much
responsible for how we define the situation.
For to be free is not to choose the historicworld in which one arises... but to chooseoneself m the world whatever this may be. 2
We are never locked into a particular situation be-
cause, since we are in a constant process of "becoming,., we
are never identical with what we have already made of our-
selves. 3 To use one of Sartre's examples, if a worker ac-
cepts a subsistence wage because it is the only way in which
he can survive, he is still free in that he has chosen a
specific response to his situation. He has made a choice
regarding the value of his life by choosing barely surviving
over not surviving at all.
This attempt by Sartre to deal with the issue of the
2Ibid
. , p. 668.
3Richard Bernstein, Praxis and Action (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), p. 137.
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individual situation does little to alter or rectify a
fundamental problem in his theory. If Sartre . s
are different for each individual, then it is only through
an underestimation of their significance that Sartre can
claim that each individual remains egually free insofar as
his choice of how he will define such situations are con-
cerned. Sartre maintains that it is bad faith on the part
of the individual which prevents him from fully exercising
this freedom. it is, however, only through an overly in-
dividualistic and vague conception of freedom that he can
hold this position. it may well be that all individuals
have a capacity to say "yes" or "no" even if it is a purely
Physical capacity. But this says little regarding the wider
differences in the quantity and quality of the choices
which are made materially available to different indivi-
duals, as well as the great inequalities with regard to the
risks and rewards for the different individuals who make
such choices. 4 Further, this position of Sartre's pa /S in-
sufficient attention to the fact that it is quite possible
to manipulate people in such a way that they are not moti-
vated to act in the manner which Sartre describes. To put
it more directly, it may be possible to render persons in-
capable not only of making rational choices, but of making
any choices at all
.
4Sartre does make note of the fact that to have the
freedom to choose one's projects (which he affirms as being
equal for all), is not the same as to have an equal chance
of succeeding in such projects (which he admits are not
equal for all).
95
For example, suppose person x ^^^
situation B. situation B is doing significant both
to X and to his community. Purther> suppQse ^ x ^
« he so desires and chooses, change his situaUon fcQ /
which would he a vast improvement for all concerned. Por
Sartre, regardless of which situation X does choose, he is
responsible for that choice. However, suppose that X has
been, in a sense, programed in such a way that he either
prefers B to A, does not see A as a vi able alternative, or
has been rendered incapable of executing any such choice.
Sartre, to be consistent, must deny the very possibility
of such intensive programing. Therefore, he would regard
any of the above possibilities as being mere rationaliza-
tions and hence, acts of bad faith. As Sartre points out,
it is still the responsibility of the individual, regard-
less of how he has been socialized or manipulated, to dis-
cover and create himself. 5 He can make "errors" as regards
how he goes about attaining his ends, but this does not
alter the fact that the choice of the end itself is an act
of freedom on the part of the individual.
In terms of the possibility of eguality of opportunity,
Sartre is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, it may be
that eguality of opportunity is implicit in the existential-
ist notion that existence precedes essence. All are egually
capable of, and responsible for, making the choices which
5Jean Paul Sartre, Situations (New York: George
Braziller, Inc., 1965), pp. 364-368.
possi-
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determine what they are. On the other hand Mn a, as soon as we
introduce the notion of different
"situations," the
bility of attaining equality of opportunity is sharply
diminished. Por even if We continue to maintain, as Sartre
apparently does, that all do have the opportunity, as well
as the responsibility and necessity, to make their own
lives in an autonomous manner, and that such programming
as was alluded to in the previous paragraph can be overcome
by the individual; nevertheless the fact that the situa-
tions of people do differ, implicitly indicates that the
ability to consciously make decisions is not going to be
equally distributed. We can maintain that all are capable
of doing X, and that all should do X, without implying that
all are equally capable of doing X. Some may have greater
barriers to overcome than do others, though in terms of
moral autonomy, Sartre would deny this assertion.
For example, Sartre states that the slave and t he
master are equally free to choose their projects, though
they each see and experience different worlds. in explain-
ing this, Sartre appears to imply, though he does not use
this terminology, that slave and master are within different
paradigms and each makes choices, forms projects, and de-
fines himself within his respective paradigms. For a parti-
cular slave and master this may be the case. However, a
possibility which Sartre does not acknowledge is that a
particular paradigm (or situation) may render those within
it incapable of making choices, forming projects, and defining
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themselves ,t all . If such is the^ ^ ^ ^
less to speaK of the slave being as freg as ^ ^
for that matter, to speaK o, the slave as being "free" in
any capacity. This will especially be the case if the
slave's paradign, negates even the possibility of suicide.
As alluded to earlier c-.^
_
ner, Sartre prefers to see such possi-
bilities, as a mere evasion on the part of the slave - an
act of bad faith.
This illustrates one of the fundamental difficulties
with Sartre's exposition of freedom and responsibility. m
a number of the cases which Sartre presents, including the
example of the individual who accepts the subsistence wage
cited earlier, the "free choice" ultimately comes down to
either an acceptance of a particular situation or order, or
suicide. Hence, Sartre makes reference to one "choosing"
to do something, despite the fact that the only alternative
is death, because of the value which one chooses to place
upon his life. in Sartre's presentation, the alternatives
of life and death are analogous to any other sets of alter-
natives in the sense that one is condemned to make choices
autonomously, and that any rational adult knows that the
possibility of suicide always exists. Such a consciousness
of suicide renders it a perennial choice for persons. Yet
it does seem that an explanatory theory which does not ap-
pear to see even a prima facie case in favor of the alterna-
tive of living over dying has some fundamental limitations.
If a prima facie case does exist in the minds of most persons
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in favor of survival, can a person be said to be making a
completely free choice when
, he prefers life at a subsist-
ence wage to suicide? Are not the scales weighed suffi-
ciently in one direction so as to render suicide a more
difficult and less l ikeiy alternative to be chosen?
Sartre's repeated reliance upon suicide as an alter-
native to any particular life situation is, therefore, an
evasion of the issue of free choice and individual responsi-
bility. This evasion is heightened by the fact that suicide
is not as viable an alternative for a person brought up with
the belief that suicide is a mortal sin which condemns its
perpetrator to eternal damnation. To this last example,
Sartre again would claim that this is merely an example of
bad faith and that the individual, by defining himself in
such terms, has simply attempted to escape from his free-
dom and responsibility, an attempt destined to fail because
the act of defining is itself an act of freedom. However,
the question again arises, even granting that the choice of
suicide does exist continuously for all persons, as to
whether this implies that all are egually free to make such
a choice.
The existentialist position, with its heavy emphasis
upon the autonomy of the individual, his freedom and his
responsibility to make the choices that define him as an
individual, still has a great deal of difficulty accepting
the possibility of equality of opportunity. Sartre is not
speaking of an equal opportunity to attend college or obtain
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desirable jobs. He i <5 -; M o4-~ ^1S> instesd, speaking to the question
of human nature itself; to the question, that is, of
whether all do possess the freedom and capacity to tran-
scend their environment, their past, and other such
"situations... Sartre's answer is in the affirmative, but
for the purposes of this essay what is more significant is
that regardless of whether or not we accept this question-
able assertion, this in no way points towards an assertion
of the existence of equality, of opportunity to make such
choices. All may be free and responsible, but Sartre has
not shown that all are equally free and responsible.
Stuart Hampshire, in Thought and Action
, addresses a
number of these same issues in a manner somewhat different
from that of Sartre. For Hampshire, the key element with
regard to freedom and responsibility appears to be the
individual's self-conscious awareness of his particular
situation. Thus, for example, in the critical area of un-
conscious motivation, Sartre maintains that it does not
exist and that to justify actions on such grounds is bad
faith. It is also contradictory since we can hardly attempt
to justify an action unless we are conscious of it. Further,
to Sartre, there are no limits to our ability to be self-
conscious. We act only in ways that we choose to act.
Hampshire, while approaching this perspective, does not
make the same assertion. He does accept the idea that per-
son can act in ways that they do not .'choose" to act to the
extent that they are not aware of, and therefore not
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responsible for, such activities. We are not really free
and responsible individuals engaging in deliberate actions,
until we become self-consciously aware of ourselves.
6
Further, unconscious drives can exist and the individual is
not fully responsible for them, or for actions resulting
from these drives. However, as soon as we do become more
aware of the relationship of such drives to our thoughts
and actions, then we also become more responsible. a per-
son can then identify his own limitations. Once thi, has
been accomplished, the freedom to act or not to act, or at
least to form intentions to overcome our drives, becomes
operative
.
When Hampshire discusses the idea of the individual's
freedom with regard to forming intentions, though nol neces-
sarily with regard to specific actions, he approaches Sartre-
view that a person's freedom to choose his projects bears no
necessary connection to "success" in such projects. There
does seem to be more emphasis by Sartre upon the individual's
responsibility to be self-conscious, yet both authors regard
the possibility of transcending one's own sphere to be ever
present. Like Sartre, Hampshire draws a line regarding how
far we can remove the individual from responsibility. His
contention that all individuals have the responsibility to
try to improve, rather than acquiesce in, their particular
6 Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action (New York:
Viking Press, Inc., 1959), p. 175.
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situation is of a highly existentialist nature. 7 what is
moBt crucial for Hampshire is that the individual be aware
of himself. A person can excuse himself for actions com-
mitted in the past, prior to the development of self-con-
sciousness, but with self-consciousness comes freedom and
responsibility, both for present and future actions. What
divides Sartre from Hampshire is that the latter implies
that total self-consciousness may be impossible given the
influence of social context. Thus, we can move from less
self-consciousness to more self-consciousness, and there-
fore from being less free and responsible to being more free
and responsible, but we cannot become fully free and respon-
sible in the existentialist sense that Sartre appears to be-
lieve possible. Differing environments, and particularly
differing economic conditions, can render the likelihood of
self-consciousness as more or less likely. Lucien Goldmann,
for example, claims, like Marx, that one's level of conscious-
ness is, in large part, a product of one's social environ-
ment. 8 Likewise, as shall be shown, a stratified society
renders equality of opportunity impossible.
One possible way out of this problem might be to main-
tain that if an individual were so programmed or conditioned
as to render him incapable of attaining self
-consciousness
,
or even attempting to attain it, then that individual would
7Ibid., p. 186.
8Lucien Goldmann, The Human Sciences and Philosophy
(London: Cape Publishers, Inc., 1969), pp. 87-89.
102
no longer constitute a human being
. ^
remains as to whether this implies that ^ are
capable of self-consciousness. If such avareness is^
difficult for SOmG to attain than for others, or if forming
the intention to become aware is more difficult for some
than for others, than even at this basic level, equality of
opportunity cannot be said to exist. It may be conceivab!e
that complete equality of opportunity, in the sense of self-
consciousness and autonomy, could be brought about, but only
under a very different set of circumstances than currently
exist in the United States.
It is clear that if the existentialist position, or at
least Sartre's representation of that position, is difficult
to reconcile with complete equality of opportunity, then
surely visions of the human condition which place less
emphasis on human freedom, choice, autonomy and responsi-
bility are also inconsistent with the kind of equality of
opportunity which we have been discussing. if Sartre is un-
able to present a solid case that equality of opportunity
either can or does exist, it is unreasonable to expect a
B. F. Skinner or a Karl Marx, with their respective images
of human action and potential, to be more able to overcome
the problems inherent in the full realization of equality of
opportunity.
B. F. Skinner, while perhaps willing to admit of the
possibility of attaining equality of opportunity, implies
that such an endeavor would require a massive amount of
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social intervention and engineering. 9 Given the Veight
which he attaches to the external environment in terms of
forming a person's personality, desires and capacities,
Skinner must call for a basically egual environment for all
if equality of opportunity is to be a viable goal. m
Sartre's terminology, the "situations., of all must be made
equal if all are to have an equal opportunity. As has been
shown, Sartre denies that such a process must take place
since the meaning and significance of the individual's
situation rests upon the individual himself and the choices
that he makes. For Skinner, the process that takes place is
almost the exact opposite of what Sartre describes. To
Skinner, the individual at birth is lacking free will, in-
tentions or expectations, except for those basic drives re-
lated to self-preservation. The environment with which the
individual comes into contact makes or conditions the indi-
vidual as he grows. Thus, if all individuals come into con-
tact with the same environment, they all will be "made" in
the same way and hence all will have equal opportunity.
How far back into the individual's life such engineer-
ing must be utilized, and how far back Skinner is willing to
go, is not of particular importance here. 10 Suffice it to
9See B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1972).
10See authors such as Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social
Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1958); and George Kateb, Utopia and Its
Enemies (New York: Schocken Books, Inc., 1963), for
critiques of Skinner's position.
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say that while both^ ^ ^
^"^ " as a poSsibiUty. only gartre
nects it with a notion o, human freedom and ^.^ ^
Skinner, such a vision is nonsensical>^ ^^ ^
how and why persons make cho . ces at ^ ^ Ms
description « what, in fact
, such choices ^
SKinner-s world, the idea of an individual being responsible
for his choices is itself contradictor,. Since autonomy is
eliminated and we are virtually powerless to affect the so-
called "choices" that we make, we can hardly be held re-
sponsible for them. The point, for Skinner, is that given
a particular stimulus, we are conditioned to respond in a
particular manner. Therefore, SKinner is not speaking of
choice at all, but instead is discussing conditioning and
responses. Under these conditions, there is no real freedom
or responsibility on the part of the subject. U
A third method of dealing with the notion of human
choice, freedom, and equality of opportunity is that of
which Karl Marx and Jean Piaget make use. m this third
approach there is a kind of synthesis of both Sartre and
Skinner. According to this approach, an interaction pro-
cess takes place between the individual and his environment
in which the individual simultaneously shapes and is shaped
by the external world. In Marxian terminology, peoples-
consciousness are a reflection of the material conditions
llNoam Chomsky, "The Case Against B. F. Skinner," TheNew York Review of Books
. December 30, 1971, p. 19.
around them. it iq nrM- u0t
'
h°Wever
'
a reflection sincepersons use thpi r „ •e consciousness to try to alter these
-teriax conditions, m so doing, the newly created
-terial conditions which they have helped to create, af-fect the™ in different ways leading to a different con-
sciousness and to the livelihood that hoth material condi-
tions and consciousness win again he altered in the future
Hence the individual and the environment are products of
each other in an ongoing interact- inny y eractio , and cannot be spoken
of in isolation from one another.
According to this paradigm, therefore, both Sartre and
Skinner are incorrect in that each of them sees the process
as fundamentally a one-way street. Skinner views environment
as determining the total make up of the individual insofar as
his wants, capacities and choices are concerned. Sartre,
while admitting that the external world does have an effect
upon the individual by defining, in some vague manner, the
parameters of his choices, nevertheless is unwilling to see
the significance of this factor and hence regards the iso-
lated individual as totally autonomous and therefore totally
responsible for all of his choices. The Marxist position
does not absolve the individual from responsibility for his
choices and actions, but it is far more willing than Sartre
to accept and deal with the importance of the parameters of
consciousness which the environment creates, and with the
related problem of how such parameters can be transcended.
The fact that the parameters can be transcended at all in
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no Way eliminates their signi fi cance in tMs
perspective. The dialectic process is still at the root or
an individual's actions and conse^ently, the freedom and
responsibility of the individual is neither as total as
Sartre claims nor as illusory as Skinner asserts. m this
process, the individual does not merely react to his en-
vironment but, by his actions, helps to create his environ-
ment. Man is active, but not in the same sense that Sartre
describes. His choices do mate a difference, and not just
for the individual actor.
Jean Piaget adopts a position similar to Marx regard-
ing human action and responsibility, though his terminology
is less political and his emphasis primarily upon the devel-
opment of the child. He too sees behavior as developing
through the interaction of the individual with the environ-
ment, as opposed for example, to the stimulus - response
mechanism that Skinner regards as fundamental to human be-
havior. Nor does Piaget regard man as a passive recepticle
of experience. Instead, the individual is active and does
form intentions and purposes. 12 In addition, the individual
is active in the sense that he can and does make adjustments
as he comes into contact with the outside world. The inter-
action process which takes place simultaneously involves
12j. mcv. Hunt, "The Impact and Limitations of the
Giant of Developmental Psychology," in Studies in Cognitive
Development
: Essays in Honor of Jean Piaget
, ed. by David
Elkind and John H. Flavell (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1969), p. 8.
ex-
ex-
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both "assimilation., (an adjusting of the environment to fit
oneself), and "accomodation" (an adjusting of oneself to fit
the environment). 13 The individual organi2es ^
experience does not just directly affix itself to him. Thus,
as he views the world, there is both an assimilation by the
subject and an accommodation of the subject. How he organ-
izes the experience determines the manner in which the
perience determines, or influences, his future. To an
tent, the individual, through his activity, does help to
construct his own world.
It is important to re-emphasize that the large role
that both Marx and Piaget ascribe to human activity is guite
dissimilar to that of Sartre. Piaget is careful never to
exclude egual roles for experience and choice in shaping
human action. This is the basis for the interactionist
approach. For example, Piaget does not regard it as pos-
sible that there can be a sudden and radical jump in the
cognitive development of the individual. The reason for
this is that:
. . .the organism can assimilate only those
things which past assimilations have pre-
pared it to assimilate . 14
Change via assimilation must be slow and gradual,
leading to continuity in development. This being the case,
13John H. Flavell, The Developmental Psychology of
Jean Piaget (Princeton, NJ : D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.,
1963), p. 19.
14 Ibid
. , p. 50.
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it is clear that Sartre's autonomous individual, able to do
or at least to choose to do, whatever he pleases regardless
of hrs past, is an impossibility in Piaget 's paradigm. IB_
stead, Piaget criticizes the existentialist image of the
"free" man by asserting that the individual who believes
himself to be totally free only succeeds in becoming uncon-
sciously affected by others. 15
This discussion indicates the immense difficulty in
attaining full equality of opportunity. The "equal access
to a range of specified resources" aspect of the definition
of equality of opportunity obviously can be extended to mean
that all individuals must either already be equal, or be made
equal, prior to the attainment of equality of opportunity,
in fact, we might be able to make the case that all persons
must not only be equal, but also the "same." Thus an idea
which seems to be premised on the notion of diversity, com-
petition, freedom, and winners and losers, may instead imply
a rigidly conformist, tightly engineered and stagnant society.
The conclusion to be drawn here is that total equality of op-
portunity may be impossible due to certain aspects of the
human condition. However, to reiterate a central theme of
this essay, different contexts may be more or less conducive
to a closer approximation of equality of opportunity than
currently exists.
15jean Piaget, Insights and Illusions of Philosophy
(New York: World Publishing Company, 1971), p. 16.
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The Question of Talent
in dealing with the poSsi bi lity of equality of oppor-
tunity, a number of the more substantial issues and related
problems may be discussed through confronting a specific
issue
-
that of an individual's talent. The concept of
talent is generally defined as something which a particular
individual "has," much like a part of his body, usually gain-
ed either through an hereditary genetic endowment, or simply
via chance. For a talent of any sort to be utilized, there
must be some combination of natural endowment, environment
and individual motivation, if this is what constitutes ta-
lent, and if, as is generally believed, talent does have an
important connection to our chances for success in the world,
then the implications of talent for equality of opportunity
are substantial. On the other hand, if we argue that there
is no such quality as talent, or that the "natural endowment-
aspect of talent has been highly exaggerated, then there are
different but equally significant implications for equality
of opportunity.
Let us first assume that talent is a sort of "gift"
which is an essential part of a particular individual. In
terms of the notion of equality of opportunity, one of the
first and most obvious points to be made about such talent
is that the possession of it is not "earned." The exercise
of talent may involve something which the individual does,
but the mere possession of it is a result of either heredity
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or chance, and therefore ig ming^^ ^
dual has neither control nor responsi bili ty . The relation.
shrp of this issue to equality of opportunity can ta seen
m the following example. Suppose that an art contest is to
be held with the winner being the individual who paints the
finest painting. In their attempt tQ ^
the judges are not told the names of the contestants until
after they have selected the winning work. Hence, the
judges can only use fhpir Qc,4-i^4- • • ,Y tne aesthetic judgment in determining
the best painting. Therefore a claim can be made that there
is an egual opportunity for each of the contestants to win
the contest. Further, to ensure that it's not just a matter
of some having more expensive equipment than others, all are
supplied with the same quality and quantity of supplies.
Before going on, two assumptions must be made. First,
it must be reiterated that we are assuming that such an en-
tity as innate artistic talent does exist in unequal quan-
tities among different individuals. Second, we are assuming
that the judges' standards do conform, at least minimally, to
some objective standards of what constitutes "good art."
Given the above conditions and assumptions, it follows
that, all other things being equal, the most talented is
most likely to win such a contest. Now the question arises:
Is such a contest truly run on the principle of equality of
opportunity? Certainly the "race" is not unfair to the ex-
tent that personal biases in terms of a contestant's wealth
or fame are not relevant to the outcome. On the other hand,
Ill
« it fair, and is it equality Qf opportunity> . f ^ ^
come of the race is foreordained by the chance distribu-
tion of talent? it may be argued that the possession of
the talent constitutes only a part of the requirements for
winning the contest. Contestants must be wining and able
to mate the fullest use of such talent, m fact, it is
quite possible that a less talented individual, who is will-
ing to put in a greater effort, may succeed in having his
painting judged superior and thereby win the contest. This
argument might conclude that equality of opportunity does
exist in that it is possible for anyone, regardless of in-
nate talent, to win.
The above argument suffers from the defect of not coming
to grips with the fundamental issue, it is not that the pos-
session of some innate talent necessarily allows us to win
those contests which involve the use of that talent; rather
it is that when we possess a talent, we are at a decided
advantage over those without, or with less of, that particu-
lar talent. Effort does not become the chief criterion for
determining who wins because if a talented contestant and an
untalented contestant exert the same amount of effort, the
talented individual will win every time. Where does this
leave eguality of opportunity?
Perhaps we should eliminate the guestion of talent al-
together and deal exclusively with effort. Rewards and vic-
tors could be determined by the amount of effort that is put
into a particular enterprise. Certain obvious problems arise
112
vith regard to the ability and possi bi lity of accurately
determining and measuring an individual's effort. This
would he particularly difficult in dealing with the measur-
ing of artistic effort since the very notion of somehow de-
termining how strongly an individual is taxing his creative
potential seems almost beyond the realm of the possible
Nevertheless, this sort of approach does have its adherents.
John Gardner, in his boo*, Excellence, attempts to mate the
case that since all are not born egual insofar as talent is
concerned, the optimum solution is to have equality of op-
portunity to attain some kind of "excellence. "16 m other
words, equality of opportunity to do excellently that which
one is most able and suited to do. An equality of opportun-
ity for excellence, but without all striving to attain the
same kind of excellence. This may better fit the tradition-
al American vision of equality of opportunity insofar as it
appears to place almost complete responsibility upon the
individual and not on genes, luck, or some other attribute
beyond personal control. However, even if it were possible
to determine accurately for each individual the general
direction in which he or she should strive to achieve excel-
lence, Gardner's position, nevertheless, exhibits a weakness
which collapses the foundation of his ideal of equality of
opportunity.
Gardner's problem lies with two interrelated issues:
16John W. Gardner, Excellence (New York: Perennial
Library, Inc., 1961).
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is man fully autonomous? Is ,effort „ a part Qf ^ .^.^
dual himself, or is it, at least in part, environmentally
determined? Both questions may, in this context, be sub-
sumed under the issue of talent. If
, for example
, Qne ^
be "born ambitious," a p0si tion to which few ^
individuals do not have the same opportunity to engage in a
sustained effort to attain excellence. However, if up-
bringing helps determine the degree of effort in which one
is willing to engage, then equality of opportunity is again
an impossibility as long as different individuals have dif-
ferent upbringing. The third possibilities is the acceptance
of a view of man as fully autonomous, but here too some re-
sponse has to be made to the question of ..why" some indivi-
duals are willing and able to put in a stronger effort than
are others. it will not suffice to respond to such a ques-
tion by stating that "that's the way people are," or some
similar rejoinder, particularly if the way people are has
been isolated from both hereditary and environmental factors.
In essence, Gardner's position is but a restatement of
the functionalist position in which each individual finds his
or her proper niche. The only important distinction is that
Gardner's view is somewhat more pluralistic. He places re-
latively few guidelines as to which areas of achieving excel-
lence are superior and which should be discouraged:
provided that I am engaged in a socially
acceptable activity, some kind of excel-
lence is within my reach. 17
17Ibid
. , p. 157.
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Nor
GX-
This, however, dnpcoes uttle to resolve the essentia! i
relating to the attainment of eguality of opportunity
do Gardner- s guidelines for how and where to achieve
cellence eliminate the possi bi i ity of striving for excel-
lence in activities which could, with some objectivity, he
deemed trivial or useless m o~ •. a society which wishes to
encourage activity beneficial t-nr cia o the community as a whole,
such vague guidelines are counter-productive . 18 They do
,
however, serve the function of socializing children, parti-
cularly in the educational process, into the belief that all
do have a chance via equality of opportunity. Generally,
despite what Gardner may imply, the goal desired is money.
Le
^!f!^nG that 311 • °r at least most, individuals
^1^^^ This assumption does
not imply that all are born with the same kind of talent,
nor that all are born with the same amount of talent. We
can also assume that each individual is sufficiently auton-
omou^nd^responsible so as to be capable of the same degree
of effort. Given such assumptions, is it not possible to
Accept equality of opportunity as a viable possibility in
the sense that we could create an environment more conducive
to allowing or encouraging all persons to develop their re-
spective talents to the fullest? Even aside from serious
difficulties inherent in the above assumptions, the answer
1 ft
°For a criticism of Gardner which, though elitist intone, does make some telling points, see David Lyons,
"Equality and Excellence," Ethics , LXXVI (July, 1966),
302 ™™ 304 •
must still be in the negative.
in the first place> there ^ ^^ ^
of opportunity which must be distinguished. There is the
equality of opportunity to develop our talents, whatever
they may be; and there is equauty ^ oppQrtunity tQ
be a "success" in society, a notion which, in African
soclety, generally implies some combination of wealth, sta-
tus, and happiness. For the former, the chief obstacle has
to do with equalizing motivation, for the purposes of this
argument we are assuming that such an equalization is pos-
sible. However, to allow for each individual to have an
equal opportunity to develop his or her talent requires a
number of pre-conditions which are unlikely to be attained.
Regardless of what our inherent talent may be - and it must
be kept in mind that we are now speaking in terms of in-
herent possession rather than environmentally produced ta-
lent
-
it nevertheless follows that if we are in an environ-
ment which severely restricts or perhaps negates the develop-
ment of that talent, then we do not have the same opportunity
to develop that talent as those born into more advantageous
environments. For example, if one has a talent for painting,
but is born into a poor rural family in which it is necessary
to labor almost continuously to survive, the chances for
developing such a talent are considerably diminished, it
may be possible for a truly motivated and talented indivi-
dual to overcome such obstacles and thereby to develop this
particular talent, but this hardly can lead to the conclusion
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that such an individual has had an opportunity equal to that
of the child of more wealthy parents. similarly, to borrov
from an example discussed by Charles Frankel
, if an indivi-
dual is born in the heart of New York city, he is not going
to have the same opportunity to develop any innate talents
that he might have to play baseball as he would have were
he born and raised in the more wide open spaces of Oklahoma. 19
in both of the above cases it is still possible for the
talented but environmentally disadvantaged individual to give
his best effort at developing his particular talent. Yet he
is less likely to try if the environment acts to discourage
such an attempt, and is more likely to fail should be make
the attempt. it is not at all an easy matter to ensure that
all have an equal opportunity to develop their talents. Even
if we assume that all are equal with respect to putting forth
the same amount of effort, it is also unlikely that people
born into different environments which directly affect their
chances of developing their specific talents will be assured
of the means to put forth the extra effort which would be
required
.
The fact that talent, regardless of its source, re-
quires at least minimally favorable environmental conditions
in order for it to develop, indicates that talent cannot be
examined or judged in isolation from the environment in
which it has or has not been nurtured and developed. Nor
19Frankel, "Equality of Opportunity," 202-203.
thrs particular type of problem limited to the
regurrrng two individuals having same ^ ^
-isea in the same environment in order ^ them ^ ^
eqUallty
" - aevexop such talent
. There u
also the problem of two individuals having ^^^^ kinds
of talents beinq raised ^g m the same environment, m this
case, we must deal with t-v^ i ,i the i lkeiy possibility that the
same environment may be faro more conducive to the develop-
o* one form of talent over another. Thus
, what appears
to be impli cit in the attaint of eguality of opportunity
to develop a talent is „ot merely the same "neutral., en-
virons for all
- a requirement impossible to meet even
under the best of circumstances - but rather
, the
of that variety of environments suitable for the develops
of various talents. Even Skinner would probably regard this
goal as being unattainable.
TO conceive of meeting such a goal, the attainment of
equality of opportunity would require that we somehow dis-
cover at a very early age just what each child's talent was,
and then direct that child into an environment conducive to
the development of that talent, and to which all other child-
ren, possessing the same talent in the same quantity, would
also be sent. Hence society would become subdivided, at
least at the level of child rearing and education, into
numerous areas by talent. The problems of such an under-
taking are legion, and they are intensified by the necessity
of dealing with, for example, the child who appears to have
an abundance of different talents as well as the chi ld who
though talented, may retire more time to develop.
,s re-
gards the former, society would either haVe to establish
its priorities as to which of the child's talents were most
important, though the question of whether this prior: ty is
with regard to society or to the individual would also have
to be examined; or it might simply try to establish a
separate environment for the multi-talented child, a sort of
"renaissance man" environment. As for the talented but slow
developing child, here too the difficulty in establishing
equality of opportunity would be compounded by the negative
psychological effects which might well be the result for
such a child as he perceives others with similar talent
progressing at a more rapid rate of development. Thus, with
respect to the environment, to standardize it for all or to
leave it as it is would be insufficient for equality of
opportunity. Instead, society would have to draw together
the right environments for the right individuals, and this
would have to be done for all individuals. Hence., to call
for presenting to all individuals an egual opportunity to
develop their talents to the fullest is to open a Pandora's
box of related difficulties and obstacles which are surely
beyond solution.
There are also a great number of difficulties with the
related notion of calling for each individual to have an egual
opportunity to be "successful" within a particular society.
The problem that inevitably emerges is that each society has
its own particular hierarchy Qf vaiu6s2o ^
V1
" ^ m°St— - ^^le, and rewards that
talent or behavior accordingly.
^ ^ ^^
a talent which society deems very useful - particularly . f
such a talent is in short supply . is to te given a ^
better opportunity for societal rewards than that given the
individual who has the mi sfortune to he horn with talent not
neatly in demand. This indicates that i f talent is even
partially connected with heredity or some other uncontrol-
lable force, the equality of opportunity to become a success
is that much less likely. Fnr , f-L^i i o i the so-called "born poet,"
seeing the unliKelihood of a prestigious and lucrative career
as a poet due to the existing hierarchy of values, decides
upon a different career, he win still be at a disadvantage
with relation to those who have innate talent in such an
alternative career. if we wish to make the argument that
being an excellent poet is itqpif ^ f^>-™ ^P^ u t> sel a form of success, then we
must also confront the fact that in our society being a
success generally involves some combination of wealth, sta-
tus and power, and that most poets rarely achieve all three.
It is also difficult to conceive of a pauper, regardless of
what he happens to be doing, viewing himself or being viewed
by others, as a "success" in the American context. Thus, as
long as society rewards some talents more than others, there
20schaar, "Eguality of Opportunity," p. 136.
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can hardly be equality of opportunity.
For example, suppose we maKe the following argument:
sxnce success in society is dependent upon the possession
and exercise of particular types of talent, and since all
citizens do not possess such talents to the same degree,
that therefore, becoming a success is mainly a matter of
chance. should we not then change the rules of the game?
If the rules determining who shall be the winners inevit-
ably favor one group at the expense of another, and the
best that persons can hope for is an impartial application
of such rules, then to alter the rules would be to change
which groups or individuals come out on top. Thus the
advocate of complete equality of opportunity may find him-
self calling for a method of choosing by lot those who
shall occupy the positions regarded as most desirable in
the political, as well as economic and social sphere. This
would immediately and significantly alter the society's
notion of success. Surely, for example, the status, pres-
tige and perhaps material benefits attached to the top
positions would diminish considerably once it was determined
that anyone, irrespective of talent and effort, could at-
tain these positions. What is more significant is the ef-
fect that such a means of determining top positions might
have upon those with the most talent and ambition. Parti-
cularly if we accept the "homo economicus" theory of human
nature, we can see that such a method of determining winners
might well have a negative effect upon many individuals as
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well as upon the societv as * ^v^iy a whole. The case hypothesized
here is not merely selection by lot for temporary political
office, as was occasionally done in some of the ancient
Creek city states. Instead
, equality Qf opportunity ^ ^
leveis would be retired so that virtually all positions
would be selected in this manner. Thi s change in rules
would be to the benefit mainly of the less talented and at
the expense of the more talented. Again
, we are assuming
that talent is both innate and distributed in unequal amounts
among persons. The guestion here is: if a particular game
requires a certain skill, and some do not have that skill,
does eguality of opportunity require that the rules of the
game be altered so that such a skill is no longer required
for success? m a sense, this is precisely what full
equality of opportunity would logically require. For if
equality of opportunity is to entail that each have an
equal opportunity to be successful, and being successful
requires the possession of certain specific talents which
are not equally distributed to all in equal measure, then
full equality of opportunity can exist only if we break the
chain at the point of responsible choice.
Given the assumption of a genetic component of talent,
it is obvious that we cannot attack the chain at the level
of each individual possessing qualitatively and quantitative-
ly unequal degrees of talent. Therefore, the rules of the
game must be altered so as to make talent virtually irrele-
vant as to success in society in terms of wealth and prestige.
Is
as-
s
For reasons already discussed, we cannot^^ ^
chief criterion for attaining positions ^
chance in selection of what we do and what the reward
shall be becomes the criterion to parallel the chance
Pect of being horn talented in the first place
. In thi
way we would approach the attainment Qf equauty Qf oppQr_
tunity, but tfe would also ^ deaUng w . th a fQrm ^
so abstracted from political and economic life as we Know it
that it is almost impossible to conceive of it ever coming
to pass or wording for long if it were eventually establish-
ed. What conceivably could be brought about is a society
which awards positions according to some combination of
talent and effort while awarding wealth in particular, by
some other criterion
- perhaps need. However, when equal-
ity of opportunity is not the goal so much as the stability
inducing image of equality of opportunity, then the latter
society is impossible.
Let us now suppose that talent is not an innate and/or
genetic product, but instead is, in large part, a result of
the external environment. What are some of the specific
measures which would be required to make equality of oppor-
tunity a reality, given the assumption of a significant
environmental component of talent? it shall be shown that
the more stratified a society is, the more nearly impossible
the attainment of equality of opportunity becomes, reqard-
less of whether such stratification is de jure or de facto.
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The Class Structure
If talent is environmentally shaped, either wholly orm part, and if talent is required ^ ^ ^ ^
clear that equalization of environment becomes a necessity.
It is crucial to see that this entails a great deal more
than, for example, the abolition of inherited wealth.
Though the latter is significant, it is but one, and by no
means the most important, of a number of factors and charac-
teristics passed from parent to child which interfere with
the attainment of equality of opportunity. The relation-
ship between the class position of the parents and the
values, behavior, and eventual class position of the Aild
has been discussed by Melvin Kohn in Class and Conformity.. 21
Kohn discovered that the values of the parents are
intimately connected with their particular class, that such
values are transmitted from parent to child, and henc 3
, that
the values adopted by the child are highly conducive to his
or her remaining in the same class as the parents. In ex-
amining three different studies, Kohn shows that different
classes lead very different lives and dwell in different
worlds. This being the case, their hopes, fears and the be-
havioral demands which they place upon their children will
be notably different from class to class. Thus, for the
child of middle class parents, the parents are likely to
2lMelvin Kohn, Class and Conformity : A Study inValues (Homewoods, IL: Dorsey Press, Inc., 1969).
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Place more stress upon values such as curiosity, happiness
and consideration for others; while for the child of work-
ing class parents, the values more likely to be stressed
involve obedience, conformity and neatness. Such value
differences may more adequately be described in terms of
upper and middle class children learning to place more
emphasis upon their own internal standards of conduct and
a greater confidence that their actions are more than just
their arbitrary and untrustworthy whims. The child of
working class parents, according to Kohn, is less likely
to rely upon such internal standards and instead is more
comfortable with adherence to society's external rules.
Hence, the latter child, having inculcated these values,
is more likely to conform to the specific rules of society
and be more rigid in the way that he applies them both to
himself and to others. 22 This is also illustrated in terms
of what each group of parents surveyed regarded as "punish-
able behavior" on the part of their children. Without get-
ting into specifics, the working class parents surveyed were
far more concerned with the external consequences than with
the intentions of the child's behavior. For the middle
class parents, the stress was the opposite. Punishment was
deemed more appropriate when aimed at the intentions of the
child. 23
22ibid., p. 80.
23Ibid . , pp. 97-100.
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While these findings have important ramifications
terms of equality of opportunity, what is of greafcer
ficance is Koto's anaiysis as to why the particular val
transmitted from parents to their offspring are .so diff nt
between cl asses. Kohn regards as most cruci al the ef,
the Parent. s worklife upon his or her vaiues. A parent
-
Part of the upper or middle claSs i„ terms of income a„d
Prestige is likely to have a more satisfactory job than a
parent from the working class. By "more satisfactory is
meant that such a position has far more intrinsic, as well
as extrinsic, satisfactions. There is a substa„tial oppor-
tunity to engage in a variety of different tasks, and to
exercise initiative and self-direction. Thus, there is
more interest in the work, greater freedom and, if desired,
a greater opportunity for community service. 24
The parent who is a part of the working class, espe-
cially the factory worker, is far less likely either to
have, or give greatest stress to, intrinsic job satisfac-
tions. Instead, he will emphasize extrinsic rewards such
as higher pay, longer vacations, and shorter hours. On the
other hand, the middle cl ass worker will be less likely to
stress pay in his hierarchy of values, not so much because
he does not desire high pay as becaUse high pay is not as
problematical for the upper classes as it is for the working
class. The less difficult a goal is of att a inment, the lower
24lbid., pp. 139-142.
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it will tend to be ranked in one's value hierarchy. Good
pay is rarely an easily attainable goal for the working
class parent and hence, his greater concern with it.
Further, the job requirements and opportunities of this
latter individual tend to have little, if any, relationship
to initiative, self direction or creativity on the part of
the worker. instead - and an assembly line operation is
the clearest example - what is usually required is obedi-
ence to the man in charge, conformity in behavior, and the
ability to do the same work continuously throughout the
working day. Thus, the job itself precludes both the need
and the opportunity to engage in creativity and self-direc-
tion, in addition, because the worker in such a job will
tend to have little control in the workplace, it is more
likely that he win tend to see his actions in general as
having little consequence.
This is very significant in terms of child-raising.
Because the working class parent sees in his daily life that
his survival and security depend upon obedience to authority
and conformity to the socially accepted, this is the sort of
behavior that he will encourage, either consciously or sub-
consciously, in his children. Therefore, the child of work-
ing class parents will be brought up in a "stricter" environ-
ment, while the child of middle or upper class parents will
tend to experience a more tolerant and egalitarian family
life. 25 It follows that as the child grows to adulthood,
25Ibid
. , p. 109.
.
1
eventually to pass them on fco Ms ^ ^
Thxs relationship has important ramifications for
equality of opportunity. What Kohn has iu ustrated is
that as long as the class system which currently exists in
most developed capitalist societies continues and, in par-
ticular, as long as the hierarchical division of labor per-
sists, the attainment of equality of opportunity is highly
unlikely. Given Kohn . s evidence Qf g
ship between job and values, each helping to shape the
other, it becomes that much more likely that both values
and job, or at least job capacity, win be passed along
intergenerationally. The parent . s values>^ ^ ^.^
ily suited for, and partially a result of, his particular
Place in the hierarchical division of labor, will tend to
be passed along to the child, thereby rendering that child
capable of serving at that same level, but less capable of
working at other levels. The working class father whose
job demands of him conformity and obedience, rightly per-
ceives such values to be a necessity for whatever success,
or at least security, he may attain at his position. Often
he will pass such values on to his offspring, regardless of
whether the parent wants his child to do the same work as
he does, or whether he desires and pushes his child to at-
tain a far higher status. Assuming that the chijd has
adopted such values, he is, even before he ever enters the
job market, rendered virtually incapable of adeguately
s—g the higher status positions which may require
sons wllling and able tQ tMnk ^^^^^
txve a„a direct theraselves
.
26 ^ has ^
ia son « 3eH-perpetuating mechanigm by^^ vgiue
Kohn does not ignore other factors which help tQ
shape the child . s vaiues and thus determine his eventual
level in the division of labor. For exanrnio „ru mple, education
level is also significant in fchis regar(j
_ ^ higter
level of education, the more curiosity comes to he valued
the greater experience gained in independent thought and
the greater capacity achieved for self-direction.27 How.
ever, since education level, both qualitatively and quan-
titatively, is largely a function of social class, it does
not appear to be as crucial a factor as social class itself
in determining eventual status. This again illustrates that
equality of opportunity in a stratified society with a hier-
archical division of labor is an unrealizable goal.
Such a lack of intergenerational mobility is not in-
evitable. Certainly it is not an unheard of occurrence for
a child of working class parents to achieve higher status,
nor for the child of upper class parents to descend in the
class ladder. However, it is sufficiently unusual to be re-
garded as the exception rather than the rule. To cite just
26Ibid .
. pp. 198-200.
27Ibid . p. 31.
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s
is
one example, only percent of
^ ^_
ing Class parents ever make it to the upper level positions
of African society. 28 In terms of Qverall ^ .
most typical for the child to rema in in the same class a,
the parents, or to move up or down only a short distance in
the class ladder, what the exceptions do accomplish is to
preserve the myth of equality of opportunity and thereby
render more stable the existing class system.
If Kohn is correct in his analysis of why mobility is
minimal, then attaining equality of opportunity cannot occur
so long as the hierarchical division of labor remains as it
is. The passage of legislation outlawing discrimination in
employment or raising the minimum wage, or increasing educa-
tional benefits for the poor, or establishing a pure merit
system in employment would still leave society a long ways
from eguality of opportunity. The parents can only prepare
the child for the world as they know it, and that world is
greatly influenced by their worklife and social class. As
Kohn states:
Social class is significant for human behaviorbecause it embodies systematically differentiat-
ed conditions of life that profoundly affect
men's views of social reality. 29
The attainment of full equality of opportunity would
also require a number of specific measures which are very
^°For a more complete picture of mobility statistics,
see U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
Toward a Social Report (Washington, DC: U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1969), p. 24.
29nohn, Class and Conformity
, p. 189.
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unlikely to be attempted and probably impossible to achieve
even were the attempt to be made. Specifically, equality Qf
opportunity would require that the environment be engineered
so as to provide an equal chance for all. It is manifest
that a number of obvious factors which are a part of the
environment would have to be eliminated. For example, a
society desirous of attaining full equality of opportunity,
or at least of approaching it, would certainly have to
eliminate racism and sexism, de facto as well as de jure.
This is not a particularly controversial idea, though how
to put it into effect is no small matter. Nevertheless,
few consistent advocates of equality of opportunity would
argue against this requirement.
Somewhat more controversial than the elimination of
such obstacles as racism and sexism, but nevertheless a
clear precondition for equality of opportunity, would be
the elimination of inherited wealth. On the one hand, it
is obvious that if the opportunities for developing talents
are to be equalized, and if all are to have "equal access to
a range of specified resources," then inherited wealth is
inconsistent with equality of opportunity. For inherited
wealth is not "earned" by the recipient in the same sense
that he "earns" money at a job, and it almost inevitably
presents the recipient with "unfair" advantages over those
who might be equally talented but who have not any inherited
resources. Referring back to the race analogy, this means
that, in a particular race, all are not starting from the
P°lnt
-
ThiS diSparit
^
is
-i**— * the fact that
x» many modern societies
, money is bQth a means ^
On the other hand, arguments also have been made in
opposition to eliminating or ^
wealth. Robert Nozick makes the point fh^n t at merely because
a person has done nothing to "merit., an inheritance, this
aces not, in itself, render it an "unfair., exchange. Rather,
he places the emphasis on the freedom of the giver to pre-
sent his wealth or whatever to whomever he pleases. 30 How.
ever, this argument whi!e having a place in dealing with the
relationship between equality of opportunity and individual
freedom, does not, in itself, contradict the notion that
full equality of opportunity would require the elimination
of inherited wealth. Basically, this argument of Nozick-
s
forces us to make a choice between equality of opportunity
and a particular notion of individual freedom. It does not
present a case for saying that the free and unimpeded right
to inheritance is consistent with the attainment of equality
of opportunity.
It is clear that wealth is not the only inheritable
good which can prevent the realization of equality of oppor-
tunity. We could also present a fairly strong argument
claiming that the family as it exists today must itself be
eliminated. Different families, with their diverse and
30Robert Nozick, Anarchy
, the State and Utopi a (NewYork: Basic Books, Inc., 1974), pp. 215-2367
perhaps unequal methods of child r»1 «l un i aising have created, not
different
'
bUt «« environments for their
°ffSPring
-
le-S t0
— ^ividuals having decided
advantages over others, and thereby ensures inequality of
opportunity in any society which retainsi utn a family structure.
This problem can be i linofr^^<*n o llustrated, and hopefully clari-
fied, by examining the Dossihiin^ ~-rn p ibil ty of eguality of opportunity
in a chronological regression beginning with the child's
school. it is generally acknowledged that equality of
opportunity requires that schools, primarily elementary and
secondary, be as equal as possible in terms of teacher
quantity and quality, class si 2e
, extracurricular activity
opportunities and facilities, and similar attributes. While
some have made the point that an attribute like the oppor-
tunity and facilities for extracurricular activities have an
effect, not so much on learning per se as on the creation of
a more enjoyable environment in school, 31 it is also true
that a more enjoyable scholastic environment is itself con-
ducive to a more positive attitude toward schooling, and
thus is more conducive to learning. At a minimum, therefore,
expenditures on schools, both within and between school dis-
tricts, would have to be standardized. Whether this would
be done on a per school or a per pupil basis is one of the
issues that would have to be resolved.
Expenditures in themselves, however, deal with but a
31 Christopher Jencks, et al^., Inegualitv (New York:Harper Colophon Books, 1972), p. 29.
133
Part of the problem
. TQ provide ^ equaiuy ^ Qpportunity_
there would have to te> in addition> ^ ^
t-n of an puplls as could te accompl . shed- Th . g goes f^
beyond the already demonstrated d i ffi eultieS in attaining
racial integration. Economic and social class integration
would also be reguired as long as the society itself was
stratified along class lines. This would be a far greater
tasK than racial integration, for it would require either
that all school districts themselves be integrated by class,
which probably would involve a lowering of the costs of buy-
ing and owning a home in a wealthy neighborhood; or a busing
program which would dwarf the contemporary busing to achieve
racial integration; or the elimination of social classes
themselves. We might try to counter the need for such class
integration with the argument that, having already equalized
expenditures and thereby the quality of all schools, re-
gardless of the socioeconomic status of their respective
districts, there would be no further need to integrate across
school districts to achieve so-called "class integration."
But schools and school environment do not differ just in the
quality and quantity of faculty and facilities. They also
differ sharply with respect to the quality of the students
within the schools, at least insofar as "quality" of students
is measured in terms of attitudes and abilities required for
academic success. Fellow students are, in fact, a very
significant part of the educational environment, particularly
in terms of helping to shape students' attitudes toward
schooling. Because, for reasons already hinted at in the
Konn discussion, environs hecome decreasing^ conducive
to educational attains as class level decreases, it
would appear that full educational equality of opportunity
must entail a class, as veil as racial, integration in the
school. Again, this assies that the donation of a class
structure is not a viable alternative within the parameters
of liberal capitalist reform.
Even assuming that the class integration could be at-
tained, this would be insufficient. m the first place,
there would remain the problem of differential treatment on
the part of teachers according to the cultural background of
their students. What this often involves is a sometimes sub-
conscious distinction that a teacher sets up between, for
example, those who have been encouraged, particularly in
their homes, to present opinions or raise guestions in a
more coherent and intelligible manner, and those who have
not. it does not necessarily follow that the teacher will
"like" such students more, nor that such students necessar-
ily will get better grades. What generally does result is
that the teacher, with some accuracy, will perceive which
students are the most likely to wind up in college and, be-
cause of the teacher's own educational background, he or
she is likely to regard such an attainment favorably. Having
come to the conclusion as to which pupils are "college
material," the teacher will often treat them accordingly
in terms of greater encouragement, higher expectations, and
the type of extra attention^ ^^ ^^
propriate. By doi„g so , the teacher heips ^ ^
or her oW„ prophecy as tQ which ^ ^tential. Further, by focusing upQn what ^ ^ ^
student's aca^ic potential, the teacher is not overtly
violating the ethic of equality of opportunity.
The relationship of the above to equality of oppor-
tunity is heightened by the fact thaf it-i u» r r n t it is generally in
the homes of the upper class that, for example, the child-
ren win be most encouraged to read, the parents win be
most able to help the child, the environment of the home,
in terms of noise and number of other children, will be most
conducive to learning, and the physical health of the child
will be best. Given such a situation, it is not at all sur-
prising that the children of wealthy parents will often seem
the most willing and able to learn and therefore, the most
likely candidates for higher education. Thus, as was seen
in the Kohn study with regard to future employment, so too
with regard to future educational attainment - the children
of the wealthy are at a decided advantage regardless of the
amount of integration which may be present.
This illustrates the problem in expecting equality of
opportunity to be attained solely via the manipulation and
engineering of the school environment. A more significant
root of inequality of opportunity lies outside of the school
and within the home and social relations of the family. To
begin with, if equality of opportunity is to have any
relationship to "equal access" and to the i d„ rea of "earning"
a place in society, i-h^-nt t e the very nature of the family runs
counter to such equality of opportunity. For all famiUes
are not equal With respect to ^^ ^ ^.^^
training, values and contacts that they provide to their
children; therefore they do not all provide equal access to
the resources of society and subsequent rewards, and no
child can ever be said to have "earned" his position to the
extent that he "deserved" to be born to a particular family.
It is clear that the family as we Know it cannot co-
exist with full equality of opportunity. It follows that if
we accept the inevitability and/or desirability of a class
stratified society, only two alternatives remain. Either
complete equality of opportunity must be regarded as an im-
possibility, or at best, far too costly in terms of societal
cohesion; or the raising of children must be removed from the
hands of the parents and placed instead in the hands of the
state. John Charvet suggests that state run nurseries
would be the precondition for total eguality of opportun-
ity. m such a manner, the environment for each child
could be equalized, and the role of the parents in shaping
the child's values, intelligence and opportunities for suc-
cess could be minimized, if not terminated. However, the
removal of just the family would not suffice to ensure
32john Charvet, "The Idea of Equality as a SubstantivePrinciple of Society," in Contemporary Political Theory, ed.by Crespigny and Wertheimer, p. 157.
complete equality of opportunity Aoain -. g , to quote Charvet
:
The principle of eouaiifw
quires that everyone te fr, »
opportunity re-
in regard to those 5hSV? equal Position
development i e ~? ?lp and courage
friends? 2tc. 33 '
parent s, teachers,
Since "friends, etc." help in the shaping of values
and outlooks, it is clear that those individuals vho have
access to persons whose values and outlook are more condu-
cive to success i„ a particular society^ ^ a
than egual opportunity to be successful. Hence, it now be-
comes necessary to regulate with whom individuals become
friendly in such a way so that each individual can somehow
have the same opportunity to become friendly with an equal
number of good and bad influences. The choice that the
individual would then make would derive from some aspect of
his upbringing, though since upbringing would be fairly
standardized, it is likely that most would make the same
choices. While this might seem to involve a logistic prob-
lem regarding whether there are a sufficient number of "good
influences" to go around, this could be offset by the likeli-
hood that, in theory, as more and more good influences are
selected, the "selectors" themselves become "good influences."
Thus, the pool of this latter group steadily increases while
the "bad influences" slowly wither away.
This is an obviously farfetched scenario, and its ap-
plicability to the united States, where even day care centers
are viewed by many with suspicion and hostility, is parti-
33Ibid.
cularly limited
. However> alternative> accQrding ^
Charvet, is to eliminate ^ associations ^^ ^
lndiVidUalS ar<? at a11 de~t upon any others for their
development. As charvet correct!, points out, this would
involve the abolition of society itself an„ .j-tbeir, d this too is
unlikely. 34
Charvet-
s position is based upon the assumption of a
liberal capitalist society. While no society has ever
equalized all families in terms of size, values, etc., it
is true that in a society without a class structure and
based upon some rough equivalent of the socialist dictum,
"TO each according to his needs," the role of the family as
a mechanism to channel offspring into the parent's class
could be eliminated. The role and/or need for state run
nurseries need not be as comprehensive as charvet describes
unless we are unwilling to go outside the parameters of
stratified society. 35 Here> as „ith mosfc Qther criUcisms
of equality of opportunity as an attainable and/or desirable
goal, the problem is less with equality of opportunity per se
than with the context in which it is so often framed.
Even with the ability and willingness to regress to the
extent of the elimination of the parent's role in child
34Ibid
. . p. 158.
35 Ibid. For an interesting examination of child rais-ing in the Soviet Union, see Urie Bronfenbrenner
, Two Worlds
of Childhood (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, T970K
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-smg and the requisite standardizatiQn Qf opportunities
for friendship with socially and intellectuaUy advantageous
individuals, we still have not gone bacR enough
_
Point at which to draw the line the individuai ^
the environment can be stretched back to the pre-natal en-
virons. A case can be made that unless we standard
pre-natal environments, equality of opportunity does not
exist. impr0per nutrition in the pregnant woman can have
a detrimental effect, both physical and intellectual, upon
the infant. Thus, we cannot guarantee equality of opportun-
ity by dealing only with the child, even if the state takes
full charge moments after birth. Instead, state interven-
tion must commence in the pre-natal stage. As to what such
intervention would entail, at a minimum it would have to en-
sure that all pregnant women be given an equal degree of
rest, proper diet and adequate medical care. The alterna-
tive, assuming that we are still desirous of equality of
opportunity, would be to eliminate the role of the mother
altogether and perfect the so-called "test tube baby." Of
these alternatives, the former would involve a degree of
state intervention and egalitarian treatment sharply at odds
with the prevailing liberal capitalist ethic. The latter
alternative would reguire even more state intervention than
the first and is unlikely ever to be realized in this or
most other conceivable societies.
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Equality of Opportunity Elsewhere
It is evident that equality of opportunity, in the
sense of equal access, is a very dlm possibility in any
society. The reqression from who qets hired and who makes
the most money, back through the schools, the neighborhood,
frrends, family and even pre-natal environment demonstrates
the overwhelming preconditions which would be required be-
fore full equality of opportunity could be said to exist.
As the difficulty involved in accomplishing each successive
prerequisite increases, the livelihood of their being accom-
plished decreases. However, we can also mate the point that
the likelihood of equality of opportunity is decreased to
the extent that a society has class stratification. For
this reason, equality of opportunity is less likely to be
realized in the United states than it is in a number of
other, somewhat more eqalitarian societies.
In this regard, it is instructive to look briefly at
the United States in comparison to various other societies
with regard to equality of opportunity. For example, given
what is already known about the difficulty of attaining
equality of opportunity in a stratified society, we would
expect that there would be more equality of opportunity in
the socialist countries. For if such societies are less
stratified, then it would seem to follow that equality of
opportunity would be more likely to be approximated.
Statistics seem to bear this hypothesis out. They reveal
141
that, at least in the* ''ef afa „^ • , .ne state socialist" countries where
statistics are readily available, thus excluding a number
of states such as Cuba and China in which equality of op-
portunity may be more fully reali^ri ^-n zed, there does appear to
be more equality of opportunity than in the more stratified
capitalist nations. It is not necessary to show that such
state socialist societies are entirely
"classless" to maKe
this point, only that whatever class stratification that
they do have is significantly less pervasive than that
existing in the United States. There is evidence that such
is the case, despite periodic fluctuations in such states
with regard to how strongly the goals of classlessness and
economic equality are stressed. Recent work by Milton Man-
koff, Frank Parkin and David Lane all describe how the
socialist societies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union,
despite not being communist in the Marxist sense of the
term, nevertheless exhibit far less inequality, particularly
in terms of income, and far more mobility and equality of
opportunity than do most Western societies. 36
Such mobility is shown in the higher likelihood for
the children of manual workers in such state socialist
countries to make it into the higher status and prestige
non-manual occupations. For example, a 1960 survey cited
by David Lane reveals that the children of working class
36Milton Mankoff, "Toward Socialism: Reassessing In-
equality," Social Policy , III (March/April, 1974); Frank
Parkin, Class Inequality and Political Order (New York:
Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1971); and David Lane, The End of
Inequality? (Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books, Inc., 1971).
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social mobility than dQ such cMidren ^ ^
Great Britain, Sweden and the United States. That is , 14 5
Percent of such Soviet children maKe it into the more elite
positions compared to only 7.8 percent in the United
States. 37 It can be argued that this merely illustrates a
greater favoritism toward the worKing class in the soviet
Union, as opposed to equality of opportunity. Such a hy.
pothesis is strengthened by the fact that the same 1960
survey shows that upward mobility rates from the middle
class to the elite is relatively similar in all the coun-
tries surveyed, including the Soviet Union. 38 However
, the
point would still remain that, at a minimum, we would have
to conclude that there is more upward mobility i„ the soviet
Union than in the other countries surveyed.
in exploring why there is more mobility and equality
of opportunity in the state socialist countries than in the
Western capitalist countries, certainly a good part of the
answer must lie with the greater degree of equality, parti-
cularly economic equality, that exists in the state social-
ist countries. Questions of individual freedom and political
rights aside, the fact remains that there is less stratifica-
tion in the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
than there is in the United States. For example, in terms
37Lane, The End of Inequality?, p. 29.
38Ibid . . p. 30.
Of income differentials in the Soviet Unioni ^
entials, after an increase during ^ ^
are restively narrow. In fact
, tne ^
such differential portray the ratio between the highesfc
ana lowest incomes in the Soviet^ as^ ^
the highest and average incogs as 100,1. m the united
States, during the same time period, the ratios were
11,000:1 (highest to lowe<?f \ n r>™ , , .u est ), and 7,000:1 (highest to
average) . 39
Likewise, sexual equaiity in the Soviet Union is also
far more pronounced, at least on the occupational level>
than it is in the United States. For example, in 1967
women accounted for 52 percent of all professionals and 72
percent of all doctors in the Soviet Union.40 In the United
States during the same year, women accounted for approximate-
ly 38 percent of the classification,
"professional and tech-
nical workers," of which elementary and secondary school
teachers were the most prevalent, (42 percent of all profes-
sional women). The trend here was for more and more women
to be placed in elementary school education. 41 In terms of
the medical profession, women's percentage of the total
America physici an force was approximately 7 percent. Sexuai
39Ibid . . p. 74.
40Ibid . p. 88.
u
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Women's Bureau, U. S. Department of Labor,1969 Handbook of Women Workers Bulletin 294 (Washington, DC-U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 98.
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discrimination does exi 4 M » •st in the Soviet Union, but as shownby the above fiqures u 4 eg , it 1S manifested occupational^ to a
lesser degree than in the United States.
Lane also shows that in terms of the social relations
ly allocated the taqVcsks of cooking and cleaning. Occupation-
ally it is also relatively rare for a woman to be in a posi-
tion in which she gives direct orders to men.42 Nevertheless
in view of most societies hierarchies of status and income,
and given that the professions are generally at or near the
top of the scale, a greater percentage of women classified
as professionals would seem to indicate a lesser degree of
occupational sexual discrimination.
There are many reasons why there is more equality,
particularly in terms of income, in the state socialist
countries. Perhaps the key factor, particularly in the
Soviet Union, is that there is no "private propertied class
possessing great concentrations of wealth. "43 Because pri-
vate ownership of the means of production is generally for-
bidden, it becomes that much more difficult for any indivi-
dual to accumulate great amounts of wealth for his own or
his family's personal use. For those who do accumulate much
in the way of wealth or status, restrictions on inheritance
lessen the ability to pass such wealth onto their children.
42Lane, The End of Inequality?, p. 89.
43Ibid
. , p. 69.
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a
The fact that the state socialisfc cQuntries provide
areat deal more in the way of free or low cost services
includi„g health care
, hQusing> variQus ^^^^ ^^^^^
and transportation. helps make this more acceptable for all
those concerned. Apparently the hoped .for^ ^ ^
policies is that the need and desire for persona! accusa-
tion will he reduced. Whether the need or desire is still
Present is an open question. But it is true that the less-
ened personal accumulation has occurred. While an end to
private property has not, as bane points out, necessarily
led to communal ownership or control, it is nevertheless
true that the control that does exist is not inherit able in
the same way that Western private property is. 44
Despite the above facts and figures however, it is
also true that complete equality of opportunity has not been
attained in the state socialist countries. While they are
closer to it than the Western capitalist states, there are
still very substantial obstacles blocking the path to full
equality of opportunity, and such obstacles are quite similar
to a number of those facing the capitalist states. For ex-
ample, an interesting table in Lane's book examines the re-
lationship between parentai occupation and their aspirations
for their children in a number of state sociaiist states.
The findings indicate that there is a positive correction
between the two variables. The higher in status the parent's
44lbid
. . pp. 46-47.
s re-
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occupation, the higher win be the aspirations fQr ^
children. This indicates that either complete equality
of opportunity does not exist in such countries, or is
perceived not to exist by a substantial portion of the
population, or that most parents have a tendency to feel
that their children are simply „ot going to be able to get
much higher on the occupational ladder for reasons of
parental failure, inherited traits or whatever, whichev,
of the above possibilities is the case, the result i,
duced opportunities for upward mobility among the lower
levels of the occupational ladder. While there is some up-
ward mobility, and to a significantly greater extent than
exists in the United States, it is primarily from manual
occupations into industrial or "applied" occupations. Those
entering the more highly placed occupations tend to come
from families who are themselves non-manual workers with
strong educational backgrounds. 4
5
Regarding education in such societies, Lane also points
out that while school is open to all in the state socialist
countries, success in school tends to be correlated with the
educational background of the parents and their social posi-
tion. Even with the financial costs of education being re-
latively low, and with the income differentials in society
being far less extreme than in capitalist states, neverthe-
less the educational, and hence occupational, equality of
opportunity that does exist is undermined by the family of
45Ibid . . p. 114.
the child, or as Lane refers to if k ^
.
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by the differences intamily milieu* "46 mv.^ enVlr~ a family creates>m terms of hoDPq • .
of „
"
aSP"at
— 'or the children, in terms
cultural environment, and in terms Qf values ^
encea by the educational ^
^
Parents. since such backgrounds differ
, so too^ ^
portunities for the children of each family. This relgtes
to many « the same conclusions which have heen discussed
regarding opportunities in the United States. The differ-
ence, and it is a significant difference, being that in the
United states such inequalities of opportunity are greatly
compounded by factors such as more inherited wealth, greater
income differentials and fewer free or low cost services
available to the citi Zenry , as well as a prevailing ideology
"hich is far less egalitarian than that in the state social-
ist countries.
Hence, as long as current relationships in terms of
property, political power, the division of labor, and the
nuclear family continue to exist, so too will the inability
to attain a truly egalitarian society with eguality of op-
portunity. Focusing on the last two of these reasons, we
see the same basic arguments used by Kohn and others to ex-
plain some of the reasons why the United States has not yet
attained equality of opportunity. Thus Kohn-s findings do
have some application to the Soviet Union. But this is not
46Ibid
. . p. 119.
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surprise given that . hierarchical divisiQn Qf
exist in the Soviet Union.
However, it is imporfcant fcQ ^ ^^
socialist cou„tries of Eastern Europe ana the Soviet Union
have advanced further along toward equalitv « opportunity
than the capitalist states. This would seem to indicate
that a more egalitarian frarneworK than currently exists in
the united states is a precondition for more, if not full
equality of opportunity. On the other hand, equality of op-
portunity in the united States is generally thought to neces-
sarily and justifiably lead to the very stratification which
is so contradictory to thp aH a {«mo„L *y rne attainment of equality of oppor-
tunity, if this seems peculiar it is because what passes
for equality of opportunity in the United States never has
been more than a political facade to justify existing class
relationships. To view equality of opportunity as requiring
an egalitarian setting undermines these justifications.
Affirmative Action and Reverse Discrimination
Having shown that complete equality of opportunity is
impossible anywhere in the foreseeable future, and that, more
importantly, high levels of stratification and inequality
render even a substantial closing of the gap between the
reality and the ideal to be highly unlikely within the exist-
ing American economic, social and political frameworks, it is
instructive to examine a few of the more recent attempts to
advance toward equality of opportunity. It is clear that
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the ostensible purpose behind programs such as affirmative
action in hiring, the use of quotas in accepting various
minority groups and women into college undergraduate and
graduate programs, and in some cases, policies of "open
admissions," is to help foster eMty Qf ^^.^
The basic rationale being that since certain groups his-
torically have been discriminated against, the most viable
and fair way to alleviate this past discrimination is to
discriminate in their favor today.
Such programs have come under fire both from pro-
ponents and opponents of traditional Western-style equal-
ity of opportunity. Daniel Bell labels such programs as a
return to an ascriptive, as opposed to an achievement
oriented, society, and thus against the very core of Ameri-
can tradition. Further, he regards such programs as damag-
ing both to the society as a whole, and to the supposed
beneficiaries. Reverse discrimination, he feels, leads to
the lowering of societal and professional standards, damage
to those still operating under the achievement ethic, and a
significant blow to the self-esteem of those who are admit-
ted or hired under such circumstances. 47 According to Bell,
an advocate of equality of opportunity must reject an alloca-
tion of rewards on any principle other than competition open
to all with talent and ambition determining who gets what. 48
47Bell, "On Meritocracy and Equality," 37.
48 Ibid
. , p. 41.
It is unfortunate that Bell does nnfu a ot specify
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how
competition is to hPj-^ £e made open tn an •
i „ v
1 ln the ^ht of whatis known of the effect of Past ai <= •r p discrimination upon a group
«—
,
M11U .« and ,«pl„u«. sv.„ „Jn »
r~ * - -—— ....wages and authority, Ben 4 „ ,
,
.
11 15 VSry Va^e in terms of how pastdiscriminations are to be handled n. vn ai . He acknowledges
"thepriority of the disadvantaged "49 wh , lo ,a, l e alsQ opposing mQst
than temporarily alleviating thgir
^
ently would favor the continuation of various ^^^^^
type programs as a means of granting to ^^^^^^
their
..priority,., but ignores the more
of Pest distinction by opposing reverse discrimination in
their favor.
Bell's position is quite consistent if we rea i i2e tha t
he is not merely attempting to illustrate the value of
meritocratic society, but also that he is assuming that
the united States aire ady is that meritocratic society. „
we take the position that the contemporary United States is
not a meritocratic society or even particularly close to be-
ing a meritocratic society, then we must deal with the pos-
sibility that existing inequalities of opportunity may well
lead to many persons not developing their talents. Such a
situation is a loss both to the individuals involved and to
the community. Given Bell's assumptions, however, it makes
49Ibid
. p. 67.
XittXe sense for him to accept the need for quotas>
I"
aCti°n
' ^ admissi°- or any otner form „ reverse
discrimination.
A somewhat more favorable approach to such reverse
discrimination has been taken by George Sher in an article
entities
-on Justifyin, Reverse Discrimination in Employ-
— 50 While he states ^ other methQds ^ comp€ nsating
Past victims of discrimination are preferable, and while his
conclusions regarding the relative merits of such discrimina-
tion for Blacks as opposed to women are questionable, never-
theless he does present a position favoring reverse discrim-
ination in a way which examines issues that Bell ignores.
That is, he sees that equality of opportunity cannot come
about without reverse discrimination.
v^r^
e
H'
t0 an
.
ade<
?
u*te justification of re-erse discrimination is to see that practice
ratw redressing of p^st privations, buiather as a way of neutralizing the presentcompetitive disadvantage caused by th^T^stprivations and thus as a waf^f restoring
equal access to those goods which societydistributes competitively . 51 1
Hence, in response to those like Bell and Robert
Nozick, the latter claiming that reverse discrimination un-
fairly punishes those who themselves have had no hand in
creating the victims' current position, 52 sher reSponds that
50George ^her, "Justifying Reverse Discrimination inEmployment," Philosophy and Public Affairs
. IV (Winter, 1975)pp. 159—170.
51lbid., p. 163.
52Nozick, Anarchy
, the State and Utopia
, pp. 235-237.
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com-
their responsibility is not the issue1 SU
' mat is important i fathat they are the beneficiaries of such past di. • •Ln P discrimination,
and it is a benefit to which they have no right. In
Parison to those who reject reverse discrimination in
total, Sher presents a position which does o«er a reason-
able justification for its utilization.
A critique of reverse discrimination which is quite
different from that of Bell, Nozick and many others, is
presented by Jean Bethke Elshtain. Criticizing the way in
which reverse discrimination has recently been applied in
the united States, and specifically dealing with the com-
pensatory programs that have been pushed for women in America,
Elshtain cites a number of problems which have arisen as a
result of these programs. First, such programs tend to dis-
criminate against young White males, leading them to bear a
disproportionate share of the burden for past discrimination,
(in this regard, Sher's argument may still hold, but never-
theless it does not mate it any more of a pleasant situation
for the young White males and may well lead to an increase in
resentment towards those disadvantaged persons receiving the
benefits.) Secondly, if reverse discrimination were to be
completely fair, it would benefit all of those individuals,
Black and White, male and female, who have been the victims
of past discrimination. For example, it would include White
workers as its beneficiaries. Finally, reverse discrimina-
tion involves, at best, a reshuffling of positions within
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the system, not a change in the system itself. 53 This final
Point is crucial for Elshtain and for numerous other critics
both of reverse discrimination and of equality of opportunity
as practiced in the American context. They are concerned
that more than a closer approximation to equality of oppor-
tunity is necessary for the attainment of a good society.
implicit in proposals to bring about equality of
opportunity via numerous forms of reverse discrimination
is the problem that even if such programs could be imple-
mented to a greater degree than is currently the case, the
result would still be a substantial distance removed from
equality of opportunity as it has been defined. There
certainly are no proposals regarding the abolition of the
hierarchical division of labor, the ending of the class
system, or significant alterations in the traditional nu-
clear family which have a serious chance of being undertaken.
Thus, even if we could discount the relative lack of com-
prehensiveness of most reverse discrimination programs,
their lack of full implementation, and the sharp resentments
that have arisen from many quarters regarding such programs,
it is nevertheless clear that, insofar as equality of oppor-
tunity is their goal, they are doomed to fail.
For example, if we wish to create educational equality
of opportunity via open admissions and the desegregation of
public schools, then it makes little sense to stop at that
53Elshtain, "The Feminist Movement," 473.
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Point. it would also be necessary to try to equalize the
home environment as well. Christopher Jencks, in Inequal-
ity, deals with this i SSUe by calling an end to income in-
equality as a far more important and effective method of
attaining equality of opportunity than merely spending more
money and in a more evenly allocated manner upon school-
ing. 54 Jencks denieg thafc schooUng ^ se
to do with either cognitive inequality or poverty. He there-
fore calls for income to be redistributed in a more equal
manner, with both merit and need taken into account. 55 His
rationale for this emphasis beings
variations in what children learn in schooldepend largely on variations in what theybring to school, not on variations in what
schools offer them. 56
Further, a better indicator than schooling or test
scores of where persons eventually ends up in terms of oc-
cupation is what Jencks refers to as "noncognitive traits,"
specifically, what type of personality they possess and the
attitude that they hold. 57 Programs such as busing and quota
54jencks, Inequality
, p. 10.
u ff1^' For . a critique of Jencks' assertions regard-ing both the relative lack of significance of schooling andthe need for income equalization, see Patricia Cayo Sexton,The Inequality Affair: A Critique of Jencks," Social
POlxcnr
,
IV (September/October, 1973), 53-61. Sexton arguesthat Jencks is mistaken in his low appraisal of the impact
of schooling and that he is vague and impractical in his
recommendations for reform.
56jencks, Inequality , p. 53.
5 7Ibid.
, p. 198.
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systems in college amissions will have relatively Uttl-
effect in this regard. As Kohn has shown, and jencKs ap-
pears to agree, the personality of the child, especially in
terms of values, is connected with the occupational status
of the parents. Therefore, a high degree of occupational
inequality will inevitably lead to a hi„h Jor i « n g degree of unequal
aspirations and subsequent low degree of equality of oppor-
tunity
.
We need not totally agree with Jencks's specific re-
commendations for alleviating current difficulties, nor with
his specific views on the role and value of educational in-
stitutions, to see that it is necessary to go beyond educa-
tional reform to attain a closer approximation to eguality
'
of opportunity than currently exists. And if, in realistic
terms, it makes little sense to call for the creation of
"test tube" babies, or for children to be raised in total
isolation from their parents, it is reasonable to call for
various structural reforms, in terms of income differentials,
the hierarchical division of labor, and the social relations
within the nuclear family without being a Utopian theorist.
For if such reforms are Utopian, either within or without of
a capitalist framework, then so too is the desire for any-
thing more than a mere illusion of equality of opportunity.
As has been shown, the significant problem is not that total
equality of opportunity is impossible. What is more important
is that an honest attempt to approximate equality of opportun-
ity requires a more egalitarian setting. The fact that few
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policy makers have attempted to move in thi s direction
indicates how strongly the goal of ^
actually is held in the United State,. It has become a
political device utiH Zed to avoid more substantive qUes-
tions of social justice.
The next chapter win deal with the question of one
response that has been made to the problems that have
arisen when the image of equality of opportunity has been
more difficult to maintain. When the same groups continual-
ly fall into the lower levels of the occupational and income
hierarchies, then either we must admit that equality of op-
portunity does not exist, or we fall back on a more genetic
approach to the subject and thereby claim that the victim
is still to blame for his situation. Thus, genetic theories
of intelligence have been utilized to rescue the image from
the empirical evidence. Chapter IV will deal with the
specifics of this attempt.
CHAPTER IV
BIOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS TO EQUALITY
OF OPPORTUNITY
The Theories of Herrnstein and Jensen
As mentioned in the last chapter there are two types
of obstacles to the establishment of equality of opportun-
ity. The first, with which Chapter in has already dealt,
involves the social factors which appear as inherent
limitations to full equality of opportunity. The second
obstacle concerns possible biological or genetic barriers
to the achievement of equality of opportunity, it is this
latter obstacle that will be dealt with in this chapter.
Two of the key figures involved in the genetic (I.Q.)
controversy are Arthur Jensen and Richard Herrnstein. While
Jensen concentrates upon the I.Q. situation of Blacks, Her-
rnstein is both less specific and more encompassing in re-
lating genetic inferiority more to class than to race.
Herrnstein argues that most of the poor are genetically in-
capable of achieving high levels of intelligence. He include
women among those individuals who tend to be less intelligent
than the average white middle class male. 1 The positions of
both Jensen and Herrnstein shall be discussed in terms of
Richard Herrnstein, I.Q. in the Meritocracy (Boston:
Little Brown and Company, 1973), p. 197.
"
C°nneCti0n t0 the « staining equality Qf
opportunity. then catiques Qf jensen ^ ^^^^^be examined vith regard both to the ^^
theories as a whole and with regard to theif
for equality of oPPortunity
. „owever
, detaUed anaiysig
or their findings ln statistical terms^ ^ ^ empha _
Sized since such an approach would go somewhat far afield
from the specific implications of their theories to equality
of opportunity.
2
Richard Herrnstein- s position regarding the herit-
ability of intelligence and its implications for equality
of opportunity can be summed up in the syllogism which he
presents:
11
Inheritor68 ""^ aMlitieS *™
2. If success requires such abilities;
*
If earmngs and prestige depend upon
success;
4. Then social standing will be based
on inherited differences .
3
As shall be seen, each of the above three "if state-
ments are far from certain. Herrnstein claims that as
society improves the environment for all citizens, the
heritability of I.Q. (vhich Herrnstein, like Jensen, equates
with intelligence) will increase. This will occur because
improved and more standardized environments will naturally
lead to less external environmental influence upon I.Q.
2Articles dealing with this issue from a historicalperspective may be found in Shaping the American EducationalState, ed. by Clarence J. Karier (New York: The Free PressInc., 1975). '
3Herrnstein, I.Q. in the Meritocracy , p. 199.
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Or, if the effect of environment is still present, with
equal environments it will be the same effect for all.
Therefore, subsequent differences in I.Q. can be due only
to genetic causes and thus, the effect of heritability on
I.Q. will increase as the role of environment decreases.
4
indeed, Herrnstein claims that the removal of all
environmental inequities and artificial barriers will not
bring about more social mobility, since equality of social
opportunity can only emphasize innate differences between
individuals or groups based upon respective differences in
inheritance. He concludes that full equality of opportun-
ity is not a viable possibility . 5 According to Herrnstein,
if a limited form of equality of opportunity was put into
effect it would ensure that those in the lower classes who
had the highest I.Q.'s would, by virtue of that intelligence,
rise out of the lower classes. The result of this process
would be that the lower classes would soon be lacking any
individuals with a high, or even average, level of intelli-
gence. This process would not only render the lower classes
less intelligent as a whole, but also would increase the
distance between themselves and the middle and upper
classes .
6
Still another significant aspect of Herrnstein'
s
4Ibid
. , pp. 205-208.
5Ibid . , p. 209.
6Ibid
. , p. 211.
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theory is his telief thafc the combinat . on Qf a geneticauy
inferior class of people, permanently inferior by birth,
plus the trend in today's societv r„ r -v,y fo the most menial and
least intellectually demanding jobs to be taken over by
machines
- vhile other positions requiring a relatively
high level of intelligence are increasing - win eventually
lead to a sort of class of "unemployables. - This group
would be comprised of those too stupid to get jobs and
eventually thus constitute a class of the heriditarily un-
employable. 7
Finally Herrnstein, in order to offset some of the
problems of equality of opportunity, connects his theory
with the educational process. He asserts that one's success
in school is based largely upon one's I.Q., with both abil-
ity and attitude seen as a function of I.Q., and not upon
such factors as the home or school environment. Therefore,
the poor are generally poor because of low intelligence, and
since it is virtually impossible to raise the I.Q. of stu-
dents to any significant or permanent degree, the solution
for the poor is not more schooling, but a different form of
schooling more suited to their relatively low i.Q.'s. They
should be trained for the types of jobs that they are in-
tellectually capable of handling, not for positions for
which their low I.Q.'s render them unfit. Hence, the solu-
tion is not more schooling, but more "diversified" education. 8
7lbid . . p. 214.
8 Ibid . , p. 164.
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It is clear that Herrnstein attaches a great deal of
weight to both the importance and accuracy of X . Q . and r . Q .
testing. He accepts the notion that l.Q., by itself> is
not a sufficient explanation for academic and occupational
success, but he does regard it as a necessary condition. On
the whole, he also accepts the claim that the American occu-
pational hierarchy is functional, necessary and stratified
by intelligence. Further, his strong belief in the herit-
ability of l.Q. to the extent that he portrays it as 85 per-
cent inherited, 10 percent environmental, and 5 percent
attributable to "test unreliability," renders him pessimis-
tic with regard to the possibility of adequate compensatory
educational programs. Just as present programs have failed,
so too will any future attempts. Compensatory education pro-
grams are, therefore, "impractical."9
Arthur Jensen's position is in most respects similar to
that of Herrnstein. Jensen too, cites the "failure" of
existing compensatory educational programs and the merito-
cratic nature of the occupational hierarchy within the United
States. Further, while recognizing that the environments of
children can differ substantially, he downplays their effects
by claiming that genes create the environment. 10
9Ibid . . p. 180.
l°Arthur Jensen, "How Much Can We Boost l.Q. and Scho-lastic Achievement?" in Environment . Heredity and Intelli-
gence, compiled from The Harvard Educational Review (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard Educational Review
, 1969), pp. 1-123.
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Where Jensen does differ somewhat from Herrnstein is
in the former's emphasis upon racial differences in I.Q. as
opposed to Herrnstein' s emphasis upon class. Jensen sees an
average 15 point difference between Blacks and Whites on
I.Q. tests with Whites consistently scoring higher. There-
fore, when Jensen speaks of the problems of equality of op-
portunity, he is referring to attempts to give both Blacks
and Whites the same opportunities. For example, he speaks
of the intense pressure and frustration in the schools which
derives from the assumption that all are relatively equal in
intellectual capacity. Furthermore, he claims that environ-
mental equality of opportunity would lead to even less equal-
ity of achievement between Blacks and Whites. Finally he
cautions that without birth control, the high rate of repro-
duction among low status, low intelligence Blacks is poten-
tially dangerous in that it is leading to an ever larger
proportion of low intelligence individuals, thus bringing
down the average intelligence level of society as a whole. 11
Critiques of Jensen and Herrnstein
There are several errors and untested assumptions made
by Jensen and Herrnstein. Those relating to the specifics
of their data collection as well as with the various problems
and inconsistencies connected with the specific guestions of
heritability and the twin studies that they both utilize will
iilbid., p. 85.
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not be dealt with in this chapter. Problems regarding their
implicit assumptions about human nature, the status they
give I.Q. tests, both as measures of intelligence and pre-
dictors of occupational and economic success, their casual
and premature rejection of existing and future compensatory
programs, and, particularly in Jensen- s case, the racial im-
plications drawn all arp rpiova«f 4-~e ele ant to my thesis and thus sub-
ject to examination.
The status of i.q. tests as accurate measures of what
is regarded as intelligence is very much open to question.
While both Herrnstein and Jensen, as well as various other
proponents of I.Q. testing, define intelligence as being
that which I.Q. tests measure, numerous other students of
I.Q. testing are more cautious, if not skeptical, of such a
claim. This skepticism has its basis in several aspects of
I.Q. testing both as a measure and as a criterion of intel-
ligence. Jensen and Herrnstein are confident not only that
I.Q. equals intelligence, but also that the process by which
they determine I.Q. is sufficiently accurate and reliable as
to be applicable throughout Western culture. 12
Rather than going into any specific detailed explana-
tion of the concept "intelligence," Herrnstein and Jensen
prefer instead to equate I.Q. with intelligence. Herrnstein
admits that in defining intelligence, "subjective judgment
must decide what we want the measure of intelligence to
12Herrnstein, I.Q. in the Meritocracy
, p. 74.
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es
on
measure. "13 His npyf <=*-«~ •h ext step ls to maintain that such abiliti
are measured by I.Q. tGsts M therefore> ^^^
an I.Q. test is equivalent to one's intelligence. To but-
tress his argument, Herrnstein states that intelligence tests
satisfy "common expectation" in terms of their ability to
predict educational and occupational levels. 14 This defini-
tion of intelligence has a number of difficulties, m the
first place, "intelligence- is used to describe different
things, not only between cultures, but within the same cul-
ture as well. There is no one way in which intelligence, or
intelligent behavior, is understood. Furthermore, to de-
scribe intelligence in terms of "common expectations" as both
Jensen and Herrnstein do, also presents a number of problems.
N. J. Block and Gerald Dworkin describe such problems as:
1
.
Too many different qualities satisfy "com-
mon expectations" as to what intelligence is.
z.. some such common expectations may be in-
correct, but the lack of a theory of in-
telligence does not allow one to choose anyfor rejection.
3. The fact that some qualities are highly
susceptible to measurement on an I.Q. test
can in no way lead one to the conclusion
that such qualities are the measure of
intelligence. 15
Block and Dworkin conclude that the very notion of a
quality called "general intelligence" is itself highly
13Richard Herrnstein, "I.Q.," Atlantic
. September,
1971, p. 50.
l^Herrnstein, I.Q. in the Meritocracy , p. 106.
15n. J. Block and Gerald Dworkin, "I.Q. i Heritability
and Inequality," Philosophy and Public Affairs
, IV (Summer,
1974), 67-68.
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Problematical, and that if it does exist, there is cer-
tainly no consensus over what it entails. Jensen and Herrn.
stern, without mUch evidence, not only assume that it does
exist, but also that it can be accurately measured via I.Q.
tests. Thus, their position is weak even prior to a criti-
que of the tests themselves.
Another possibility regarding the nature of intelli-
gence which Jensen and Herrnstein appear to ignore, is the
Piagetian interactionist model. This view sees intelligence
not as being innate or 85 percent inherited, but instead as
part of a developmental process in which intellectual abili-
ties develop in a step by step interaction between the in-
dividual and his environment. David Layzer uses the analogy
of building a house. The finished product is partly a re-
sult of the skill of the builder, and partly a result of his
intentions and the environmental challenge that he faces.
Hence intelligence is partly genetic, but it is also partly
an adaptation to, and hence is influenced by, the external
environment. 16 Such an ongoing interaction cannot be separat-
ed into its component parts for the purpose of determining
"how much" is genetic and "how much" is environmental because
there are no separate and distinct parts.
The claim that I.Q. tests do measure intelligence as
well as the further claim that they successfully predict
educational and occupational success are even more suspect,
l^David Layzer, "Science or Superstition?," in The
Fallacy of I.Q. , ed. by Carl Senna (New York: Third Press,
1973), p. 133.
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particularly i„ light of the substantial criticisms Qf ^
"culture-bound" nature of these tests. Hhat x.Q. tests do
measure are certain specific abilities under certain develop-
mental conditions, toy relation tetween such ^
"general intelligence," assuming the latter does exist, is
coincidental. On the other hand, the conditions are such
that a strong case can be made that the results of the tests
are inconclusive since the tests themselves are biased, many
feel deliberately, in favor of those with an upper class
background
.
To gauge whether this is the purpose of i.Q. tests,
along with the specifics of its "culture-bound" aspects, we
must examine the tests themselves, both in terms of their
content and the test situation. Numerous studies of such
tests have found significant elements of bias in favor of
one kind of socioeconomic background over another without
any direct connection to the level of intelligence of the
subjects. To begin with, those who draw conclusions re-
garding intelligence on the basis of I.Q. testing either
must accept the proposition that, to a very substantial de-
gree, equality of opportunity already exists in the United
States, or that environment has very little, if any, effect
upon the intellectual level that one attains. This assump-
tion pervades Jensen's conclusions regarding class differ-
ences in intelligence. Either the environment of all child-
ren in the United States is equally conducive to intellectual
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development, or the environinent is
^
inteuectual development. If both Qf ^^ _
then the whole structure of Herrnstein • « ^ ,n nstem s and Jensen's posi-
tions collapses . They apfK5ar fcQ^
_^ ^ ^ ^
those positions, with these assumptions, differences in
I.Q. leVel, which are presumed to reflect differences in
intelligence, are explainable only by genetic factors. A1 l
other factors have heen accounted for by the general equality
of learning environments for all children. Even assuming
that environmental factors have a limited effect upon I.Q.
scores, it is still a significant step, requiring further
assumptions about the tests themselves and their relation-
ship to intelligence, before we can draw inferences about
the heritability of intelligence. However, it is important
to realize that the assumption that environmental factors
have little effect upon I.Q. scores is itself false. The
best evidence indicates that such tests do, in fact, dis-
criminate against both non-Whites in particular, and the
poor in general.
There is first, the test situation itself. The fact
that the tester is most often White, poses an immediate
problem for many Black children who have already begun to
associate various fears, suspicions, and hostilities with
White-controlled activities. An analogous problem may exist
for poor children by virtue of the tester generally being
middle class. It is generally accepted that fear, anxiety,
and suspicion on the part of individuals taking such tests
may well depress the score achieved. This will „mi especially
evident in that section of the test when the child is
asKed to repeat digits in the reverse order in which the
tester says them. ^iety regar<Jing ^ ^^^
will inevitably lower the score here.17 „ence
, ^
the test is actually admi„istered, it is possible to see
factors which may render the results inapplicable to the
measuring of inteiligence, particularly if we are attesting
to compare levels of intelligence between the classes or
between the races based upon such tests.
An even more significant problem regarding ^
ness of I.Q. tests has to do with the actual content of the
tests, particularly their vocabulary and comprehension sec-
tions. For example, the vocabulary section measures the
subject's ability to give accurate responses to a large num-
ber of words of varying degrees of difficulty. The more
words that the subject can define, the higher his score and
hence, the higher level of intelligence that he will be
judged to possess. The problem is that this implicitly
assumes that children somehow develop a vocabulary in a
vacuum
- that the guantity and guality of their verbal abil-
ity is attained in isolation from, or with a significant de-
gree of irrelevance to, the environment in which they are
being raised. Such an assumption is not warranted by evid-
ence. A vocabulary is developed in various ways; through
17jane R. Mercer and Wayne Curtis Brown, "Racial Dif-ferences in I.Q.," in The Fallacy of I.Q. , pp. 7g-82.
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verbal interactions with others, through contact with radio
and tension, and through reading. it is not necessary to
go into the very obvious problems experienced by children
whose parents do not speak English in the home. Obviously
environmental factors are crucial in vocabulary development.
For example, if the subject is brought up in a poor area, in
which most of his contacts, family, friends
, etc ., are nofc
well educated, it is unlikely that he will readily attain a
familiarity with the kinds of words which appear on the vo-
cabulary section of the test, and whose comprehension is
essential to attaining a high score. Hence, in this respect,
the score on the vocabulary section will be, in part, a re-
flection of his class background, rather than innate intel-
ligence, even assuming that innate intelligence does exist.
To score very well on the vocabulary section would
probably require that the child have done a substantial
amount of reading. However, a child does not simply "decide-
to do a great amount of reading. A number of factors in his
environment will render such a decision more or less likely.
Certainly the motivation will be influenced by the parents.
If the parents themselves do very little reading, they will
be less likely to provide a motivating force for extensive
reading by the child. Furthermore, in another obvious re-
flection of the role that socioeconomic class has upon read-
ing, even if the child is motivated, either by friends, par-
ents, or teachers, the chances for finding a physical en-
vironment conducive to reading are diminished as we descend
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the class ladder. For example, the families of the poor are
generally larger than the national average. Large family
size, combined with low income level, win generally result
in the unlikelihood of the child having a room of his own or
being able to find any quiet place in the home in which to
read or study. Furthermore, it win result in the parents
being unable to spend much time in terms of individual at-
tention to and encouragement of each child. The child, in
turn, is forced to take a greater degree of responsibility
for his own physical well being. The result, quite natural-
ly, is for the child of a poor family to have less inclina-
tion, time, and a less favorable physical setting to read
and study. Subsequently such a child win have less of a
chance to score well on the vocabulary section of the test
for reasons which have no connection to intelligence as an
inherited trait.
Another aspect of the test which actually measures
something other than intelligence is the comprehension sec-
tion. This section basically contains a series of questions
based upon "What would you do if...?" type situations. The
subject is to choose one of a number of possible responses
which are deemed "correct" or "incorrect" depending upon
what the test designer regards as appropriate attitudes or
behavior. While it is conceivable that intelligence may
figure into certain attitudes and values, it is by no means
clear that they are one and the same. To assert that such
attitudes and values are somehow genetically inherited is to
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make a highly tendentious claim.
Thus, in several aspects of the test, for reasons
having little to do with either genes or intelligence, a
child from a middle or upper class home is likely to score
significantly higher than a child from a working class home.
It is almost inevitable, as Melvin Kohn has shown, that not
only genes but also values win be transmitted intergenera-
tionally. Such values will affect how one does on the I.Q.
test, it is, therefore, difficult to see how tests, based
upon a statistical norm bound to favor the most numerous
group in society, can possibly determine either the level
or the heritability of intelligence in individuals and/or
groups. 1 8
The shortcomings of the I.Q. test as a measure of in-
telligence is only one of the questionable aspects of Herrn-
stein's and Jensen's theories. Another significant mistake
that they and their supporters make is in their tendency to
see I.Q., or even accepting their definition, "intelligence,"
as being an accurate predictor of educational, economic, and
occupational status. They make the error of assuming that
equality of opportunity and the meritocracy already exist
in the United States and that, on the whole, more intelligent
individuals are in more socially important, higher status,
and better paid positions. There are two errors in this
assumption. It is wrong with regard to high I.Q. and/or
intelligence being the chief criterion of educational,
18 ibid . , pp. 64-66.
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economic and occupation success, and it is wrong in the
assumption that the higher paying and more socially import-
ant positions are one and the same, and that, particularly
for the latter, a high intelligence level is even a pre-
requisite.
Herrnstein indicates that I.Q. is the chief predictor
for success in school, occupation, and income as well as for
possibilities of social mobility and that the school acts as
a
-channel.' through which the individual's I.Q. carries him
to his proper place in society. 19 Furthermore, for Herrn-
stein, it is not just that the attitudes of the child are
important to his success or failure, but also that the
child's attitudes and behavior, like his environment, is
the result of the child's genes.
Children with high I.Q.'s simply behave dif-ferently from those with low I.Q.'s and there-by the two types of children (and the adultsthey grow into) create different environmentsfor themselves . 20
Critics of these views have attacked Jensen and Herrn-
stein on several interrelated issues. Overall, the position
of many such critics is that the correlation between I.Q. and
success is irrelevant and/or not so much a result of the im-
portance of I.Q. itself, but rather because both I.Q. and
success depend largely upon class background and its attend-
ant attitudes. A stronger correlation can be made between
19Herrnstein, I.Q. in the Meritocracy , p. L27.
20ibid., p. 181.
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I.Q. and the amount of time qnPnf 4~spe t in school as veil as
"success., in school
. Bowles ^ ^ ^
that the really crucial associations are between years of
schooling and economic success, and between famlly back-
ground and economic success. While high I.Q. often goes
with success, it is not necessarily a major cause of suc-
cess. 21 The possibility Qf economic success , s to a
degree inherited, but it has little to do with any genetic
transmission of I.Q. In fact, in terms of the question of
poverty and equality of opportunity, Bowles and Gintis find
that the matter of I.Q. level, along with the question of
whether it is or is not inherited, is largely irrelevant.
Hence, even if I.Q. could be equalized, it would make little
difference in terms of the social and economic structure in
existence. 22
Regarding the same issue, Block and Dworkin find little
correlation between the grades that students earned and their
eventual occupational status. if higher I.Q. children usual-
ly do stay in school longer than low I.Q. children, it is be-
cause I.Q. tests measure abilities useful in school. 23 This
relationship is compounded by the tendency of teachers, ad-
ministrators, and vocational guidance counselors to take I.Q.
21 Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, "I.Q. in the U. SClass Structure," Social Policy
. Ill (January/February, 1973),
22-rbid.
23Block and Dworkin, "I.Q.," 368.
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scores into account when evaluating and advising their
pupils. More important yet, children with high I.Q.. S
tend to come from home environments having economic and
cultural characteristics conducive to their remaining in
school . 24
Therefore, staying in school for a longer period of
time, aside from the obvious economic factor that children
from the lower classes are less able to afford to stay in
school, also involves certain attitudes, such as persistence
and ambition, which have little to do with intelligence per
se. As has been shown, however, these attitudes may well
have a significant effect upon one's score on an I.Q. test.
The various factors influencing how long the individual child
stays in school have been analyzed by Jencks. He finds that
children from well-to-do families generally stay in school
longer and therefore get more educational credentials for a
number of reasons of which genes have less of an effect than
do cultural attitudes and values. 25
Samuel Bowles, in looking at the criteria utilized by
employers in deciding who to hire, also finds that the pro-
spective employee's intelligence plays a minor role. He
argues that a number of noncognitive traits are of greater
importance. Briefly summarizing his findings, Bowles sees
five criteria used by employers:
24Ibid
.
, 369.
25jencks, ineguality
, pp. 138-141.
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Of these five characteristics, only number one is
directly involved with what is commonly referred to as
intelligence, particularly given the information already
revealed with regard to the criteria for educational cre-
dentials, it is true that Herrnstein and Jensen attempt to
connect virtually all such characteristics to I.Q., to show
that such characteristics are inherited, and that therefore,
we have a meritocracy. However, the correlation that they
attempt to draw between I.Q. and educational and occupational
success is weak. This is further shown by Chomsky when he
points out that to make it to the top in American society
usually will reguire that one be:
...ruthless, cunning, avaricious, self-seek-
ing, lacking in compassion, subservient to
26 Samuel Bowles, "Understanding Unegual Economic
Opportunity," American Economic Review
. LXIII (May, 1973).
352-353.
lo^ia^Sfe^ aband°n
It is doubtful that this is the Kind of different be
havior that Herrnstein has in mind when he speaKs of how
children with high i.q.. b „ behave differently . „ Jf . fc
and he wishes to equate such behavior with intelligence,
'
then he win be using a definition Qf intelligence vhich
has little connection with the "common expectations" of
which both he and Jensen speak.
Thus, to those like Herrnstein who claim that a
meritocracy does exist in the United States and that there-
fore, both those who "make if and those who do not, each
deserve their respective positions on the basis of their
ability or lack of ability, critics charge that instead:
The disturbing truth is that we live in apseudo meritocracy," whose ideology is that
success'; springs solely from merit but whosereality is that some with ability get sub-
stantial rewards, while many with equal abil-1
^Y
1
a
f
e left in the dust, and others with lessability may on numerous occasions attain evenhigher rewards. 2 °
Further, that:
To get a job at any particular level in thehierarchy of production one has to meet two
tests: first, one must be able and willing
to do the work; and second, one must be of
appropriate age, race, sex, education and
z/Noam Chomsky, "The Fallacy of Richard Herrnstein'
s
'I.Q.
'
Social Policy
. Ill (May/June, 1972), 21.
28s. M. Miller and Ronnie Steinberg Ratner, "The
American Resignation: The New Assault on Equality," social
Policy
. Ill (May/June, 1972), 13.
demeanor so th^i- • ^
contribute to ?he sense thafThf j °b^order of the firm ifjust^ the S°Clal
Herrnstein is also wrong in his claim that it is "no
coincidence" that society's values puts its "brightest..
People in the best jobs, and that the trend is toward more
and more skilled and managerial jobs requiring above aver-
age I.Q..s and away from the more menial jobs which can be
done by those with below average I.Q.. S .30 For the most
Part, any ranking of occupation in terms of social import-
ance, prestige, and rewards is going to be in terms of
contribution to the maintenance of the system. This will
be further intensified in a market economy where so much of
the pay level is dictated by supply and demand, and where
both supply and demand can be manipulated by those with the
greatest power so as to increase their own wealth and power.
The relationship that Herrnstein sees between intelligence
and the ability to do the most socially useful work serves
those who are already in a position to define •"useful" and
is particularly self-serving in cases where the supply of
various professionals is deliberately kept low so as to keep
demand, and therefore fees, very high. As for the correla-
tion between high pay and social usefulness, Philip Green
points out that Herrnstein' s own occupational hierarchy,
based upon a World War II study of occupation and I.Q.'s,
29 Bowles, "Understanding Unequal Economic Opportunity,"
30Herrnstein, I
.
Q. in the Meritocracy
, p. 124.
354.
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ass tw%?z£ ssjrss s-
relevant to any effort at extending the realwealth and thus the well being of lociety?31
in addition, with the advent of more and more advanced
technology, the amount of skill, training, and intelligence
reguired to fin most positions may well decrease. Further,
the average I.Q. of all groups studied has been rising over
the years and there is little reason to believe that it will
fail to keep pace with whatever higher levels of intelli-
gence may be required to fill most positions in the future. 32
An additional point made by both Jensen and Herrnstein
which has very serious implications for equality of opportun-
ity is their assertion that, in Jensen's words, "Compensa-
tory education has been tried and apparently it has fail-
ed. "33 The implication of this claim is that I.Q. is in-
herited since environmental alteration has failed to raise
the test scores. Therefore, equality of opportunity cannot
overcome these inherited genetic deficiencies.
There are two major criticisms which can be made with
reference to Jensen's and Herrnstein' s conclusions regard-
ing the failure of compensatory education programs. In the
first place, such conclusions may well be both premature and
31 Philip Green, "I.Q. and the Future of Equality,"
Dissent
, XXIII (Fall, 1976), 407.
32jjbid., 410-412. See Ivar Berg, Education and Jobs :
The Great Training Robbery (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969),
for an elaboration of this point.
33jensen, "I.Q. and Scholastic Achievement," p. 2.
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wrongly focused. Jensen's condemnation of such programs,
which Herrnstein also cites, is based upon a 1967 govern-
ment report on the Headstart Program. This report stated
that, thus far, the achievement gains of those participat-
ing were negligible. However, 1967 was only two years after
the Headstart Program first came into existence, so it may
have been too early to evaluate both its overall success or
failure, or to draw conclusions from that to the possibility
of success in any other subsequent environmental interven-
tion. Many War on Poverty programs, including Headstart,
were poorly funded and poorly organized. To draw the kind
of premature conclusions that Jensen does, is poor analysis. 34
Nevertheless Herrnstein and Jensen look at the early
results of these programs, and conclude that because they
illustrate that participating pupils do not show significant
improvement in I.Q. scores, such pupils cannot be helped
through environmental programs. Thus, they place the blame
squarely upon the pupils, though there is no reason to be-
lieve that the blame should in part, if not wholly, be placed
upon the administration of such programs. It might well be
that these programs were not only poorly funded and poorly
organized, but also that those running the programs did not
have sufficient knowledge to know how to make them more con-
ducive to learning or to the raising of I.Q. scores. 35
34Richard Lewontin, "Race and Intelligence," in The
Fallacy of I
.
Q
.
t p. 3.
35phiiip Green, "Race and I.Q. i The Fallacy of Herit-
ability," Dissent , XXIII (Spring, 1976) 188.
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s case
However it is much easier to blame the victim in thi
the pupil. such an approach is wholly consistent with the
African notion « equaUtv « opportunity and individual
responsibility.
The fact that criticism of compensatory programs may
be premature or misdirected is only part of the weakness of
the Herrnstein-Jensen position. Of more significance is the
apparent evidence indicating that compensatory programs can
vorK. How veil they can worR is difficult to Know since re-
sults vary between different programs. However, any raising
of I.Q. via environmental intervention would serve either to
discredit, or at least throw into serious doubt, the .hole
heritability versus environment aspect of their theories.
A few such studies can be cited to illustrate the point.
The Headstart Program itself, which Jensen cites as
being indicative of the futility of attempting to raise I.Q.
scores, in fact does indicate that pupils in the program
gained between 5 and 10 points in I.Q. test scores. Jensen
discounts this by claiming that when these pupils left the
program and entered school, their I.Q. scores returned to
their earlier lower levels. While Jensen implies that this
is indicative of the very temporary nature of such environ-
mentally induced gains, it is at least as reasonable to
assume that the source of the subsequent drop is more due
to a failure of the public school teachers and programs than
it is due to a failure of the child. Several other studies,
on smaller scale compensatory programs, also indicate that
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I.Q. can be raised significantly through environmental in-
tervention. Jensen cites one of his own studies to show
how, after Making a young subject more at ease and less
inhibited with hi», the child's I.Q. score would increase
from 8 to 10 points. 36
Other studies shov even more significant increases in
I.Q. scores after the child was enrolled in compensatory
programs, or when the child was placed in an adoptive
home. 37 still another study (Klineberg), indicates that
the i.Q.'s of Blacks in the urban North were higher than
that of Blacks in the rural South. 38 Each Qf these studies
presents evidence in direct contradiction to the conclusions
that Jensen and Herrnstein draw with regard to the effect of
compensatory programs upon test scores. Insofar as eguality
of opportunity is concerned, such studies do not, therefore,
negate the possibility of attaining more eguality of oppor-
tunity via environmental engineering, assuming that I.Q. does
have some relation to eguality of opportunity. Herrnstein
himself says that it is "possible" that science could dis-
cover ways of significantly raising I.Q. scores via environ-
mental intervention, but dismisses such a possibility as being
36jensen, "I.Q. and Scholastic Achievement," p. 81.
37see the Skodak - Skeels study in Influences on Human
Development, ed. by Urie Bronfenbrenner (Hinsdale, TL:
Dryden Press, 1972).
38Cited in Green, "Race and I.Q.," 187.
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as-
•impractical in today's world. "39 The ..impractical
pect is directly related to the perception that such inter-
vention would have to go beyond the educational process and
deal with the economic structure as a whole.
Underlying many of the criticisms made of Jensen and
Herrnstein is a general critique of their acceptance of the
functionalist position. 40 The question of whether a func-
tionalist, and therefore meritocratic, society exists in the
United States has already been alluded to in the discussion
relating I.Q. and intelligence to chances for educational,
economic and occupational success. Likewise, the establish-
ment of criteria to determine which positions are "most
important" and therefore most deserving of reward has been
studiously
- ideologically - avoided by both Jensen and
Herrnstein. Indeed, it is not at all clear that the greater
rewards offered to managers than are offered to factory
workers bears any relationship to objective criteria re-
garding the relative importance of the two positions. Thus,
by simply identifying "brightest" with "most important posi-
tions" and further, by seeing a congruence between highest
rewards and positions most important to society, the ques-
tion of establishing criteria for which positions are most
important becomes a matter of seeing where the brightest,
39nerrnstein, I
.
Q. in the Meritocracy
, p. 180.
40see the Davis and Moore debate with Melvin Tumin in
Readings in Social Stratification , ed. by Melvin Tumin
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ : Prentice-Hall
,
Inc., 1970).
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and apparently wealthiest, individuals are located. This
however is an example of circular reasoning rather than
evidence to support their position.
Even more significantly, Herrnstein and Jensen, with
their functionalist image of human nature, assume that it is
necessary to offer unegual rewards in order to get the more
important societal positions filled. Herrnstein is very
clear about this. m an attack upon the possibility of
socialism and particularly in opposition to the dictum,
"From each according to his ability, to each according to
his need," Herrnstein states that a person's ability "ex-
presses itself only for some sort of gain. "41 Hence> given
his view of men being very unegual in terms of abilities
combined with the need for society to utilize especially
those with the most ability, it follows that this latter
group must be rewarded with far greater rewards than those
whose abilities are less in demand. It also follows that
an egalitarian society is guite out of the guestion because
if all received relatively egual rewards, or rewards based
upon need, there would be little, if any, incentive for
those with the most ability to develop and use their ability.
This position is based upon a number of assumptions.
Even if socialism is not workable, there would still be
fundamental weaknesses in the argument. The assertion that
men exercise their abilities only for some sort of gain says
41 Herrnstein, I .Q. in the Meritocracy , p. 216.
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very little by itself u
" What "ostein means by this isthat men exercise abiUties o„ly for material^ ^
Wealth
' " ^
°bViOUSly «— — - Portion denies
the possibil i ty of men working fQr ^^^^^
saturations such as creativity, contributing to the well-
being of society, or working with others on a common pro-ject, if Herrnstein is denying that such motivations have
mistaken. While it is true that in a capitaiist economy the
primary motivating force for work itself often is mereiy an
attempt to earn money, particularly for those for whom !oss
of a job may affect their very survival, it is also true that
as one rises on the class ladder, other incentives gain in
importance. As Chomsky has said, it is unlikely that Herrn-
stein would become a baker or lumberjack even if such posi-
tions paid him more than he earns as a professor. 42
The point is that people do, in fact, express their
abilities for reasons other than material gain. However,
functionalism, like capitalism itself, must see man in more
guantitative terms. To see man as being willing to work hard
for non-material rewards is thereby to deny that economic man
is universal man, unchanging regardless of social circum-
stances. If economic man is not universal man, then the
possibility of socialist man becomes that much more tenable,
and with it, the increased viability of arguments asserting
that the latter may be more rational and desirable. It also
42chomsky, "Fallacy of Herrnstein's I.Q.," 410.
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becomes more v alid t0 argue for a more genuine form of
equality of opportunity via the "impractical changes that
are dismissed by Herrnstein.
Carl Senna makes an ana!ogous point by tracing Herrn-
stein- s position to the equality of opportunity view of life
as a race. Not only do Herrnstein and other functionalists
make the assumption that life* k ^ u ^dT: ilte ls a r ace, but they also assume
that all run it and that all have the same goal in mind. 43
Their view would, therefore, regard anyone who either did
not run the race, or who ran it and lost, as being in some
way "inferior," either in ability or attitude. To Jensen
and Herrnstein the inferiority would be primarily genetic.
Obviously this position does not allow for a great deal of
diversity in either life-style or goals. Those who do not
act like economic man must either be "sick" or genetically
inferior
.
If, however, what Herrnstein means by his claim that
individuals use their abilities only for gain is a notion of
gain sufficiently broad so as to encompass non-material in-
centives such as creative work and community service, then
he is correct. However, such an assertion proves very
little, particularly with reference either to the viability
of capitalism or the impossibility of socialism. Nothing in
socialist theory precludes the possibility of rewards of
some kind, especially intrinsic rewards, for various labors,
43Carl Senna, "Speed and Direction," in The Fallacy of
I .Q. , pp. 51-52.
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though it would be unlike! v i-Via* 1.1,i Keiy that the rewards would be so
varied as to involve very larat- m^ov-^i . .L J-arge material inequalities.
Given this second internrpfaf t ,p et tion of Herrnstein' s assertion
regarding motivations, it would not be necessary to make
the reward differentials very iarge at all. If this bro, rJ
interpretation of what Herrnstein means by "gain" is util-
ized, it can encompass virtually any system: from slavery,
wherein the slave works so as to survive; to capitalism,
wherein the worker works so as to gain money and perhaps
power; to socialism, wherein one works, in part, so as to
achieve rewards emanating from the labor process itself.
Tn drawing conclusions from the work and critiques of
Jensen, Herrnstein, and other proponents of their genetic
theories, it is difficult to make a solid case either for
or against the possibility of equality of opportunity. Cer-
tainly Herrnstein and Jensen would have it that, for genetic
reasons, full equality of opportunity is an impossibility.
Since people are born with very unequal capacities, espe-
cially on the intellectual level, it follows that they will
not have the same opportunity to achieve success in society.
Nor can this ever be remedied, or at least it cannot in the
near future. On the other hand, since they do imply that
environment has a relatively minor effect upon the indivi-
dual's capacities, and that in the United States, those with
the greatest abilities generally do receive the greatest re-
wards and are at, or near, the top in terms of power, pres-
tige and wealth, a kind of equality of opportunity already
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does exist in the United States Ti- i .s . it s an equality of op-
portunity which qives all persons equal access to virtually
all resources except for qenetic maKeup. The fact that this
latter factor is .ore crucial than any other is unfortunate
for the advocates of more equality of opportunity, but there
is little that can be done about it. Thus, for Jensen and
Herrnstein, the United States probably has as much equality
of opportunity as is possible.
What is very important to remember is how much the
above conclusion is dependent upon acceptance of the various
assumptions and claims made by Jensen and Herrnstein. To
accept their positions regarding the possibility of equality
of opportunity, it is necessary to accept such points as:
1. I.Q. score is crucial to chances
for occupational and economic
success
.
2. I.Q. score is virtually permanent
and cannot significantly be altered
via environmental intervention.
3. I.Q. score is primarily inherited.
4. Economic man is universal, regard-
less of social and economic cir-
cumstances
.
The fact that each of the above points is either un-
substantiated or incorrect renders their arguments regarding
the possibility of equality of opportunity wholly unsatis-
factory. Their arguments are far more important in terms
of their social significance, for what they do is to provide
a rationale for those who would argue that equality of oppor-
tunity must inevitably lead to stratification because of the
traits of persons rather than because of a particular social
structure.
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Conclusions
in this chapter, and in Chapter m
. t have attempted
to expire the guestion of Aether eguality of opportunity
is a conceivable goal. In chapter m u wgs^ ^ , f
-
are speaKing of total ana complete e« ity of opportun.
ity. xt is indeed an inconceivable goal. Opportunities, in
terms of physical and intellectual capacities, motivations,
and social setting win te influenced by such an infinite
number of diverse factors that controlling them would be
impossible. it would require a more highly controlled
society than has ever existed.
While it is difficult to draw a firm line as to where
inconceivable turns into possible as regards eguality of
opportunity, it is possibie at least to approximate it. it
has been shown that a number of social factors could be al-
tered so as to greatly encourage the attainment of a more
complete equality of opportunity than currently exists. The
abolition of large differentials of wealth, the equalizing,
in relative terms, of the now highly unequal home and educa-
tional environments through which children are channeled,
and most importantly, and inherent in both of the above, the
elimination of the hierarchical division of labor, are all
measures which would have a critical impact upon the attain-
ment of eguality of opportunity. While this would not en-
tail "complete" eguality of opportunity, it would involve a
much closer approximation than is present today. Hence, if
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we are attempting to discover an answer to the question of
whether equality of opportunity is socially conceivable,
the response is positive to a limited extent. Most exist-
ing social barriers could be overcome, but it would invoke
a heavy price in terms of certain long accepted social
values
.
In response to the question of whether biological
limitations severely reduce, if not eliminate, the possi-
bility of equality of opportunity, the answer is negative.
This does not take into account unusual circumstances such
as whether a child born retarded has an equal opportunity
to develop and succeed as those who are born without such a
disadvantage. As has already been shown, biological limit-
ations regarding intellectual capacities usually are either
illusory or remedial. Thus, such biological factors, parti-
cularly those relating to intelligence, do not present a
serious limitation to eguality of opportunity. Both their
source and their remedy do not lie within the individual, but
instead are based upon societal factors which could be sur-
mounted given a more egalitarian framework.
Within the existing social arrangements in the United
States, equality of opportunity is impossible to even ap-
proximate. What is more important is that the function that
the myth of equality of opportunity serves in this society is
such that its realization is undesirable from the perspective
of those deriving the greatest benefit from the myth. The
1 90
stabilizing and legitimi2ing function of this myth has teen
»°st evident in American educational policy, it is with
this latter area that the next chapter win dea i
.
CHAPTER V
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY-
A CASE STUDY
in this chapter I will examine the related questions
of who benefits most from equality of opportunity and how
it has been utilized in American society. m particular r
will explore the development of the goal of equality of op-
portunity in American educational policy with specific
reference to which groups and individuals have secured the
most advantages and which the least by the propogation and
occasional implementation of the equality of opportunity
ideology. Some of the points already raised regarding the
problems of equality of opportunity are also at the root of
the benefits which accrue to certain individuals and groups
via this ideology.
It is understandable why equality of opportunity has
become so widely accepted a goal. in a very real sense, it
has something for everyone. For the wealthy and successful,
there is the satisfaction of knowing, believing, or at least
hoping others believe that their position has been "earned."
If equality of opportunity implies that all persons deserve
to be where they are, then those who are in the most desir-
able positions can project the image that they are the most
deserving people in that society. From this, it is but a
short step to a self-image of being among the superior group
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m society. For those individuals who are at the middle or
lower levels of the social and economic hierarchy there is
the hope that they eventually will "make it" and are there-
fore not locked into a particular position. Or, as is more
likely, they can hope that their children win make it to
a higher level. Finally, for those whose chief concern is
the well-being and stability of society as a whole, there
is the belief that with equality of opportunity, not only
will the most deserving and efficient persons get into the
most crucial positions, thereby bringing about a meritocracy,
but also that the opportunity structure will be such as to
diffuse the likelihood of serious class conflict. The one
group that such an ideology does not benefit are those deem-
ed incapable of ever really advancing to a decent level and
who are likely to have children also deemed incapable of
significant advancement. However this latter group is un-
likely to be particularly functional to society or to pos-
sess the capacity to seriously disrupt society, it is pos-
sible to argue that they have an important role in that they
may constitute the "reserve army of unemployed," but this
is not as overtly functional a role as that of the regular-
ly employed worker. Therefore this group generally is per-
ceived neither by others nor by themselves as having a vital
role to play in the system. With this self-image, their
potential for seriously threatening the established order is
significantly undermined.
It is not surprising that equality of opportunity has
become so highly valued
. goal . ^ ^ ^^
regarded as either an attempt to return to an inefficient,
unfair, and anti-democratic ascriptive society, or as in-
dicative of fear and a lac* of confidence in the individuals
and/or group's ability to handle fair and open competition.
The latter is the more damaging criticism since it is prob-
ably less offensive to be labeled an aristocratic reaction-
ary than an inferior or incapable coward. m either case,
the result is to ensure some hesitancy in criticizing the
desirability, if not attainability, of equality of oppor-
tunity
.
This explanation is insufficient to explain the per-
vasiveness of this ideological goal. To probe more deeply
into the matter, especially as it relates to the context of
American society, I will analyze the relationship of equality
of opportunity to American educational policy. Educational
policy has been chosen because it is the most significant
policy area insofar as equality of opportunity is concerned.
Not only have there been considerable legislation and court
rulings specifically dealing with equality of educational
opportunity, 1 but it is this policy toward which most Ameri-
cans, the busing issue notwithstanding, have been most
favorably inclined. This is due to the crucial role which
xJoel H. Spring, The Sorting Machine (New York: David
McKay Company, Inc., 1976), goes into some detail regarding
many of these measures and decisions since 1945. A more
process-oriented examination of a specific educational policy
may be found in Eugene Eidenberg and Ray D. Morey, An Act of
Congress (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1969).
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education, and specifically schooling, is viewed as playing
in the life chances of the American child. This attitude
was best exemplified by Lyndon Johnson, who felt that poverty
and other assorted social problems could be relieved, if not
eliminated, by a combination of education and equality of
opportunity. 2 Further, education is viewed widely as a
common experience all American children share. Finally
there is the belief that education can solve problems with-
out upsetting the status-quo - its gradualist emphasis is
on the individual as the problem, not society, and it can
be provided to the poor without decreasing the amount made
available to wealthier children. 3
Equality of Educational Opportunity -
A Definition
The major conflict over equality of opportunity is
over the question of whether an interdependence exists
between equality of educational opportunity and equality in
the results of schooling. Those who stress the need to deal
with results are by no means in agreement regarding the
specific results to be considered. Educational credentials,
knowledge, personal development or eventual income are all
taken as indicative of educational opportunity. On the other
2Edgar B. Gumbert and Joel H. Spring, Superschool and
the Superstate ; American Education in the Twentieth Century :
1918 - 1970 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1974), p.
45.
^Robert L. Church and Michael W. Sedlak, Education in
the United States (New York: The Free Press, 1976), pp.
433-434.
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hand, many attempt to isolate, or at least distinguish,
between the opportunity and the results. For this group,
the key elements of equality of educational opportunity in-
clude such possibilities as free education up to a given
point (though the location of this point in age, grade level,
and competence can differ), and equality of resources for all
schools with no class, racial or sexual discrimination within
the school. As a general means of classifying these differ-
ing approaches, I win refer to the results orientation as
an outputs approach and the resources orientations as an
inputs approach. 4
The inputs model is most in line with the traditional
view of equality of opportunity in the American context. Re-
ferring again to the analogy of a race as well as to an ex-
tension of the liberal capitalist laissez faire view of
equality of opportunity, the crucial emphasis is on seeing
to it that all contestants are given the opportunity to
start the race at the same point. Because school is a form
of race, equality of opportunity in education consists of
granting to each child the opportunity to attend schools of
relatively equal quality and for a period of years whose
minimum duration is specified by law. Advocates generally
4This schema owes much to Thomas F. Green, "Equal
Educational Opportunity: The Durable Injustice," in Philo-
sophy of Education 1971 ; Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh
Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society (Ed-
wardsville, IL: Philosophy of Education Society, 1970); and
to Thomas I. Ribitch, "The Case for Equal Educational Oppor-
tunity," in Schooling in a Corporate Society , ed. by Martin
Carnoy (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1972).
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-intain that if compulsory
, g
cal to the liberal ideal of freedom
, it is nevertheless one
of those points at which it is permissible and necessary for
the state to interfere with the liberty of its individual
citizens for their own, as well as society's good. What the
state, or any other level of government is not permitted to
do however, is to intervene to guarantee or impose eguality
of results upon those attending the schools. As in the
analogy of the race, the state can see to it that all start
at the same point and at the same time, and can see to it
that none cheat during its course. At the end of the race,
the only role of the state is to confirm victories and de-
feats, and reward them accordingly. The emphasis is upon
the ability and effort of each individual.
One result of this inputs model is a public emphasis
upon trying to equalize expenditures for all school dis-
tricts. Since equality of educational opportunity requires
an equal start, sharp differences in the quality of educa-
tion that children receive must be reduced. This view is
reflected in the movement to void the constitutionality of
the property tax basis of public school financing in favor
of an across-the-board equalization of funds regardless of
disparities in wealth between districts.
5
5See Spring, The Sorting Machine
, pp. 242-243; and W.Lee Hansen and Burton A. Weisbrod, "Bottom Dogs Subsidize TopDogs: The Equality Fiction in Higher Education," in Up_ the
Mainstream: A Critique of Ideology in American Politics and
Everyday Life, ed. by Herbert G. Reid (New York: David Mc-
Kay Company, Inc., 1974).
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Another atten.pt to bring about an inputg ^
of equality of opportunity in the schoois has been the re-
cent busing programs in which pupils are bused across dis-
trict lines in order to achieve racial integration. This,
in theory, serves to accomplish two interrelated input ob-
jectives by seeing to it that all public school pupils are
given an equal start in terms of racial integration, while
also making less relevant the usually unequal tax base
between White districts and Black districts. However in
terms of equalizing school quality (or at least making it
more random) busing to achieve racial balance cannot cope
adequately with this kind of unequal opportunity. To do so
in terms of a busing program would reguire that the busing
be class based as well as racially based. Busing to achieve
racial integration has some justifications, but as an attempt
to equalize school resources its success is unlikely. What
often happens is a kind of racial integration, but not class
integration and certainly not a situation where school qual-
ity is rendered equal to the schools in the more affluent
suburbs which normally are not touched by such programs.
Clearly such a situation is some distance removed from
eguality of educational opportunity.
Thus the two key points of emphasis in the input model
are what resources are made available to schools in terms of
materials, libraries, pleasant surroundings, teacher guant-
ity and quality, and the question of access. What this
latter point entails is that all should have access to
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ques-
he
upon
Schools 0f approximately quanty ^^^^^ ^^deemed educational irrelevant, lilte race
, sex and
3io„. As with most noUons Qf equauty Qf Qpportunity> fche
question of access, not resni k= =.ults, is given the emphasis.
School is the beginning of an important race and the
tion of resources and access is a means to ensure that t
race is "fair" and that victory or defeat is based only
-hat the schooling system is supposedly designed to do -
develop all pupils while at the same time separating the
more capable from the less capable.
Defining equal educational opportunity in terms of in-
puts is inadequate for several reasons. One of these reasons
already discussed in Chapter Hi, has to do with the nQtion
of ensuring that all arrive at the starting line with an
equal opportunity. The inputs model appears to draw a line
at the point of equalizing school resources and access, it
is unclear whether we can go beyond that line to guarantee
each child about to enter school an equal opportunity to
develop the capacities, attitudes, and motivations which win
foster academic success, is it enough to throw open the
school door to all with "Here it is-do with it what you will?.
That this will not provide equality of opportunity has
been shown in a number of recent works. The resources a
school possesses have relatively little effect upon the cog-
nitive development of its students, particularly as measured
by test scores and when students' eventual income levels are
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A
s
noted, school really become „marginal
maj0r Pr°POnent
°
f
—tic Christopher Jencks
, ha „
criticized on the grounds that he accepts ^^Of I.Q. tests as reiiable measuring devices> ^ ..^^^
xn terms of his proposals for deaUng
^^^^^ ^dto see tne school
• s potential as . ?
Nevertheless, the most popular criterion ^ ^
adequacy of schools in terms of their i nte 1 Xectual role, re-
nins the test scores of their pupils
. „ expenditures per
pupil have little sffeot upon such scores, then tne validity
and rationale of the inputs approach is undefined. There
is little purpose in equalizing expenditures to achieve
equality of opportunity if their effect on education is
negligible. An input advocate may ^.^
the school, particularly the poorer school, a more pleasant
Place via giving it the same amount of funding as the
wealthier school on the grounds that, regardless of test
scores or cognitive development, all children are deserving
of an equally attractive environment in which to spend their
time, with an equal amount of resources available to them.
8
However, this leaves open the question of the purpose of the
Differenc^"
f
?n
Co
?
frey Hodgson, "Do Schools Make au rrerence? i The "Inequality" Controversy , ed. bv Donald
igTsr^Vf J° Bane (New YorkT-^Ic Books, Inc1975); and Jencks, Inequality . i .,
7See Sexton, "The Inequality Affair," 53-61.
^^Je.Bane and Christopher Jencks, "The Schools andEqual Opportunity," The Saturday Review of Education
. Octo-ber, 1972, p. 6. — ~
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school itself
. Different individualg give differing emphasis
to the socially integrative, cognitive, and egalitarian
functions of the school. Few persons however are wining
to assert that the sole, or even major, purpose of the
school is to provide a pleasant environment for the child,
unless it is on the instrumental grounds that such an en-
vironment is more conducive to learning. Therefore, to
make this latter goal the basis for eguality of educational
opportunity, as measured by inputs, is a position which is
unlikely to be defended with any tenacity.
This argument shows the impossibility of maintaining
a sharp distinction between the inputs and outputs models.
To attempt to do so is to make an arbitrary decision about
where the line between input and output is to be drawn.
There is little reason to believe, and good reason not to
believe, that the equalization of financial resources made
available to schools will have any significant role in
bringing about equality of educational opportunity. 9
Advocates of the outputs model see equality of educa-
tional opportunity being achieved if all students have not
only the same opportunity to complete a given number of years
of schooling, but in addition, having completed such school-
ing, have an equal opportunity to achieve similar occupa-
tional and income levels and/or, that the gaps in cognitive
9An attack upon further increases in education expendi-
tures is made in Daniel P. Moynihan, "Equalizing Education:
In Whose Benefit?" in The "Inequality" Controversy
.
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How
abilities between students nave narrowed substantially
this latter level is fco ^ ^^^^ ^ a sub^ct ^ ^
siderable debate n„t 4-u^e. But the particulars of hQw tQ meagure
such abilities are ^ iof less importance here than the issue
of equality of results in terms of fhou t ese measures.
The major premise of the outputs^ ^^^15 Uttle 361156
^ diSCUSSW quality of opportunity inde-
pendent^ of the only adequate means of determining whether
-
has been attained. To test whether such equality existsm a given setting, we must looK at the end of the race
rather than the starting point. It is only by a close
analysis of the results that we can perceive what factors
-st he equalized and which are less crucial. For example,
if expenditures between school districts were to be equal-
ized, and the differences in the cognitive, income and oc-
cupational levels of the students from different districts
remained very high, this would lead one of two possible al-
ternative explanations. We could taKe a Jensen-Herrnstein
position and maintain that there is nothing more than can be
done. The equal opportunity was there and it was the genetic
inferiority of some of the students, due either to their
class, race or both, and not their schools or the social
structure, which led to their lower test scores and ultimate
positions in society. since a functionalist meritocracy is
assumed to exist, such genetic inferiority in cognitive
ability of necessity leads to the income and occupational
inegualities as well. The shortcomings of this approach
:s are
ex-
S already ^ i- «- Proceeding chapter
. Asan alternative, we could claim that if such
nrghly unequal despite an equali2at . on , n
_
penditures for all districts t-w, then expenditures by them-
selves, are insufficient to attain equality Qf
opportunity. SometMng else ^ tQ ^^
The
..something else" which has been called for and
occasionally i mplemented has proceeded in two different
directions. On the one hand, there has heen the pressure
for affirmative action programs and quotas on the grounds
that such policies are necessary to bring about eguality
of opportunity because past policies deliberately excluded
various minorities and women from eguality of opportunity
in both education and jobs. This involves some tampering
with the race itself as well as with ultimate results, but
it is justifiable in order to redress past discrimination.
Another policy which fits into the outputs model is
the Head Start Program initiated in the mid 1960's. Unlike
the affirmative action programs which deal with the race it-
self, Head Start is an effort to achieve a more equal re-
sult by focusing on the pre-school period - a period which
is prior to the school race. it is based upon the realization
that regardless of the quality of the school, if the child
reaches this starting line with substantial handicaps based
upon his pre-school life experiences, he will not have an
egual opportunity in the school
. Head Start attempts to
reach the child before these handicaps can have a significant
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o
e^ect upon the eventuai outcome
. The ^ ^ fc
ensure an equaUty of outcomes than to ensure that the chi ld
not he put at an insurmountahle and unfair disadvantage inthe competition. In this case,
.-unfair" refers to the
handicaps and d isadvantages for which the individual chi ld
l. not responsive. Head start acKnowledges the need to
taKe xnto account more than the child- s performance in
school
.
This rationale is typified in , iq^j-n a m a 1965 speech by Lyndon
Johnson at Howard University.
While Head Start does deal with some of the root
causes of inequality of performance in the school, it too
suffers from some fundamental defects. Clearly it is im-
possible for any program or programs to penetrate far enough
and comprehensively enough so as to overcome the inequalit-
ies of opportunity based upon physical environment and
socioeconomic background. Head Start programs can make a
dent here, but no more than that. A second problem is that
were such a comprehensive pre-school program to be developed,
it probably would first be utilized by those with the most
money and power or the program might be countered by other
t-^ d i^ibtdu inJ ' S * Fuerst > "Quotas as an Instrument ofhe Public Interest," Society
. XIII (January/February, 1976),
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efforts to retain the differences in power and wealth be-
tween the classes.ll lB a sense tMs hag already ^^
via expensive private nurseries and day care centers.
The most fundamental problem in utilizing Head Start
as a means of overcoming inequality in educational oppor-
tunity is that it overlooks the basic cause of the inequal-
ity
-
the inegalitarian economic and social system as a
whole. When a system both encourages and requires sub-
stantial inequality of result in terms of wealth, power,
prestige and work life, programs designed to foster equality
of educational opportunity, even with an emphasis upon edu-
cational results, cannot be successful within the context of
that particular system. Hence, while it is possible that
efforts to reach the child prior to his entering the school
"race" may be a necessary condition for equality of educa-
tional opportunity, they are not a sufficient condition.
Further, it is likely that in a more egalitarian society
lacking such widespread inequalities, a program like Head
Start would, except in certain exceptional cases, quickly
become superfluous. Therefore, two conclusions are possible.
Either there have been a series of misjudgments on the part
of those who have formulated and implemented these programs;
or at least some of those concerned are using these poli-
cies, and the image of equality of educational opportunity
in general, as a means of legitimizing a highly inegalitar-
ian system.
11-Thomas F. Green, "Equal Educational Opportunity," p
137.
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respite the above problems with outpufc oriented ^
qrams. it is clear that of the tvo models of equality of
educational opportunity, the output model is superior Itinvolves both a perception or, ana an attempt to deal with
the interrelatedness of opportunity and result. The more
simplistic premises of the input model which imply that
equality of opportunity can he attained via an equalization
of financial resources on a per pupil basis, ignores this
interrelationship. The main strength of the input model is
that it envisions a clear and attainable means of bringing
such equality of opportunity about. This is hardly a fruit-
ful method of conceptual analysis and is unlikely to be a
successful basis for policy.
Objectives of Equality of Educational Opportunity
The widely accepted version of American educational
policy, as it has evolved over the last two centuries,
Places great emphasis on its role in promoting the develop-
ment and success of the individual, and on its role in pro-
moting the prosperity of society. This view sees American
education as having three major purposes: to integrate the
individual into society, to foster his intellectual and
moral development, and to act as an egualizing force in
society. it is within this context that American educators
have taken so much pride in their historical efforts to in-
crease upward social mobility for various immigrant groups,
31 min°ritieS a"d «*" of the poorer classes
.
12
Another set of goals^^^ ^^
met by American education are the societal ne „eds, parti-
cularly those created h„ *. tby technology. As technol _
«T develops, particularly in the latter half of the nine-
teenth century, so too does the need tor more skilled and
educated workers. Technological reguirements dictate the
increased push both for mass education and for educational
reform which play so important a role during the Progressive
era. This need has continued into the present, though to-
day the demand and need has b.en upgraded so as to reguire
college educated labor rather than high school graduates.
These technological needs, combined with eguality of educa-
tional opportunity, have resulted in the functional merit-
ocracy which adherents to this perspective often claim exists
m the united States. The overall role of eguality of oppor-
tunity here is to serve both individual and social needs by
seeing to it that the "best" reach the top positions and
therefore keep things running smoothly and efficiently,
while also maximizing the "fairness" of the process by
granting to all persons the same opportunity to achieve
educational, and eventual financial and occupational success.
Compulsory Education
The most encompassing critigue of the liberal inter-
wv ,
1
lSee Colin Greer, The Great School Legend (New YorkVikrng Press, Inc., 1973), for a critic SfthTs position.
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pretation of American educational policy has to^ ^
overall and underlying purposes of such ^ ^
Past century. The orthodox liberal interpretation stresses
both technical prerequisites and the desi re to accomo-
date and fulfil, democratic ideals. In short
, both a^
nalistic and idealistic basis are cited, though which of
the two is given greater emphasis varies from author to
author. In reality, the idealistic basis is greatly exag-
gerated, and the materialistic basis, while important, has
been so in a manner very different from that which is
generally acknowledged. As for the notion of educational
policy being directed toward the personal development of
the individual student, this is true only if we accept a
view of personal development which equates it with fostering
in the child both the ability and the desire to "fit" into
the existing social, political and economic order without
upsetting the class structure.
If the attainment of equality of opportunity is per-
ceived as being at the forefront of American education, then
one of the essential tools for achieving this goal has been
the policy of compulsory education. It is, to paraphrase
Rousseau, a "forcing to be free" kind of policy which theo-
retically, helps to ensure eguality of opportunity, since,
for the sake of individual prosperity if not survival itself,
all are going to be running in a similar race and striving
for similar rewards, especially the reward of wealth, it
follows that education must be made available to all so as
ensure that all will have ^^
-cause all parents may not be gufficientiy responsibie ^
aware of the necessity for the education Qf their ^
spring, the state has ^ ^ .^ ^ ^^
this matter sole iy in the hands Qf ^ .^.^
and thereby face the inevitable result that some children
will not attend school and win not have equality Qf^
tunity, or the state can actively intervene in the process
and see to it that all children do get at least some minimal
amount o, schooling. Thus laws are passed^ piace ^
state in the position of compelling attendance by the child
in school regardless of the wishes of the parent or the
child. 13
Here, equality of educational opportunity is not the
goal so much as a means to a particular end - systemic
stability. Neither democratic ideals nor technological
necessity are at the roots of such programs. instead, these
policies serve to socialize the child and thereby to legiti-
mize such aspects of life in the United States as the com-
petitive ethic, the virtues and necessity of the existing
factory system, and the overall distribution of wealth and
power
.
Compulsory education, as applied to the children of the
immigrants in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
13 See Bane and Jencks, "Schools and Equal Opportunity,"
and Ivan Illich, Deschoolincr Society (New York: Harper andRow, inc., 1971) for attacks upon compulsory education.
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centuries, remove such children from the influence of their
Parents and their "old country" and perhaps radical ways,
and "Americanizes" them. However, the Americanization is
not merely a process by which the cMl(J learns ^^
norms, traditions and mores of American society, it is
also a process through which the child is fit into a parti-
cular role within the system, generally a worKing class
role, and is taught to accept the desirability, or at least
inevitability, of this role, without compulsory education,
the children of both the American-born workers and immi-
grants could eventually constitute a disruptive force. On
the one hand, it would mean large numbers of children being
left to the influences of their families and neighborhoods,
neither of which could always be expected to influence the
child is a system-legitimizing direction. The destabilizing
potential would tend to increase as the poverty and resent-
ment of the child's parents and neighborhood increased.
Hence, the need to get these children into school where they
could temporarily be insulated from their home environment.
At the same time, the school could attempt to offset the
negative and potentially disruptive influences of family and
neighbors via a socializing process designed to foster a
sense of pride and gratitude in being an American. This
process might have been further enhanced by the push for
school centralization with its resultant decrease in commun-
ity control over education. 14
14creer, The Great School Legend p. 81.
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Nor is this argument negated by the often stated
claim that the factory system and urbanization, parti-
cularly in the late nineteenth century, had the tendency
to reduce the socializing role of the family. 15 We can
hold to such a view and stilx regard compulsory education
as an atte.pt to maKe the school a major agency for bring-
ing up the child. Mhether the school
•
s role is to replace
supplest or complement the parent would probably depend
upon the strength and direction of parental influence, m
any case, compulsory education eventually does help to
stabilize a potentially unstable situation via increasing
the school's custodial role. 16
Regardless of how positively inclined toward the
American system immigrant parents happened to be, the fact
that most of these families lived in impoverished conditions
left the authorities with essentially three choices. They
could ignore the situation in the immigrant ghettoes of the
cities, but this was potentially dangerous to the overall
stability of the system. They could attempt to alter the
existing distribution of wealth and power in the United
States such that the poor, both immigrant and native-born,
were given a more egual share of the benefits. However,
this was highly unlikely since it would necessarily require
a substantial dimunition of the wealth and power of those in
J 5^ 1™? 1 ?owle^."Unequal Education and the Reproduc-tion of the Social Division of Labor," in Schooling in aCorporate Society
, p. 39. * — ~
^i
6
?J
Umbert and sPring> Superschool and the Superstate,
pp. 118-121. —c
t
°701 " AmeriCa" S°Ciety - ^—— - «- onea*e„. was to deal with the ^ ^ a ^ ^ ^
lessen discontent or- =.+- i, at least channel it away from those
on top. thereby avoiding any threat to the eating class
system and inducing them fcQ^ ^ ^
the state as transmitted by its agent . ^ ^
third choice involved presenting education as a means of
escaping poverty i„ a legitimate^
_ ^ ^
by compulsory education and the ethos of eguality of oppor-
tunity itself. Thus
, educational reformers lihe Horace Mann
could can for universal compulsory education as a means of
securing eguality of opportunity but the reality of the situa
tion was that the chief rpsnif ^ ^met e ult of the schooling was to inte-
grate youth into the labor force. 18
Technological Preregui sites
The alleged need for technological training so often
cited as being a major source of the expansion of American
schooling and the push for eguality of educational opportun-
ity is itself subject to serious question on at least two
levels. Advanced industrialization has not and does not
bear any necessary connection to the need for more school-
ing. Even if more skill is required at the average job than
^Bowles, "Unequal Education," p. 40.
*.»n /^ SamVel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Schooling in Capi-|alist America (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1976) ,1? llTSpring, The |orUng Machine, p. 17; and Greer, The GreatSchool Legend
. p. 75. —
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ivar Berg has demonstrated both that the connection
between todays jobs and the need for greater schooling is
limited, and that more schooling does not necessarily iead
to better workers.19 For example>
. g ^ ^
today there exists a greater demand for workers with educa-
19Berg, Education and Jobs
, pp.
tlonal credentials, be it hiqh school degree
, a coliege
gree, or something higher up the scale. However Berg shows
that such demands have relatively little to do with any in-
creased difficulty or complexity of the jobs being sought.20
It is not schooling per se that gives a worker greater com-
petence to perform most contemporary jobs which have raised
their educational requirements. instead what has occurred
has been a reversal of the traditional supply and demand
cycle. As the supply of college educated workers has con-
tinued to increase, more and more jobs are "educationally
upgraded.'.21 The effect of this has been to increase the
need and demand for college degrees by those about to enter
the labor market, a need for college graduates to be satis-
fied with lesser jobs than they expected, and the increased
occupational displacement of those without college degrees.
Hence, it is not the jobs themselves that require increased
education as much as it is the contemporary market forces
which have created the current relationship between in-
creased education and jobs. The supply has created a false
demand. Supply has expanded, not because of technological
needs but because of social needs relating to the stability
of the system. Hence, the production of attitudes and
20see H. Schelsky, "Technical Change and Educational
Consequences," in Education
. Economy and Society : A Reader
in the Sociology of Education (New York: The Free Press,
Inc., 1965); for a different perspective reqardinq increased
skill requirement.
21 Berq, Education and Jobs
, p. 66.
personalities not sKUls or cognitive abilities is the
major role for the school. 22
Berg elaborates on this point by reviewing various
surveys and examinations of the relation between workers'
educational attainments and their job performance, rate of
absenteeism and job satisfaction. He finds little evidence
that education leads to significant improvement in any of
these three areas. 23 Nor does educational level bear much
connection to a worker's chances for promotion. Seniority
is far more important in this regard. These results apply
both to blue collar and white collar workers. The alleged
connection so often cited by employers between educational
credentials and job competence exists neither in terms of
the specifics of a particular job nor in any "generalized
ability" which education supposedly develops in a person.
The argument that the vast upgrading of educational require-
ments for many jobs is necessary so as to ensure adequate
performance in a technological age is weak. Neither effi-
ciency nor job satisfaction is necessarily increased by such
credentials. In fact, Berg finds that in many cases job
satisfaction is decreased with greater educational creden-
tials, particularly in jobs requiring relatively little
skill. The reason for this is not difficult to discern. If
an individual has gone through the trouble of securing a
22Bowles and Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America
.
p. 9.
23eerg, Education and Jobs
, p. 87.
college degree, he generally ^ ^^
that Ms events positlon will make _
_ ^ ^^
" ind~- - "itical thinking
. rf ifc does nQt>
«* « Ms original rationale fQr gQing ^ cQiiegG ^
—a along with his sense Qf self _respect
,
24 jf g^
9oes to college with the expectation that upon graduation
he win get a good paying and interesting job> and then^ta—lf in an uninteresting position reguiring little skill
then even if such a position pays well, dissatis f
a
ction is
likely to occur. This will also te the case . f we ^^
ing with a high school graduate who gets a job which has
skill requirements far below his abilities and training.
Berg notes that the most dissatisfied are those with a high
educational level who hold low skill jobs, while the most
content are those workers having low educational levels who
hold high skill jobs.25 The former are dissatisf . ed
their education has, in effect, been "wasted" as far as oc-
cupation is concerned, while the latter workers are more
satisfied because they have, to an extent, "beat the system"
by making it without the added time and expense required to
secure educational credentials. Dissatisfaction is in-
creased by the instrumental view of education in which it
747 9dQ
4S
^
-
DaViS and M°?re
-
"Principles of Stratification,"
t I l\ . i a Presentation of the functionalist positionon what kinds of inducements are required to get persons toattend college.
"Berg, Education and Jobs , pp. 125-127.
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is seen as a means to an end
- a good paying, interesting,
high status job. The present marRet situation shQuid the^_
^ore be of little comfort to employers for it indicates that
as they continue to educationally upgrade their low pay and
low skill jobs, they can also expect increases in job dis-
satxsfaction on the part of those with the credentials who
must take such positions. This can be checked only by a
lowering of occupational and status expectations on the part
of those entering college. Given the pervasiveness of the
American Dream, particularly with regard to education and
equality of opportunity, such a lowering of expectations is
unlikely to occur. if it did occur
, mighfc^ ^ ^
the very kind of problems that the ideal of equality of op-
portunity is designed to avoid, such as increased despair,
frustration, hopelessness and potentially more explosive re-
actions on the part of those told to lower their expectations.
Either today's jobs do not require educational upgrad-
ing or the schooling that most Americans receive is insuf-
ficient for, or irrelevant to, the performance of most jobs.
In either case, we must look more deeply into why there has
been such an increased demand for educational credentials.
Even if it is merely a matter of the demand responding to an
ever increasing supply, the question remains as to why there
has been and continues to be such an expansion of the supply.
If it is a question of the schools being inadequate, then we
may either accept it with the view that society is running
sufficiently well despite the educational system, or look to
closely related to speei fic job training. To , degree
particularly since the increased fear « Soviet techno.
logical advances in thp iQ«;n.„ L ,.m e 1950 s, this latter effort has been
made, though not to the extort t-u ten that many of its proponents
would wish. 26 The crucial issue ^ ^^^^^^ gues _
tion of why the increase in supply and why, if job per-
formance is not noticeably improved by schooling, do em-
Ployers continue to insist upon their prospective empioyees
possessing a high level of education prior to their being
considered for hiring.
The Sorting Function
The issue of "credentialism" must be viewed as an
aspect of one of the school's more significant roles - that
of acting as a sorting and selecting mechanism. This bears
a close relationship to the ideal of equality of educational
opportunity since the ostensible object here is for the school
to grant each of its pupils an equal opportunity to
-prove
himself" in an open and competitive setting. Given the
nature of the job market and the demand for such creden-
tials, the importance of the school in determining the future
status and occupation of its pupils takes on added signifi-
cance.
la^ 26Se! Sp5in?' ^he Sorting Machine , regarding this post1945 period and, m particular, the emphasis on "career edu-
cation" during the Nixon Administration.
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To expire this selecting an(J certifying ^
the school, we must discuss how the school operates upon
it. students, particula rly i„ the elementary and secondary
school. m this connection, the issues of who gets the
credentials and why are important, as is the question of
the specific role that instruments such as tracking and
I.Q. tests tend to serve in this context. The school as
selecting agency is not consistent with the image of school
as equalizing agency in the same way that equality of oppor-
tunity in the American context is inconsistent both with
equality of results and with an adequate vision of equality
of opportunity itself. It is clear that . f
have been utilized to act as a selecting mechanism, their
status as an equalizing factor is very low. The usual
picture of American education is that even if the latter
point is true, at least this education has served to advance
the United States closer to a meritocracy. However, unless
we accept the arguments of Jensen and Herrnstein regarding
the racial and/or class based nature of "merit," then we
are left with the problem of how to account for the relative-
ly consistent manner in which the selecting and awarding of
credentials has tended to favor children from the upper and
middle classes to the detriment of those from the poorer
classes.
The selecting process operates on two levels. There
is the selection for occupational position which basically
entails the kind of credentials, if any, that one receives
and thereby has an important effect upon the Kind of oc-
cupational position that one is deemed capable of filling
.
Prior to this is the within-school process by which the
student is classified as being of college potential or not.
Thrs is the most fundamental classificatory process which
the student undergoes. The process includes I.Q. tests and
other so-called
"achievement criteria" as Talcott Parsons27
among others, refers to them, and thus fits quite well with
equality of opportunity. According to Parsons, the select-
ing is based upon "earned" status in which the school setting
is a race with the evaluations of teachers determining the
winners. By the ninth grade the process of determining
whether or not the child win te taking college preparatory
courses has generally been completed. This, and the result-
ing intellectual segregation via tracking that takes place
is seen by Parsons as being both fair and acceptable to most
concerned because it is based upon achievement in a context
of equality of opportunity. Parsons goes so far as to claim
that the elementary school classroom is the embodiment of
equality of opportunity, with both winners and losers being
willing to accept the results. 28 Further, the blow to the
losers is softened somewhat because, says Parsons, despite
their possessing a lower intellectual level, the teacher may
"like" such students more than he likes those who are higher
27Talcott Parsons, "The School Class as a Social Sys-
tem: Some of Its Functions in American Society," in Educa-tion
. Economy and Society .
28 ibid
. , p. 445.
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achievers. 29
The danger that this kind of tracking^ ^ ^attains and preservation of a democratic community is to
be offset via such institutions as the homeroom. In the
high school homeroom there is to be a democratic raix of
students with varied interests, abilities and backgrounds,
and it is from this source that student government officers
are to be elected. 30 The heterogeneity Qf ^ ^
to compensate for the potentially elitist nature of the more
intellectually homogeneous classroom.
The tracking that takes place involves the presumption
that some are capable of doing college work while others are
not. Once the school decides which students fit into each
category, the comprehensive high school sets up their course
work accordingly. Curricula are differentiated so that
those students who seem to have the intellectual resources
to handle college work, are given high school courses of a
pre-college nature, including the sciences and math. For
those who are deemed incapable of going on to college, the
curriculum becomes more "vocationally" oriented, including
subjects like carpentry, drafting, electronics and, for
women, the so-called "homemaking" skills. Such tracking may
also occur in terms of the type of high school that the child
is encouraged or assigned to attend. Some go on to more
29Ibid
. . p. 447.
30Spring, The Sorting Machine
, p. 49.
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academic high schools while others go to vocational or
technical high schools. The rationale behind both Kinds
of tracking, and the resulting intellectual segregation,
is that it is both wasteful and unfair to make a college
bound student waste his time on courses which win do him
little good in his occupational future. it is equally
wasteful and unfair, as well as ego damaging, to make or
encourage a student with more limited intellectual potential
to suffer through courses for which he will have little vo-
cational use and probably will be incapable of handling
adequately. Therefore, the tracking program is beneficial
not only to society by encouraging the attainment of a merit-
ocracy, but also to the individual student, be he a high or
a low achiever, by seeing to it that he is placed in the
school, class or course most suited to his own particular
capacities and interests.
In like manner, the use of I.Q. tests is based upon a
similar rationale. Where the I.Q. tests supposedly are most
valuable is in their "objective" nature. if the teacher's
evaluations are the only criterion, then personal feelings
about a given student may interfere with the judgment. How-
ever, by bringing in an allegedly objective test which all
pupils take under similar circumstances, personality factors
are avoided. The I.Q. test thereby typifies American egual-
ity of opportunity. It is designed to measure intelligence
and all those who take it have the same opportunity to dis-
play their intelligence, regardless of any external factors.
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e
rack-
such scores are of great valye in determining ^ _
-st i„telligent and therefore> fche capabie
of going on to and graduating from college.
The numerous problems connected with I. Q . tests hav
been discussed in some detail in Chapter iv. However, the
self-fulfilling nature of these tests, lita that of tr
ln9 i
"
genfira1
' " a^ --e in terms of educational
opportunity. For if a person scores pQorly ^^ a ^
in combination with low evaluations by his teachers, it is
very unlikely that that person win ever get out of a lower
track. His assigned curriculum, his vocational guidance and
the image that teachers have of him all win combine to
solidify and stabilize his track and will render him fit
only for a given occupational and status level. Further,
the intellectual segregation that inevitably occurs, despite
Parsons' claim that friendship lines cross-cut achievement
lines, 31 render it even less likely that, once set into a
low track, a pupil will be encouraged to leave it by the
words or examples of close friends. This latter point is
intensified in those cases where separate vocational schools
for those on the lower tracks exist, but is strong also when
pupils attend the same comprehensive high school but are as-
signed to different kinds of courses. 32
31Parsons, "The School Class," p. 447.
32patricia Cayo Sexton, Education and Income : Inegual -ity. of Opportunity in Our Public Schools (New York: vikina
Press, Inc., 1961), p. 153.
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and
Such a system is acceptable and conducive to eguality
of opportunity oniy if we assume ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
indicators of a child's intel ligence, that such scores
intelligence levels are unlikely to change Qver^ ^
that the resulting intellectual segregation does indeed
serve some useful purpose which outweighs the undemocratic
nature of the process. If not
, then M ^ ^ ^ ^
complished via tracking is to separate at an early age those
destined for the leadership positions in society from those
destined for the less prestigious and powerful roles. As
was shown in Chapter II, this intellectual segregation has
a very strong tendency to follow existing class lines, it
may well be that such a tendency is no coincidence or acci-
dent but instead is part of the underlying purpose behind the
selecting and sorting function of education in general.
Parsons' description of the achievement basis for
tracking and its subseguent "fair" results are filled with
misinterpretations. Upper class homes tend to produce pre-
school environments more conducive to high achievement in
school. Therefore, even if the selecting and tracking is
accurate regarding who are and who are not capable of
achieving educational credentials, this is still some dis-
tance removed from equality of opportunity . 33 Parsons is
too willing to accept the objectivity of I.Q. tests and the
33An examination of the tracking process can be foundin Florence Howe and Paul Lauter, "How the School System isRigged for Failure," The New York Review of Books, June 18
1970, pp. 14-21.
accuracy « teacher- s evasions, thereby ignoring the
class bias inherent in both selecting mechani sms
. m terms
of the teacher-s bias, it is Xi*ely that several non-academic
factors can enter into how a teacher views ana evaluates stu-
dents, ana that such factors tend to favor those pupils from
middle and upper class homes.
Finally, Parsons is misleading when he claims that both
winners and losers "accept" the results of the race and sub-
sequent tracking on the grounds that it has been conducted in
a context of equality of opportunity. Such an acceptance is
both exaggerated in factual terms and irrelevant in moral
terms. it is difficult to ascertain what percentage of
pupils, and parents of pupils, who are relegated to non-
college tracks accept this as just and fair. This difficulty
is heightened by the question of determining how non-accept-
ance would be manifested. if pupils do not wish to accept
their delegated tracks, do they, or their parents, protest
to the appropriate teachers or administrators, go to a dif-
ferent school, take to the streets, or withdraw in anger and
despair? Or do they simply go along out of the conviction
that they have no real choice in the matter? Any of these
possibilities can be viewed as evidence of a lack of accept-
ance of the process and/or results of the tracking system.
Yet many of these responses, particularly the latter two,
are difficult to measure. For example, if a student with-
draws from school, is that to be taken as evidence that he
does not accept as just and legitimate the tracking process,
or does the withdrawal serve Qnly ^^^ ^
inherent in the tracing deci sio„ that the student is not
UP to college level worK and perhaps is not up to high
school standards as well ? Obviously the answer could he
either.
Even if Parsons is correct regarding the widespread
acceptance of the results by both winners and losers, there
are still significant problems with tracking and the general
acceptance that it may engender. if tracking does not give
rise to a large number of disputes, it is mainly due to the
selling job that the school administrators and other leader-
ship groups have done on the public. Like equality of oppor-
tunity itself, tracking is seen as fair, efficient and neces-
sary, if, in factj it is none Qf thesej ^ instead operates
mainly to ensure the preservation of the existing class order,
then the acceptance it supposedly receives is built upon a
distorted foundation and says little about the value of the
process
.
Hence, class based processes, particularly tracking
and I.Q. testing, are combined to produce situations whereby
the awarding of educational credentials is itself class
based. The children of the well-to-do are likely to get
qualitatively and quantitatively better credentials than
are children from families not as well off. Since the pos-
session of such credentials has become a very convenient
criterion for employers to utilize at several different
levels in determininq cut off points reqarding who is and
"no is not eligible for variQus positions>
nature of the educational process is uninterrupted car-
rred over into the post high school hiring process. The
convenience of such a criterion for the employer is in-
creased by the fact that the more powerful and infmential
the employer, the more likely it is that his own children
W11 P°SSeSS adSqUate
°r -Pe-or credentials. Despite the
manner in which these processes inevitably favor the child-
ren of those who already possess the most wealth, power and
status, the entire process has been placed under the banner
of equality of opportunity. What occurs is a procedure by
which the system as a whole is stabilized via this banner
while at the same time the positions of individuals and
their families in the hierarchy is rendered more stable by
the educational process being structured so as to reward
best the children of the elite. Children from lower class
homes, on the other hand, are given less attention since the
meritocratic stress is always on the more "gifted" children.
Tracking provides a rationale for such relative neglect
which is more palatable than, for example, the fact that
control of most school boards is in the hands of upper in-
come groups. 34
Another aspect of the sorting function of the schools
can be seen in the rise of the junior colleges in the United
3
^Sexton, Education and Income , pp. 228-230. See
also Zbigniew Brzezinski, "America in the Technotronic
Age," Inquiry
. X (January, 1968), 16-26.
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States. What is most interesting regarding this develop-
ment is that it is both a response to one problem and a
Potential source of another. The problem to which commun-
ity and junior colleges attempt to respond is that of the
increased demand for college training by the young at a
time when the traditional rewards of status and wealth are
becoming less attainable. For example, between 1940-1960,
enrollment in American colleges almost doubled, 35 but the'
number of upper level positions in the division of labor
did not. The rewards to be gained from a college degree
have, in recent years, become more difficult to obtain. The
problem is exaccerbated by the pressures on the young to
earn some kind of college degree if they expect to earn any
sort of decent living. The situation that exists is one in
which a college degree has become increasingly important
while the rewards in terms of status and income which used
to derive from the achieving of a college degree have de-
clined markedly. The two year college is a response to this
problem.
If more and more jobs, middle level as well as upper
level, demand some type of college credentials, and if
equality of opportunity involves all having "equal access
to a range of specified resources...," then it is clear that
more and more students must be allowed into the colleges and
given the chance to achieve these credentials. The two year
35cited in Richard Parker, The Myth of the Middle Class
(New York: Liveright, 1972), p. 26.
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college responds to this situation by continuing the track-
ing process on the college level. It creates an intellect-
ually hierarchical structure among those who possess col-
lege credentials. In principle this is not unprecedented.
It traditionally has been the case that those who receive
their degrees from the most prestigious institutions, espe-
cially the expensive Ivy League schools, have gone on to
fill the more prestigious, financially rewarding and power-
ful positions in American society. Such students have
generally been from families already considered a part of
the social, financial and/or political elite. The less
prestigious institutions take most of their students from
the middle and working class and send them out into middle
or upper middle level positions.
The two year college fits into this pattern by accom-
modating, at least symbolically, many of those from working
class families who still believe in the possibility of up-
ward social mobility via education. In the past, equality
of educational opportunity was centered upon the opportunity
that all had, if they exercised the requisite abilities in
high school, to enter college. Today it is less a matter
of some few doing well enough to get into college as it is
a question of being able to finish college, the quality of
the college attended, and the willingness and ability to
stay in school beyond the B.A. or B.S. degrees so as to
achieve some graduate or professional credentials. To at-
tempt to retain the older levels, both quantitatively and
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qualitatively, that determined whether a student ^^
ted to college, is no longer a viable^ ^
of new colleges, particularly two year colleges, can be
seen as a means to ensure stability for the existing class
structure
.
The rise of the two year school can also be viewed as
a way by which American education avoids the problems of,
for example, the British system in which a clear and final
determination of each child's potential is made at a rela-
tively early age, and this determination remains with the
child for the rest of his or her life. m the United States,
a college education increasingly has been viewed as both an
economic necessity and a social right. 36 The two year col-
lege serves as a kind of compromise between those who believe
that all should be allowed at least a try at college, and
those who stress the need to maintain academic and occupa-
tional standards.
The expansion of college enrollments, particularly in
the two year schools, is of far less consequence regarding
upward mobility than has generally been implied. The gradu-
ate of the two year college is in the process of occupational-
ly replacing, or at least supplementing, the high school
graduate. The parallel is reinforced by the fact that the
student who formerly ended his schooling with high school
36 see Ralph H. Turner, "Modes of Social Ascent Through
Education: Sponsored and Contest Mobility," in Education
.
Economy and Society
, for an examination of the American and
British systems of mobility.
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tends to co. out of the same class background as today sjunior coUege graduate. In addition
, as formeriy
_ ^
ease with the non-college individuals, women and racial
-norities are disproportionately represented in the student
body of the two year school
.
The results of this situation are varied. Most clear-
ly, the rise of these schools has done little to effect the
overall distribution of wealth and power in the United States
While it would he a mistake to claim that an individual who
gains a degree from such institutions has no better a chance
of securing a decent, well
-paying job than a high school
graduate or high school dropout, it would also be an error
to assert that such a college degree is a ticket to elite or
near-elite status, it is a credential designed to fit in-
dividuals into the middle, and often lower middle level posi-
tions offering relatively little in the way of independence,
creativity, power and status, and no more than a middle class
pay scale. In times of economic contraction, such jobs are
not undesirable in comparison with the types of positions
which are becoming increasingly likely for those with no
college background. However, they are not the sort of posi-
tions traditionally associated with the possession of a
college degree. The upward social mobility which may accrue
from such a degree is usually very minor and is more a re-
sult of the generally poor background of the students in the
two year schools rather than any rags to riches scenario
played out within these schools.
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The growth of two year colleges as a response to the
increased demand for college credentials both from empioy-
ers and future employees, does serve to strengthen the
-age of ^erican as the Zand of opportunity. Thi s is not
-rely a symbolic point. If such an image becomeg^
tarnished, as it already has to large segments of the
American population on various occasions, then a serious
erosion of loyalty and support for the system is possible.
Regardless of the reality, the image of eguality of oppor-
tunity is very helpful to the stability of a society which
has so many citizens living at or near the poverty level
while others are so much more comfortable. Ironically, the
two year college strengthens such an image by its very class
based nature. What it has done is to provide for those
groups and individuals who traditionally have been shut off
from the four year institutions, the opportunity to attend
a college and receive a college degree. The poor are now
offered the opportunity to get a low cost education which
does not even require a particularly strong academic back-
ground as a prerequisite for admission, in this way those
who in the past were excluded from even entering the race,
are now granted an opportunity, even if not an equal oppor-
tunity, not only to run in the race but perhaps also to hope
to finish it well. The image of eguality of opportunity is
thereby strengthened and a potential source of instability
is rendered less threatening.
This solution is necessarily limited, particularly over
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graduates, especially those coming frQm ciass^
Poor families, enter into and graduate from two year col-
leges, the level of jobs made available to the* may decline
proportionately. It can te expected ^ ^ ^^ ^
ber of college graduates increase, not only win there not
be a similar increase in the number of high pay and status
occupations to accommodate them, but also that the number
of middle level white collar positions is unlikely to in-
crease significantly. Hence it is possible to anticipate
that eventually those graduating from the lowest level of
the college hierarchy (the junior colleges) will have posi-
tions made available to them at an occupational level in
which their parents, who probably had no college training,
already are located. Under such circumstances, social mo-
bility would not be enhanced and the idea that such schools
provide equality of opportunity for the poor would be weak-
ened. The favorable image of American society which the
two year schools appear to provide may, at best, be only a
temporary phenomenon.
Another effect of these institutions is that they,
unlike most four year schools, provide specific vocational
training. In this sense, the two year school does fulfill
a specific societal function by training a skilled strata of
workers whose abilities, aspirations and prospects are all
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set at approxi.ately the same level. 37 Clark describes how
such colleges channel most of their students away from any
expectation of attaining upper level positions via trans-
ferring to four year institutions. Far more students enter
junior colleges with the hope of transferring to four year
schools than are ever able to do so. A major function of
the two year school is to inculcate an awareness and an
acceptance of this fact to the majority of its students.
When the student has accepted this, it becomes that much
easier to get that student to accept as permanent his or her
own non-elite status. As with I.Q. tests and tracking, the
ostensible emphasis is upon the student's intellectual re-
sources rather than racial, sexual, or socieoeconomic back-
ground. As Clark points out, were this "cooling-out" func-
tion widely know, fewer students would desire to attend two
year schools and there would be greater pressure upon the
four year schools. The two year college would accurately be
perceived as, at best, irrelevant to eguality of opportunity
and perhaps detrimental to it. Instead, the "cooling-out"
leads to less psychological stress upon the individuals in-
volved and therefore to less overall stress upon the social
system deriving from unfulfilled hopes and expectations. 38
37See Spring, The Sorting Machine
, pp. 233-235, regard-
ing the proposals of Nixon's Commissioner of Education,
Sidney Marland.
38 Burton Clark, "The Cooling-Out Function in Higher
Education," in Education
, Economy and Society
, pp. 515-521.
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Social Relations in the School
An aspect of the educational system deserving of son,e
exaction has to do with the Kinds of character traits
that different schools tend to develop in their students.
This ls of great importance in ^ ^ ^^.^
from the elementary school to the most prestigious of four
year schools. However, different schools serve different
classes and render their students fit for different posi-
trons within the hierarchical division of labor. The term
"fit" should not be taken to raean only in terms of inte!-
lectual or skill capacities. Fit also involves the idea of
individuals being rendered emotionally and psychological^
capable of filling some kinds Qf positions and ^
filling others. This relates to Melvin Kohn's findings, 39
but here the emphasis is on the educational system rather
than specific occupational position. We have only to look
at the kinds of social relations which are encouraged or dis-
couraged at various levels of the educational system, to see
that different schools socialize in different ways.
For example, referring again to the average two year
college, there are significant and substantial differences
in the social relations there when compared with those
existing in the more elite four year colleges and institutions
The relative independence in selecting courses, the more
39see Chapter III of this paper.
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lenient sets of rules and standardg regarding
activities, and the more open atmosphere which characterize
the latter institutions are either absent or present to a
lesser degree in the two year colleges. within these latter
schools there is far more rigidity in degree prerequisites
and therefore less leeway in selecting curricula, more
pervasive advisement from guidance counselors - particularly
those counselors skillful enough to give the student the
false belief that he is making his own choices - a more
hierarchical arrangement between student and teacher, and
generally stricter rules regarding codes of conduct. 40
The general relationship of the social relations in
the educational structure to the social relations within the
production structure can also be seen in the ethic of com-
petition. This ethic transcends class lines insofar as it
is stressed in the high school, regardless of the particular
track, and in virtually all colleges and universities. The
results of this situation for the child and the ultimate
effect of the process upon the societal framework has been
examined by William E. Brownson in "The Structure of Compe-
tition in the School and its Consequences . "41
In his discussion, Brownson sees five preconditions
40sowles and Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America
,
p. 212; and Clark, "The Cooling-Out Function," pp. 518-520.
41winiam E. Brownson, "The Structure of Competition
in the School and Its Consequences," in Philosophy of Educa-
tion 1974 ; Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual Meeting of
the Philosophy of Education Society ( Edwardsville, IL:
Philosophy of Education Society, 1973).
236
necessary to
. competitive setting( all Qf^ ^^
Present in the American public school
. The^ Qf^
conditions is the ^a.urabiUty of success." Brownson
sees this as typi f i ed by the tendency fcQ keep ^
school for as long as possible. Schooling is domi„ated by
predetermined and measurable criteria of success and
failure. 42 Therefore, to Keep students in school for a
maximum length of time extends the ability to measure in
quantifiable terms and classify the student at the same
time that the value of perseverance is encouraged.
"Scarcity of rewards" is another precondition mention-
ed by Brownson. The scarcity is an obvious requirement since
if there were enough of the desired object(s) to go around,
there would be little need to compete for them in the first
place. A more important point brought out by Brownson is
that, because the ideal reward to be gained via education
is knowledge, and the quest for the attainment of knowledge
is not a zero-sum endeavor reguiring that some have little
in order for others to have a great deal, therefore the
school creates an artificial scarcity of artificial or dis-
torted rewards. 43 since it clearly is not the case that
knowledge per se comprises a finite sum which somehow must
be distributed among a certain number of knowledge seekers,
it follows that if the competitive framework is to be
42Ibid . p. 230.
43Ibid . . p. 231.
^eloped and maintained> ^^^ ^^^
rew,rds must be substituted
. ^ fche emphasis ^
and tests. The quest for knowledge ^^ ^
with grades mediating between sfcudent ws ^
Knowledge, and supposedly acting as an indicator of how
successful the student has been at a given point in his
quest
.
There is no inherent reason why even the reward of a
grade must necessarily be a "scarce reward," yet this is
precisely what occurs in the educational process. The
"value" of high grades is increased because all do not get
such grades. m most classes, both high school and college,
there are only so many "A-s" and "B-s" to go around. The
teacher who gives out an "excess" of such grades is regarded
as too lenient. His judgments are often not as highly re-
garded by students and by other teachers whose overall grad-
ing exhibits a better "balance." Thus, in an educational
replication of market supply and demand, knowledge itself,
as expressed in grades, becomes a commodity whose value is
determined by the number of other students getting better,
similar or lesser grades.
Closely related to the scarcity of rewards is what
Brownson refers to as the "comparability of judgments."
Just as the value of high grades becomes dependent upon
their relative scarcity, so too the judgments made of the
students themselves. The student's "value" is based upon the
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s en-
allegedly objective nature of the testing and process.44 »
-
not just for the grades themselves that the student i
couraged to compete anymore than it is for knowledge itself
that the child is encouraged and/or forced to attend school
in the first place. Knowledge and grades quickly are per-
ceived as means, by students, future employers, colleges and
professional schools, for selecting out those students view-
ed as being most likely to satisfy a particular position-
s
requirements, it is this underlying function of the school
to sort and select that keeps the competition between stud-
ents so keen. Grades alone are not able to maintain this
ethic. The fact that tests, grades and curricula are re-
garded as being both objective in themselves, and a crucial
factor in determining the student's future, helps establish
a highly competitive atmosphere in the classroom. This re-
flects a characteristically functionalist view that the
promise of material reward is the most effective way to
induce individuals to continue their education.
The fourth precondition that Brownson sees as neces-
sary for a competitive framework is the "externality of
rules." This refers to the fact that generally the child
is not given any responsibility or rights regarding the en-
actment and enforcement of the rules governing the education
process. 4 5 The competition is structured by an external
44ibid .
45 Ibid . . p. 232.
source able to define its forms and purposes
.
The final precondition Brownson discusses,
"same-
ness of actors •• ^
-tors, ls more specificaUy relafced tQ . ssue
of equality of opportunity. Here the nna , .go l of ensuring fair
competition connects to n,=the difficulty of ensuring that all
*o enter school are the "same,. „ the conditions for fair
competition are to he met, the disadvantaged child must he
brought up to the contemporary average level of other
children. Brownson points to an offshoot of this condition
«hich is that, since it is so difficult to create a situa-
tion whereby all are at approximately the same level when
they enter school, a justification is created by teachers
and administrators for differential treatment toward child-
ren on the grounds that they are "dif ferent . "46 Here
"different" should be taken to mean academically or intel-
lectually unequal and thus deserving of unequal treatment.
Generally this leads to those students who are regarded as
being superior receiving the most favorable treatment.
The highly competitive framework in the educational
process obviously has significant effects upon the child and
the society. For the child, success, in terms of schooling
and eventual economic and status rewards, becomes dependent
upon acceptance of the competitive ethic. However, the stu-
dent must not only be willing to compete, he must also be
able to win. It is not a matter of "how you play the game."
46 Ibid . . p. 233.
It happens that
"playing the game" reauir,.
it- qhnM(,
q es competing, butt s ould not be forgotten twhat the game's purpose and
meaning is not in the activity itself „„ .-Lty so much as it is theS°U9ht a"er Virt°- — -ivity
, Particularly learn .» activity, but also competitive activUy ^ generai> ^
not valued for its own sake. The childm n ls encouraged and
P-ssured to compete, hut winning is the fundamental goal
and the stakes in the education competition are so high
that implicitly the chUd ig encQuraged tQ ^ ^^^^ ^
can get away with in order to win. Cheating becomes rational
and acceptable hehavior as long as the student can escaPe de-tection^ If he does not cheat> then ,.stretch . ng „ ruies
and attesting to project the image that the teacher favors
become effective ways to be successful in school.
Another related development, closely connected to the
stabilizing purpose behind both the competitive ethic and
the kind of equality of opportunity desired in the American
context, is the discouragement of personal responsibility.
The activities of school are controlled by rules which
determine the "where," "when," and "how" of the child's
activities. The teacher and/or administrator sets and en-
forces the rules and gives the activities their meaning.
Brownson uses the examples of neatness and reading. m and
of themselves, these are not competitive activities, but in
the setting of the school they become so. The student -s
47Ibid., p. 236.
success in school becomes a function of Ms ^
ability to excel in such activities so as to be
.-better" atthem than his fellow students. 48 m such a w . vay is he judged
and in such a way does he judge himself uu mmself. Because the stan-
dards are i mposed from above, a situation is created in the
school, as it is later in the worKplace, whereby legitimiza -
tion and stability, if not contentment, is maintained via
the competition with peers and conformity to structure im-
posed by superiors.
Legitimization
Legitimization has been defined by Bowles and Gintis
as the:
indivxdullfwh^^6^112^ consci°usness among
soH.i ^13 Sh Prevents the formation ofcial bonds and critical understanding wheresocial conditions might be transformed
It is clear how such institutions as tracking and the
competitive ethic fit into this description of legitimiza-
tion. It is also clear that the kinds of character traits
most likely to be rewarded, particularly at the elementary
and secondary school levels, are also those most appropriate
for the work habits called for in most occupations. The
disciplined, hard-working, neat, punctual, unguestioning
worker is the sort in which most factories and offices are
48ibid., p. 235.
49Bowles and Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America
.D • J. J. • ———_____
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interested for the maj ority of their low and middie level
positions. This is an example of the
"correspondence
Principle" in which the social relations of production of
the school parallel those in the workplace. 50 In like
fashion, those being prepared for the leadership positions
in society tend to have different social relations of pro-
duction in school.
The legitimization is carried beyond the immediate
school and occupational levels to an acceptance of the
overall authority structure and stratification which per-
meates the entire society. The educational system not only
prepares individuals to accept their future roles as neces-
sary, inevitable, and just, but also to accept the authority
of those who give the orders that they obey. American edu-
cation thereby both legitimizes and reproduces inequality . 51
However, such legitimization is not easy and contra-
dictions tend to emerge. An example of this, as well as of
the recurring American view of education as a panacea for
all social problems, can be seen in the educational aspects
of Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty. it is clear that Johnson
86-87.
5°Ibid., p. 126; and Spring, The Sorting Machine
, pp.
51 See John McDermott, "Technology: The Opiate of theIntellectuals," The New York Review of Books, July 31, 1969,
p. 34, for a view which sees less likelihood of such a pro-'
cess adequately fulfilling this purpose. McDermott claims
that as a political, economic and educational system re-
quires greater centralization, individuals, with their in-
creased education, become more willing and able to manage
their own affairs.
ana severe of his advisQrs
_^ ^^that the root cause of poverfcy ^ ^ ^
«th the economic system
, but with the inferior education
and laok of educational opportunity tfith which the pQQr^
^ced. 52 Such poverfcy ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
fed by what became Known as the "culture of poverty...53 The
ability and will to breaK up this culture of poverty via
education would, it was thought, lead to the elimination of
poverty itself. Thus
, in an indirecfc way> Qf ^
cational opportunity, achieved through programs such as Head
Start, was to bring about individuals who, in their cognitive
abilities, skills, and attitudes would be able to bring them-
selves up from poverty.
The problem in such an approach is that educational
reform, in isolation from economic reforms, can at best lead
to increased mobility, since for each individual's or
group's upward movement there must also be an equal amount
of downward for some other individual or group, only the
identity of the poverty group changes. Poverty itself is
not eliminated. Spring describes such an approach to the
problem as a desire
52spring, The Sorting Machine
, p. 194.
53por a detailed analysis and critique of this posi-tion, see S. M. Miller and Ronnie Steinberg Ratner, "TheAmerican Resignation: The New Assault on Equality." SocialPolicy, TIT (May/June, 1972), 5-15.
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SoissfSStSrtgs'^rr the sociai -dtheir poverty?54 33 esP°"sible for
The purpose of this integration is less ^
Poverty than to ensure ^ ^ ^
a fundamental and inevitable conflict of interest exists
between the rich and the poor. Just as the poor have need
Of structural changes in the economic and social systems to
bring about their own interests, so too do the wealthy have
need of a means of maintaining the existing order, an order'
which involves Keeping the poor where they are. The War on
Poverty approach, with its equality of educational opportun-
ity emphasis, sees the problem as being one of getting the
poor up to the middle class levels in culture, income,
education and power, none of which, it is felt, require any
major change or threat to stability, m the view of the War
on Poverty policy makers, "education was considered the hope
of the poor and the method of the middle class. "55
Conclusion
In general, equality of educational opportunity in the
American context can be judged to have purposes other than
education, social mobility and democracy. Its ultimate pur-
poses can be seen in its "sorting out" ability and in its
stabilizing function whereby the authority of those indivi-
54spring, The Sorting Machine
, p. 228.
55ibid . pp. 228-229.
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duals at or near the top of the economic and political
hierarchies is legitimized . 56 The Various ^
are deemed to be the basis for equality of educational op-
portunity, such as tracking> test . ng> d . fferent^ ^
high schools and colleges and the competitive ethic are
but a series of measures designed to convince both observer
and participant that a meritocratic process is taking place
whereby all are given an egual chance and, educationally
and occupational^, the best come out on top.
The stability of the system which is dependent upon
the authority, not just the power, of the relatively few who
control the work of many, is partially dependent upon this
ability to convince people of the justice of such an arrange-
ment, it is for this reason that the stakes are so high in
the effort to legitimize authority via the notion of equal-
ity of educational opportunity. m a society where educa-
tional credentials have become so highly valued and are per-
ceived to be one of the only fair ways to gain economic
power, to undercut the legitimacy of the process by which
such credentials are obtained is to undercut the legitimacy
of the existing hierarchy itself. Ultimately, what education
in the American context accomplishes is to provide the cru-
cial arena in which equality of opportunity takes place.
Those sought after values that allegedly flow from education
such as wealth, status and authority are seen as justly
56Bowles and Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America,
p. 104.
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districted because the educational system itself is just
and fair.
Hence, it is not that the economic inequalities, in-
efficiencies and instabilities are a result of an inegali-
tarxan educational system and can, therefore, be cured
through greater eguality of opportunity within that educa-
tional system. Rather, it is the case that the structure
and problems of the educational system are themselves a
product of an inegalitarian economic system. it is for this
reason that much of the "free school" and "despooling" pro-
posals are doomed either to fail on their own, be co-opted
by the economic system or produce "occupational misfits. "57
There is little possibility of achieving an egalitarian
educational process within the context of an inegalitarian
economic system. if equality of opportunity cannot be at-
tained without far greater eguality of result, and if sub-
stantial inequality of result is inherent in the economic
system, then equality of educational opportunity is also
unattainable under existing conditions.
This is not to imply that there is no movement between
upper and lower classes. Some such movement obviously does
occur. However this mobility is rare, and certainly does
not justify the claim that equality of opportunity exists.
To make such a claim, or even assert that it can exist under
present economic conditions, serves only to legitimize
57ibid
. , pp. 252-264.
further the economic, political *ru*, and social system. This is
not a conation of equality of educational opportunity
Per se as much as , crifcique Qf ^ ^ ^_
festations within the context nf° o a liberal democratic
capitalist system such as exists ^ United ^
ve c* to the flnal question fc0 te expioredj wQuid a
ferent context allow equality of opportunity to serve the
personal develops of all members of society rather than
only the interests of those in power?
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND ALTERNATIVES
A series of problems connected with equality of op-
portunity have been dealt with in this thesis. The rela-
tionship between the concepts of equality, equality of op-
portunity, egalitarianism and equality of treatment was
examined in order to show the distinctions between them.
This was necessary owing to the prevailing feeling in the
United States that we are a people who take equality serious-
ly, despite the very inegalitarian nature of the existing
order.
Having shown that Americans generally understand, or
prefer, eguality to mean equality of opportunity, criticisms
of equality of opportunity, from both radical and conserva-
tive perspectives, were then discussed. Equality of oppor-
tunity, particularly in a liberal capitalist context is not
a universally held ideal. in Chapter III it was demonstrated
that it is neither fully attainable, nor likely to be approx-
imated, in the United States, while in Chapter IV it was con-
cluded that the genetic factors which recently have been used
to justify the lack of complete equality of opportunity and
to defend the idea that America has gone as far as possible
to approximate it, are inconsequential factors.
The underlying function of the image of equality of
analyZed in edUCati°^ case study. with educa _Uonal Policy providing perhaps mogt ^^^^^
rePr°dUCe V" iOUS
— in African society and to
:ustify the relative lack of intergenerationai mobiuty> ^
- dear that the claim Qf ^
lty provides one of the key ideological underpinning for
the political, economic and social system.
Hence, both as a desirable and as an attainable goal,
equality of opportunity in the United states is beset by
serious limitations and obstacles. While some of these
obstacles may be impossible to overcome fully, others are
more context dependent and therefore can be significantly
ameliorated, if not eliminated, through substantial altera-
tions in the American political, economic and social frame-
work. What passes for equality of opportunity in the con-
temporary united States is primarily a means to secure accept-
ance of, and stability for, the prevailing order. It has
brought neither full democracy nor a fair and efficient
meritocracy. Further, the measures which have been proposed,
put into law, and occasionally implemented with the ostensible
purpose of bringing about full equality of opportunity in
education, the labor market and political affairs have, at
best, managed only to provide incremental progress toward
this widely sought-after goal.
Clearly the ostensible thrust of many reformist pro-
grams which have arisen in the United States has been the
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effort to secure equality of opportunity for various groupsm African society. whether through the attempt to secure
voting rights for minorities, egual pay for egual work,
-re fair and open hiring practices, or the current debate
over affirmative action and guotas, the basic push has been
for eguality of opportunity. if the usual result of such
movements is to stabilize the system rather than to bring
about fundamental and necessary change, and to bring in a
reaction which includes a reawakened interest in I.Q. scores
and their supposed inherited, immutable, racial and class
based components, then the essential debate over these move-
ments is not between those who desire to change the system
and those who desire stability. Instead, regardless of the
intentions of the participants, the fundamental debate is
over how best to retain the overall political, economic and
social status quo. For those who wish for substantive change
in a more egalitarian direction, the question of alternatives
to contemporary American-style equality of opportunity must
be confronted, and this confrontation involves the considera-
tion of how to select persons for the various positions in
society.
There are four, not necessarily distinct, methods of
dealing with this problem. One approach involves the equal-
ity of opportunity that supposedly exists in the United
States. Another method is to return to an hereditary-style
ascriptive society in which position and rank is attained
via some characteristic over which the individual has no
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control. In these two possibilities can be seen, respec-
tively, the liberal capitalist and conservative aristocrat
approaches. It is vithin thege ^ ^.^^ . ^ ^
fenders of equality of opportunity generally frame their
Positions and thereby seal the debate in their favor.
There are, however, two other means of allocating at
least some positions which many egalitarians regard as being
far more just and equitable. Such proposals involve posi-
tions being allocated by chance via, for example, a lottery,
and/or a rotation of positions among various individuals
with no one individual holding the same position at all times.
No one suggests that all jobs be distributed in this manner.
For example, we obviously would prefer a surgeon to have a
high level of training and not be chosen completely at ran-
dom. However, there are serious arguments which can be made
for seeing to it that many of the less desirable occupations
are rotated or even that the highly trained surgeon be re-
quired and/or permitted to do various other jobs as well.*
Nevertheless, it does seem clear that overall, as both a fair
and efficient method of filling many of the key positions in
society, some form of equality of opportunity is a pre-
requisite
.
If equality of opportunity does, or at least can, fill
an important purpose in the creation and maintenance of a
J-See some of the literature on Cuba and China such as:
Robert M. Bernardo, The Theory of Moral Incentives in Cuba
(Tuscaloosa, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1971);
and John W. Gurley, "The New Man in the New China," The
Center Magazine
. Ill (May, 1970), 24-33.
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just society, then the real problem with the American system
1- not that it does or does not fulfil! the dominant inter-
pretation of what equality of opportunity entails. instead,
the basic difficulty lies with the context in which the de-
bate is framed. As has been maintained on several occasions
in this essay, equality of opportunity requires as a pre-
condition a far more egalitarian framework than currently
exists in the United States. Granted that equality of op-
portunity in any context does presuppose a competitive
ethic, and that competition itself is not always beneficial
to the participants in particular or to the society in
general, still it is not competition per se that is at the
heart of either the conservative or radical critiques of
equality of opportunity. Rather it is a particular kind of
competition in which the stakes are both distorted and too
high, and in which the contest itself is heavily biased in
one group's favor. it is not true that equality of opportun-
ity and egalitarianism are inherently opposed to one another;
rather it is the case that the former requires the latter.
Equality and Freedom
In taking such a position it is important to consider
the arguments of those who assert that equality of oppor-
tunity with stratification is necessary for the attainment
of a fair, free and efficient society and that an egalitarian
society, particularly when it is equated with the abolition
of the hierarchical division of labor, will necessarily run
se
"ng
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afoul of such values as freedom and efficiency. This, in
essence, is the argument that liberals maKe against the
calling for a more egalitarian system, be it via a lessen!
of income differentials, a rotation of positions or any
restrictions placed upon individual freedom in the economic
sphere
.
Liberal advocates of equality of opportunity, and
those who either deny the possibility or oppose the crea-
tion of an egalitarian society, often charge that the
latter would require an extremely powerful government. This
government would have as one of its primary purposes the
restriction of individual freedom so as to ensure the devel-
opment and maintenance of equality. Left to themselves, it
is argued, persons would soon arrange society in a more
stratified direction. Hence the choice presented is between
an egalitarian system, which is equated with conformity and
despotism, 2 and a system which has inequalities of result
which are acceptable because they are inequalities deriving
from the exercise of individual freedom and the free market.
Robert Nozick personifies this liberal perspective with its
inevitable choice in favor of freedom and the "entitlement"
to that for which one has rights regardless of the resulting
inequalities. 3 Otherwise, so the liberal argument goes, to
2Isaiah Berlin, "Equality as an Ideal," in Justice and
Social Policy ; A Collection of Essays , ed. by Frederick
Olafson (Englewood Cliffs, NJ : Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961),
pp. 139-141.
3Nozick, Anarchy , the State and Utopia
, pp. 232-233.
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ensure some for, of equality of result and/or condition, or
a distribution according to need, individuals could not be
allowed unrestricted freedom to amass as much as they could.
Because men are not angels and are motivated by ambition, the
desire to surpass others, and an ever-increasing appetite for
material goods, power and prestige, the only possible check
that could restrain these desires and maintain an egalitarian
system would be an extremely powerful government. But this
is dangerous for two reasons. First, the restrictions it
would place upon individual ambition and initiative would
themselves be unjust and antithetical to the liberal view of
freedom. Second, the potential for such a powerful institu-
tion to go beyond ensuring an egalitarian society and to be-
come instead a self-serving and unchallengable elite is too
great. Thus, the liberal advocate of equality of opportunity
states that while it might be good if all could be given the
same amount of material comfort, though on this point there
is substantial disagreement among liberals, nevertheless the
combination of differential abilities and human nature render
likely such a state of affairs unless it were enforced by
ssive governmental power and subsequent unacceptable re-
trictions on individual freedom. Nor does the liberal
ccept a possible interaction between restrictions and free-
that could result in a "forcing to be free," since
forcing implies coercion and coercion is regarded as anti-
thetical to freedom. The idea of utilizing external coer-
cion (the state, other individuals, etc. ) to overcome
un
ma
s
a
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internal coercion (compulsions, fears etc ) i .' <axb ' - ) s generally
ignored in this perspective.
One of the deficiencies of the liberal approach lies1th its very conception of freedom. To the liberal, free-
dom can be summed up as the absence of restrictions, espe-
cially physical restrictions. The fewer the restrictions,
the greater the freedom. Society, for the sake of stability
and out of some sense of obligation to ensure the survival
of its citizens, must impose various restrictions upon its
People, but the overall inclination, particularly in the
economic sphere, is to minimize the scope and impact of
governmental authority. The liberal capitalist notion of
equality of opportunity is consistent with this perspective,
particularly if efforts to implement and enforce it are
restricted to the formal legal sphere.
Liberalism treats the notions of "restriction" and
"coercion" in a very shallow manner. By its emphasis on
physical coercion, liberalism tends to ignore the more
subtle, but equally effective, kinds of coercion which may
derive from education, socialization, psychotherapy and
other non-physical manipulators of actions and beliefs. 4
Even assuming that the intention behind such processes may
be the development of intelligent autonomous beings, never-
theless the potential for their being utilized to ensure un-
thinking conformity without the need for physical coercion
4See Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse
, pp.148-150; and Benjamin R. Barber, Superman and Common Man(New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1971), pp. 64-68.
irs
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is great. Further, if and when such procesges dQ
in terms of their more ideal objectives, what has then oc-
curred could wen be described as a "forcing to be free."
Liberalism, with its emphasis on restrictions in terms of
acts rather than in the formation of thoughts cannot ade-
quately deal with such phenomena. This inability render
this whole conception of freedom inferior to a concepts
which views a free act as involving, not the absence of
restraint since the two often interact, but instead the self-
conscious intentions of the actor.
5
In addition, the liberal perspective fails to take in-
to account the interdependence of freedom and eguality. it
is not the antithetical relationship posited by contemporary
critics of egalitarianism. it is clear that poverty can, and
generally does, act as a severe constraint upon an indivi-
dual's freedom.
Poverty and ignorance, for instance, do limit
profoundly the ability of those afflicted to
formulate social options knowledgeably and to
act upon those formulations .
6
Nor is it a viable argument to claim that a society
valuing M freedom ,, must not take steps to promote egalitarian-
ism via restrictions upon the actions of the wealthy. It is
not a society-wide freedom which is thereby promoted. In-
stead, as Tawney points out, in a stratified society the
guestion becomes not one of freedom versus unfreedom so much
^Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse
, pp. 157-
158.
6 Ibid
. , pp. 168-169.
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as a question of .. freedorn for whom? „ To^ ^
their freedom implies a lack of freedom for the poor. The
absence of state intervention on behalf of the poor in terms
of policy ensures only that private power shall make the
decisions, not that each individual will freely make his
own decisions.
7 It is true that a stronger government with
greater power to intervene in the economic sector to ensure
greater equality is a potential danger to freedom. But
such a danger may be outweighed by the reality of the exist-
ing restrictions on freedom which derive from allowing pri-
vate power to go largely unrestricted. When private power,
generally a function of private wealth, is distributed un-
equally, so too will individual freedom be unequally dis-
tributed. Either equality and freedom must complement each
other, or freedom will be largely a possession of the wealth-
ier classes. 8
The essence of the problem with egalitarianism versus
equality of opportunity is not that egalitarianism inevit-
ably leads to less or no freedom for the citizens of a
society. Rather, the point is that "versus" is the wrong
description of the relationship. The presence of wide-
spread inequality and stratification is itself contradictory
both to freedom and to equality of opportunity. With such
inequality, freedom becomes far more restricted in its
7R. H. Tawney, Equality (London: Unwin Books, Inc.,
1964), pp. 228-229.
8 See Nozick, Anarchy
, the State and Utopia , for a con-
servative position on the morality of restrictions upon the
use of wealth.
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application. The choices made by persons are more lively
to be a result of manipulation or pressure by those at the
upper levels of the hierarchy, while the scope and effect
of such choices becomes largely a function of position in
the class hierarchy. While this obviously is not the ideal
of freedom which has been at the heart of democratic theory,
it is an accurate assessment of the reality of freedom in
modern stratified society.
Equality and Efficiency
Some advocates of equality of opportunity within a
stratified context acknowledge that freedom is lessened by
stratification, particularly stratification deriving from
the hierarchical division of labor, but insist that the lat-
ter is made necessary by the dictates of efficient produc-
tion. Modern technology and mass production require such a
division of labor. From the functionalist perspective, it
is necessary that some positions receive greater prestige
and income than others. To attempt to arrange society in a
more egalitarian way is dysfunctional. If inequalities are
not inevitable, then they are at least necessary unless we
are willing to make substantial sacrifices in terms of
material comforts. Arthur M. Okun asserts that material in-
centives for workers, and the inevitable inequalities that
result, are required to promote efficiency. It is this
value of efficiency, and not freedom, that is at the heart
of private ownership and inequality in the United States.
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Socialism, to Okun, with its planning and emphasis on
equality, win be less efficient even if individual rights
and freedoms can be preserved. 9 However, equality of op-
portunity combined with stratification, results in greater
freedom, greater efficiency and greater equality between
groups, if not individuals . 10
In replying to critiques of such equality of oppor-
tunity, Okun asserts that if the "races" in society are not
maintained, individuals will not have the incentives to work
as hard and therefore efficiency will be reduced. Nor can
alternative incentive systems be utilized since the market
ethic is so "deeply ingrained" in the United States. To
promote a different form of incentives, for example, working
for the good of the community, would require a massive in-
doctrination program sharply at odds with traditional Ameri-
can values. 11
While expressing the belief that inequalities are
necessary for efficient production in contemporary society,
many advocates of equality of opportunity, Okun included, do
believe that poverty can and should be eliminated. Okun calls
for a "compromose" between equality and efficiency and ap-
pears to accept a prima facie case for equality when he
states that greater inequality is justifiable only when it
9Arthur M. Okun, Equality and Efficiency : The Big
Tradeoff (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1975),
p. 61 .
lOibid., pp. 83-85.
n Ibid .
, p. 86.
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helps lead to greater efficiency. 12 The market, with its
built in efficiency producing mechanisms, should not be
allowed to go so far as to "legislate life and death," by
which Okun means that, for example, those who serve no
productive pgrpo.se should not be left to die. Nevertheless,
it is clear that Okun is placing the most emphasis upon the
value of efficiency with equality taking a very secondary
role
.
What commentators like Okun fail to take into account
is that poverty and unemployment serve a number of important
functions in a capitalist system, and therefore cannot be
eliminated within such a structure. An argument can be made
that the presence of an Impoverished group in society is an
integral part of the efficiency for which liberal equality
of opportunity is so highly praised. Herbert Gans, for ex-
ample, identifies fifteen functions - economic, political,
social and cultural - that poverty fulfills. Perhaps the
most important of these functions is the "reserve army of
unemployed" comprised of the poor and marginally employed.
Other functions include seeing to it that the least desirable
jobs get done and that poor guality goods which otherwise
might not get purchased, are consumed by this group. The
problem in Okun's prescriptions for eliminating poverty is
that from the perspective of a capitalist functionalist
analysis of society, a "compromise" between eguality and
efficiency cannot go very far. The elimination of poverty
1 2ibid . , p. 88.
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would seriously alter the existing social, political and
especially economic relationships in society to the detri-
ment of the more affluent classes since it is the affluent
who derive the greatest benefit from the existence of
poverty. 1
3
Obviously there is a moral issue involved here with
regard to whether the material comforts of the affluent can
justify the subsistence existence of the poor. The argument
has been made that the greater efficiency, and hence greater
production, which is engendered by the inequalities provides
greater comfort for all concerned. This "trickle down-
theory thereby concludes that while some may enjoy the bene-
fits of such efficiency more than others, on the whole, every-
one derives some benefit. Thus, there is so much emphasis
by advocates of this theory on comparing American G.N. P., or
per capita income, with the more egalitarian socialist
countries. However, there is increasing evidence that even
on its own terms of efficiency, an inegalitarian society is
not all that efficient. Like Sennett and Cobb, Alan Fox dis-
cusses how an inegalitarian capitalist society promotes "low
trust" relationships between its citizens. This low trust
in turn, promotes indifference to the quality of how well a
person does his job so long as the person can get away with
it; it promotes both social and psychological instability;
13see Herbert Gans, More Equality (New York: Vintage
Books, Inc., 1973), pp. 106-114, for a description of some
of the functions that poverty serves in the American system,
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and it reduces the patriotism that the poor feel toward
their country. 14 A11 of these characteristics are inef_
ficient and dysfunctional, both to the particular productive
enterprise and to the system itself. Of course, the clas-
sical liberal view of human nature, as typified by Hobbes,
would tend to see low trust relationships as being the only
kinds of relationships possible between self-interested per-
sons. Given the abstract manner of viewing individuals that
is so much a part of liberalism, the particular social con-
text can do little to alter the character of individuals or
their relationships.
Nevertheless, there are indications that the hierarchi-
cal division of labor and the inequalities inherent within
it, are not as efficient as its defenders have maintained;
that it, in itself, negates the possibility of equality of
opportunity; and that therefore, reforms within this basic
structure can bring about neither equality of opportunity nor
the optimum level of efficiency, nor a more egalitarian form
of society. We must look to alternatives to accomplish any
or all of the above goals.
Moral Incentives
One such alternative which has gained increasing at-
tention, both positive and negative, is the idea of utilizing
moral incentives instead of, or in addition to, material
l^Alan Fox, "Is Equality a Necessity?" Dissent , XXII
(Winter, 1975), pp. 53-55.
?se
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incentives. Essentially, such attention has been focused
upon Cuba and China. tt is clear that both of the,
societies place far greater emphasis upon equality of
suit and/or distribution according to need, while also
making more serious efforts toward the realization of
equality of opportunity.
The key element in the system of moral incentives
lies in its advocates' view of human nature. if we con-
ceive of man as working solely for the purpose of gaining
material rewards for himself and perhaps, his family, then
the capitalist system is the most fitting system of pro-
duction, if man views labor as inherently undesirable, if
he regards his life away from work as the only time that he
can engage in interesting and pleasurable activity, and if
this is the way man is and always will be, then only a sys-
tem which provides individual material incentives for work-
ing and material penalties for not working can ensure that
the socially necessary jobs in a society will be accomplished.
It also justifies the hierarchical division of labor because
those who put the most time into training for a position must
be provided with greater material rewards or they will have
no incentive to undergo such training in the first place.
Training, like work itself, is viewed as inherently undesir-
able. In fact, given this perspective, almost any sort of
productive activity, with the possible exception of human
procreation, is seen as, at best, a necessary evil. Given
this view of man, it is clear that only the very limited form
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of equality of opportunity which exists in the United states
" reallY POSSible
-
T° «-«• ^e stability of this system,
such a view of human nature must be made as widespread as
possible
.
For men to be motivated by non-material incentives,
especially in a framework which has as one of its major
goals the elimination of large differences in wealth and
power, obviously a different view of human nature must be
envisioned. This is why leadership groups in Cuba and
China place so much emphasis on creating "socialist man-
or "communist morality." The theory is that if communist
society is to be created, then the development of socialist
man must take place at the same time as the development of a
socialist economy, rather than first creating the latter and
then expecting the former to evolve from it. 15 it is for
this reason that Cuba and China unlike for example, Yugoslaiv;
have placed so much emphasis on the downplaying, if not eli-
mination, of material incentives in the productive process,
even at the risk of reducing overall productive efficiency.
What is entailed by the notion of moral incentives is
that people should work for other than personal material
gain. Income differentials are to be sharply reduced while
distribution of goods is either rationed according to need
or provided freely. in addition, the hierarchical division
!5see Che Guevara, "Man and Socialism in Cuba," in
Venceremos ; The Speeches and Writings of Che Guevara , ed.
by John Gerassi (New York: The Macmillan Company, Inc.,
1968), p. 391.
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of labor is to be significantly reduced. m Cuba this has
taken the form of office workers cutting cane at various
times during the year and other attempts to reduce the dif-
ferences between urban and rural workers and manual and in-
tellectual work in the hope of creating an integrated com-
munity via common work experience and equality. 16
If wage differentials and the role of the hierarchical
division of labor are to be sharply reduced, then the ques-
tion of how else to motivate persons in their work must be
examined. The substituting of moral for material incentives
involves the channelling of competitive drives into a social
ly and individually useful direction without the resulting
inequalities of material incentives. This already assumes
that such competitive drives are inherent in human nature.
If they are not, and persons can get along quite well with-
out competition, then moral incentives are less necessary.
But, to an even greater extent, so too would capitalism and
inequality be less justifiable. Assuming that persons do
have competitive urges, the response of a system of moral
incentives, as it is supposed to operate in Cuba, is to
foster "socialist emulation," and in China, to encourage a
concern with the "collective material welfare." 17 Though
16Nita R. Manitzas, "Social Class and the Definition
of the Cuban Nation," in Cuba ; The Logic of the Revolution
,
ed. by David P. Barkin and Nita R. Manitzas (Andover, MA:
Warner Modular Publications, 1973), M261, pp. 10-11
.
17Carl Riskm, "Incentive Systems and Work Motivations
Working Papers for a New Society , I (Winter, 1974), pp. 84-
85.
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there are differences between the Cuban and Chinese
terns, the essentials of both are that a form of competiti
is encouraged, which involves a great deal of cooperation
well. m Cuba, for example, the competition is for social
status, not for cash prizes, with an emphasis on group
solidarity. Further, the criteria for achieving such dis-
tinctions is not so much the guantity of goods produced,
such as is the case with piece work pay scales, as it is
the effort that one gives to the work. The symbolic awards
that are granted cannot be used to purchase goods or ser-
vices. Hence, competitive urges are taken into account, but
they are not allowed to interfere with the ultimate goal of
an egalitarian society. 18 it is a difficult combination of
getting each individual to do his best while he also helps
his group of neighbors to succeed.
China's system of collective material welfare, which
is but one of three different incentive systems utilized in
the Chinese economy, bears many similarities to Cuba's
socialist emulation. As in Cuba, the emphasis is on com-
petition between groups and cooperation within the group.
The rewards in China can be of a material nature, but they
are collective, not individual, rewards. It is the group's
performance that may merit reward, and this tends to ensure
an interdependence and willingness to help one another with-
in the group. Further, the distribution of such material re
wards within the group is based more on need than upon
18see Bernardo, Moral Incentives.
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individual performance. Another similarity to Cuba's sys-
tem is that a major criterion for such awards, both on the
group and individual levels, is the worker's attitude, in-
cluding ideological commitment, selflessness and enthusiasm,
rather than abilities or productive performance. As Riskin
points out, such criteria, though on a very different level
from capitalist criteria, are still based upon a notion of
desert rather than need, even if the distribution within
the group is not. 19
Because the desert criterion still exists in these
incentive systems, it is clear that further progress must
be made toward transcending even these more cooperative and
sharing incentive systems before an ideal communist system
is attained. The "socialist morality" of which Guevara
spoke and which Mao was apparently attempting to achieve,
has not yet been attained. However there are indications
that both Cuba and China are making some progress toward
this goal. For example, in Cuba the initial goal sought is
to make work a social duty rather than a means to personal
advancement. The eventual goal, in Marxist terms, is the
replacement of work as a duty or necessity by work as a
creative activity. 20 while there is importance in what is
produced and how it is produced, of equal importance is the
19Riskin, "Incentive Systems," p. 84.
2°Bertram Silverman, "Economic Organization and Social
Conscience: Some Dilemmas of Cuban Socialism," in The
Chilean Road to Socialism , ed. by J . Ann Zammit (University
of Sussex: Institute of Development Studies, 1973), p. 405.
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issue of why an individual produces at all.
In China, Riskin finds that some industrial workers
do approach this communist ideal. m many of the large
industrial enterprises there is combined a highly egalitar-
ian structure with little distinction between workers and
managers, and a great deal of rank and file participation
in the decision making of the firm with shared responsibil-
ity and power. The ultimate goal being that work becomes
inherently satisfying, not merely a means to some external
reward, material or non-material, individual or collective . 2
1
When this latter goal is achieved, the need and desire for
the hierarchical division of labor is terminated as is the
alienation of labor which Marx saw as inherent in capitalist
production. Further, equality of opportunity is more likely
to be a reality than under the confines of a profit-oriented
inegalitarian system.
The means, ends and relative degree of success of the
Cuban and Chinese approaches have all come under criticism.
These attacks center upon two elements which critics tend
to see as virtually inevitable with moral incentives. The
first of these is that such a system is regarded as leading
to too much state control. Cuba, in particular, is seen as
becoming too repressive, in part as a result of the attempt
by the Cuban government to impose such a system upon the
society. Critics like Rene Dumont focus attention upon the
2
1 Riskin, "Incentive Systems," p. 87.
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"militarization of the economy" as shown in the ever greater
role by the Cuban army in production, and the ensuing bar-
racks-like atmosphere of Cuban society. 22 Because of this
tendency, the participation of the rank and file and free-
dom itself is seen as having been sacrificed in the inter-
ests of greater control from a few individuals in Havana.
Whether this is inherent in the system of moral incentives
however, is an open question. The problem of the amount of
allowable coercion is a problem for any society - it is
intensified when such coercion is done in the name of an
egalitarian ideology like Marxism.
The other criticism levelled against moral incentives
is that they are inefficient because they fail to take into
account the need for profits on an individual level. Even
a number of Marxist economists argue that profits per se are
not the real problem with capitalism. Evsei Liberman claims
that utilizing profits as an incentive is fine, the key is
how the profits are spent - for individual gain or for the
good of the community. 23 For even if a system of moral in-
centives has been or can be achieved in Cuba, China or any-
where else, the problem of maintaining such community orient-
ed incentives remains. As Guevara asserts, it is vital to
"perpetuate heroic attitudes in everyday life." 24 While
22 Rene Dumont, J_s Cuba Socialist ? (London: Deutsch,
1974), p. 96.
23cited in Bernardo, Moral Incentives
, p. 134.
24Guevara, "Man and Socialism," p. 388.
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times of crisis, such as natural disasters or the presence
of a threat from a foreign power, can encourage the very
high national morale which is so much a part of the incen-
tive systems of Cuba and China, the question remains as to
whether these attitudes can be maintained should such
threats diminish. if they can be maintained, which many
deny, then this particular problem is eliminated. However,
if these attitudes cannot be retained in the absence of
such threats, then either a more profit oriented approach
may need to be imposed, or dangerous enemies and threats
may have to be created where there are none. The latter
is certainly not an unusual occurrence in history as evi-
denced by the numerous instances in which national leaders
have found it convenient to create crises for domestic polit-
ical purposes. Nevertheless such a manipulative procedure
is inconsistent with the ideal of a Marxist society. Given
this perceived choice between a limited Liberman style pro-
fit system or a more hierarchical and manipulative govern-
ment, many observers like Dumont, who are relatively sym-
pathetic both to Cuba and to socialism, have opted for the
use of more material incentives as a means of attaining
efficiency and freedom on the one hand, and a socialist
society on the other. Their conclusion is that to depend
solely upon "voluntary mobilizations" of the labor force and
to expect "heroic attitudes" to be maintained is to ask too
much of a people.
There are three responses which can be made to such
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criticisms. On the one hand, there is evidence to indicate
that, in fact, the Cuban and Chinese systems have not been
inefficient, particularly given the international setting
in which they have been operating. For example, by dis-
tributing goods more evenly and increasing output, China
has had less malnutrition than any other underdeveloped
country over the last twenty years. 25 Cuba has made extra _
ordinary advances in education which, in itself, implies an
increase in potential productive power. These examples
relate to the second response that can be made to the critics
of moral incentives; namely that these societies are utiliz-
ing a different conception of efficiency. it is not the
notion of efficiency which is reflected in G.N. P. or in-
creased per capita income. Rather, efficiency is measured
m terms of balanced growth between, for example, rural and
urban areas to the extent that technology can be slowed so
as, in John Gurley's words, "to not leave anyone behind. "26
If this results in a temporary slowing of economic growth,
the cost is seen as being outweighed by the benefits. The
lower rate of malnutrition in China, and the increased lit-
eracy rate in Cuba, both reflect this preference for an
egalitarian society over a society with a skyrocketing G.N. P.
in the midst of poverty and a highly unbalanced distribution
of wealth. To those who measure economic efficiency solely
25Gurley, "The New Man in the New China," p. 31
.
2 & ibid.
, p. 27.
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in terms of economic growth, China and Cuba appear to be
inefficient societies, and doubts regarding non-material
incentives are thereby given further substance. However,
it is clear that it is not merely a matter of efficiency
versus inefficiency. Further, equality of opportunity is
not eliminated but is increased in both the Cuban and Chi
approaches. The context, however, is so significantly dif-
ferent from that of the United States that many have diffi-
culty in recognizing it as such once the material incentives
and resulting inequalities are removed.
The third response that can be made to the critics is
that "heroism" and "sacrifice" are not the proper terms to
use if such a system is operating properly. Persons will
work efficiently because they want to help their community
and, ideally, because much of the work itself is pleasurable
and interesting. Work does not always need to be seen as
unpleasant, and working for the good of the community need
not always be regarded as a "sacrifice." To view it as such
implies an acceptance of the functionalist vision of human
nature - and such an acceptance biases our perceptions of
how well alternative systems might work. Moral incentive
systems are not designed to produce martyrs and saints.
Limits to Growth
The arguments regarding losses in freedom and effi-
ciency which liberal advocates of equality of opportunity in
a capitalist context make against egalitarians ultimately may
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become irrelevant regardless of the success or failure of an
alternative like moral incentives. This is due to what has
become known as the "lifcits to growth" problem. Eguality
of opportunity requires a constantly expanding economy. When
the economy stagnates or contracts, those most in need of op-
portunity are the first to suffer unemployment, just as those
educational programs designed to provide greater opportun-
ities for the poor are usually the first to be scrapped in
the interests of budget tightening. Thus, even fraudulent
efforts to bring about equality of opportunity decline and
with them go the varied stabilizing features of the myth of
equality of opportunity such as increased, or the hope of in-
creased, status and comfort for those at or near the bottom
of the socioeconomic ladder. An expanding economy generally
implies, in absolute not relative terms, material improve-
ment for all segments of society. While the poor will al-
ways constitute a significant segment of the population in
capitalist society, with economic expansion it is more likely
that the standard of living for almost all classes will im-
prove somewhat. Hence, continued economic expansion serves
crucial material and symbolic functions in the society and
is tightly tied into the goal of equality of opportunity.
A problem that has been gaining increased attention is
that such expansion is becoming less likely and acceptable
for reasons independent of the traditional capitalist boom
and bust patterns. The costs of such expansion in terms of
decreasing resources, increasing pollution and other
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threatening possibilities are making it more and more likely
that strict controls over what is produced, how it is pro-
duced, and how much is produced may be required. Nor do
such controls apply only to material technological pro-
ducts. The production of human beings may also have to be
regulated . 27
If the ecological crises which many are predicting
for the not very distant future do come to pass, new de-
finitions of freedom and efficiency will have to be found.
What today is called efficient production in terms of pro-
ducing larger and larger quantities of technological material
will become inefficient as its energy wasting and polluting
qualities become increasingly antithetical to human survival.
Likewise, what in a market economy is called "freedom" to
produce or consume whatever we can, will soon become reck-
less and irresponsible behavior which must be controlled for
the sake of all in society. Economic expansion, therefore,
will have to be restrained. If this comes to pass, then a
society which has already instituted a system of moral in-
centives will have an easier time in adjusting to such re-
strictions, particularly if such a society has downgraded
consumerism and has geared its technology more toward the
production of socially beneficial products rather than toward
27see Robert L. Heilbroner, An Enquiry into the Human
Prospect (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1975);
and Donella H. Meadows, et al
.
, The Limits to Growth (New
York: New American Library, Inc., 1974).
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luxury items. ta egaii tarian society> wifch mQre ^
contributing to the community and the intrinsic benefits of
labor, may not need an ever-expanding economy. Equality of
opportunity could also exist under such circumstances,
though the rewards and goals might have to be modified
somewhat
.
Persons living under a market economy win be more
likely to respond only to direct coercion since the "every
man for himself individualistic ethic so pervasive in such
a system will render persons less willing to go along with
the tight controls that an ecological crisis would neces-
sitate. Further, the continued existence of very wealthy
and very poor groups suddenly frozen into their respective
positions with little hope of change, would increase ten-
sions within the society, and render even less viable the
arguments that equality of opportunity does exist. The
contemporary liberal arguments that egalitarianism involves
less freedom and efficiency may thereby be turned against
them, even by their own criteria of freedom and efficiency,
should the ecological crises arrive and be perceived as
such. 28
Conclusion
Obviously such topics as the theory of moral incentives
and limits to growth, particularly as they relate to equality
28it should be noted that Heilbroner also is not par-
ticularly optimistic regarding future possibilities for
socialist societies.
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of opportunity, require far more examination than has been
given in this chapter. What can be surmised is that moral
incentives do provide a potential substitute for the kind
of equality of opportunity existing in the United States;
and that the future problems which the limits to growth
posit render this capitalist style equality of opportunity
less and less acceptable within any context. The popular
conception that society has a choice of allocating posi-
tions by an achievement process or by an ascriptive process,
and that the former is exemplified by the very limited kind
of equality of opportunity existing in the United States, is
not an adequate portrayal of the alternatives. Other choices
do exist, and they may not necessarily require permanent, or
even temporary, dictatorship, nor any substantive loss in
efficiency.
There are unresolved issues regarding these alterna-
tives, and the existing attempts to put such systems into
effect on a national scale are not without their problems.
However, given the fact that equality of opportunity is un-
attainable within a stratified society; that under stratified
conditions, the belief that it exists can and does do serious
harm, both materially and psychologically, to many of those
caught up in it; and that the future may render capitalist
equality of opportunity totally inimicable to human survi-
val, it does seem that more attention should be paid to re-
solving the problems of alternative contexts, rather than
continuing to try to justify the image of equality of
2 77
opportunity as it currently exists.
The examination of alternatives does not mean that
equality of opportunity per se is to be eliminated. On the
contrary, the goal can and should be retained while the
context is altered. What we have in the United States is
only the image of equality of opportunity, along with the
various problems flowing from that image. We do not have
the reality because we do not have an egalitarian society.
It is ironic that so liberal an ideal is today most nearly
approximated in some of the more socialist countries of the
world
.
It is clear that what is required is a more egalitarian
and democratic version of equality of opportunity. John
Schaar characterizes this version as: "No member of the
community should be denied the basic conditions for the
fullest possible participation in the common life." 29 it
is toward the two goals of eguality and participation in
the political, economic and social spheres that any worth-
while notion of eguality of opportunity must aim.
29john Schaar, "Equality of Opportunity," pp. 151-152.
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